{"id":6717,"date":"2016-01-18T15:54:04","date_gmt":"2016-01-18T15:54:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/01\/18\/reference-some-distinctions\/"},"modified":"2016-01-18T15:54:04","modified_gmt":"2016-01-18T15:54:04","slug":"reference-some-distinctions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/01\/18\/reference-some-distinctions\/","title":{"rendered":"Reference: Some Distinctions"},"content":{"rendered":"

Do you want to comment on the following post?  Here is how to do it properly.   You must address head-on what I say.  For example, in (A) below I make a distinction between referring and non-referring terms.  Tell me whether you agree or not. If you don't, tell me why.  Or you can ask me a question.<\/span><\/p>\n

……………….<\/span><\/p>\n

Preliminary point on sound philosophical method.  Make all the distinctions one can think to make, assuming that they have some fundamentum in re<\/em> and are not merely verbal, like the 'distinction' between a firefly and a glow bug.  Later we can decide which distinctions are ultimately sustainable.<\/span><\/p>\n

To think clearly about reference we must make at least the following distinctions.  A philosopher's motto: Distinguo ergo sum<\/em>. <\/span><\/p>\n

A. Referring terms versus non-referring terms<\/em>.  'London' is presumably a referring term as is 'Scollay Square.'  'And,' 'or' and other logical words are presumably not referring terms.  Surely not every bit of language plays a referential role.  Some terms are syncategorematical or synsemantic. <\/span><\/p>\n

B. Purported reference versus successful reference<\/em>.  Asserting 'Scollay Square is in Boston,' I purport to refer to Scollay Square.  But I fail:  the square no longer exists. But if I say 'Trafalgar Square is in London,' I succeed in referring to Trafalgar Square.<\/span><\/p>\n

C. Guaranteed successful reference versus contingent successful reference<\/em>.  It is not obvious that the first-personal singular pronoun is a referring term.  Elizabeth  Anscombe, following Wittgenstein, denies that it is.  But I say that 'I' is a referring term.  Suppose it is.  Then it is guaranteed against reference failure:  a correct use of 'I' cannot fail to have a referent and it cannot fail to have the right<\/em> referent.  The cooperation of the world is not needed for success in this instance.  If I try to make a reference using 'I' I will succeed every time.  But the cooperation of the world is needed  for successful reference via proper names such as 'Scollay Square.'  If I try to make a reference using a proper name I can fail if the name has no (existing) bearer, or if I get hold of the wrong (existing) bearer. <\/span><\/p>\n

D. Reference versus referents<\/em>.  The referent of a term is not to be confused with its reference.  'Scollay Square' is a referring term and it has a reference, but it has no referent.  Not all reference is successful reference. <\/span><\/p>\n

E. Mental reference versus linguistic reference<\/em>. Necessarily, to think is to think of or about.  Thinking is object-directed.  Thinking is essentially and intrinsically referential.  It can occur wordlessly.  It is arguably at the basis of all reference, including reference via language.  Just as guns don't kill people, but people kill people using guns; words don't refer to things, but people refer to things using words.  The referentiality of language is derivative from the intrinsic, non-derivative, referentiality of mind.
<\/span><\/p>\n

F. Extralinguistic versus purely intralinguistic reference<\/em>. Consider the following sentence from a piece of pure fiction:  'Tom's wife left him.'  The antecedent of  the pronoun 'him' is Tom.'  This back reference is purely intralinguistic.  It is plajusible to maintain  that the only reference exhibited by 'him' is back reference, and that 'him' does not pick up the extralinguistic reference of 'Tom,' there being no such reference to pick up.  Then we would have case of purely intralinguistic reference.<\/span><\/p>\n

G. Extralinguistic per se reference versus extralinguistic per alium reference<\/em>.  'Max' names (is the name of) one of my two black cats; 'Manny' names (is the name of) the other.  These are cases of extralinguistic per se<\/em> reference. But 'he' in the following sentence, while it refers extralinguistically, refers per alium<\/em>, 'through another':<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Max is sick because he ate too much.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The extralinguistic reference of the pronoun piggy-backs on the the extralinguistic reference of its antecedent. The pronoun has no extralinguistic referential contribution of its own to make.<\/span><\/p>\n

