{"id":6650,"date":"2016-02-21T13:43:14","date_gmt":"2016-02-21T13:43:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/02\/21\/the-univocity-of-exists-obsessing-further\/"},"modified":"2016-02-21T13:43:14","modified_gmt":"2016-02-21T13:43:14","slug":"the-univocity-of-exists-obsessing-further","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/02\/21\/the-univocity-of-exists-obsessing-further\/","title":{"rendered":"The Univocity of ‘Exist(s)’: Obsessing Further"},"content":{"rendered":"

The general existential, 'Philosophers exist,' is reasonably construed as an instantiation claim:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

G. The concept philosopher<\/em> has one or more instances.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

But a parallel construal seems to fail in the case of the singular existential, 'Socrates exists.'  For both of the following are objectionable:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

S1.  The concept Socrates<\/em> has one or more instances.<\/span><\/p>\n

S2.  The concept Socrateity<\/em> has one of more instances.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

(S1) is objectionable because Socrates is not a concept (Begriff<\/em>), but an object (Gegenstand<\/em>), while (S2) is objectionable because there is no haecceity concept Socrateity (identity-with-Socrates), as I have already argued ad nauseam<\/em>. (But see below for another go-round.)<\/span><\/p>\n

On the other hand, 'exist(s)' across general and singular existentials would seem to be univocal in sense inasmuch as arguments like the following appear valid:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Philosophers exist<\/span>
Socrates is a philosopher<\/span>
————<\/span>
Socrates exists.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Whatever the exact logical form of this argument, there does not seem to be an equivocation on 'exist(s)' or at least not one that would induce a quaternio terminorum<\/em>.  (A valid syllogism must have exactly three terms; if there is an equivocation