H. Grammatical pronouns can function pronominally, indexically, and quantificationally. <\/em> Consider first a sentence featuring a pronoun that has an antecedent:
<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Peter always calls before he visits.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

In this sentence, 'Peter' is the antecedent of the third-person singular pronoun 'he.'  It is worth noting that an antecedent needn't come before the term for which it is the antecedent:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

After he got home, Peter poured himself a drink.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

In this sentence 'Peter' is the antecedent of 'he' despite occurring after 'he' in the order of reading.  The antecedency is referential rather than temporal.  In both of these cases, the reference of 'he' is supplied by the antecedent.  The burden of reference is borne by the antecedent.  So there is a clear sense in which the reference of 'he' in both cases is not direct, but mediated by the antecedent.  The antecedent is referentially prior to to the pronoun for which it is the antecedent.  But suppose I point to Peter and say<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

He smokes cigarettes.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is an indexical use of 'he.'  Part of what makes it an indexical use is that its reference depends on the context of utterance: I utter a token of 'he' while pointing at Peter, or nodding in his direction.  Another part of what makes it an indexical is that it refers directly, not just in the sense that the reference is not routed through a description or sense associated with the use of the pronoun, but also in that there is no need for an antecedent to secure the reference.  Now suppose I say<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

I smoke cigars.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This use of 'I' is clearly indexical, although it is a purely<\/em> indexical (D. Kaplan) inasmuch as there is no need for a demonstration:  I don't need to point to myself when I say 'I smoke cigars.'  And like the immediately preceding example, there is no need for an antecedent to nail down the reference of 'I.'  Not every pronoun needs an antecedent to do a referential job.
<\/span><\/p>\n

In fact, it seems that no indexical expression, used indexically, has or could have an antecedent.  Hector-Neri Castaneda puts it like this:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Whether in oratio recta<\/em> or in oratio obliqua<\/em>, (genuine) indicators have no antecedents. ("Indicators and Quasi-Indicators" reprinted in The Phenomeno-Logic of the I<\/em>, p. 67)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

 For a quantificational use of a grammatical pronoun, consider<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

He who hesitates is lost.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

(One can imagine Yogi Berra asking, 'You mean Peter?')  Clearly, 'he' does not function here pronominally — there is no antecedent — not does it function indexically.  It functions like the bound variable in<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

For any person x, if x hesitates, then x is lost.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I.  Reference via names, via definite descriptions, via indefinite descriptions<\/em>.   'Socrates,' 'the wisest Greek philosopher,' 'a famous Greek philosopher of antiquity.'  Do they all refer?  Or only the first two?  Or only the first?<\/span><\/p>\n

J. Successful reference to the nonexistent versus failed reference to the existent<\/em>.  Does 'Pegasus' fail to refer to something that exists or succeed in referring to what does not exist?  Meinongian semantics cannot be dismissed out of hand!<\/span><\/p>\n

K. Speaker's reference versus semantic reference<\/em>.  'The man in the corner drinking champagne is the new dean.'  Suppose there is exactly one man in the corner drinking water out of a champagne glass.  Has the speaker of the mentioned sentence succeeded in referring to the man in the corner?  Presumably yes despite the man's not satisfying the definite description in subject position.  Here speaker's reference and semantic reference come apart.  This connects up with distinction (E) above.<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>London Ed on Reference to What is Not<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Direct and Indirect Reference<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Peter Kreeft on the Gender-Neutral Use of 'He'<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Report from London<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Do you want to comment on the following post?  Here is how to do it properly.   You must address head-on what I say.  For example, in (A) below I make a distinction between referring and non-referring terms.  Tell me whether you agree or not. If you don't, tell me why.  Or you can ask me … Continue reading “Reference: Some Distinctions”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[408],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6717","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-language-philosophy-of"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6717","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6717"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6717\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6717"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6717"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6717"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}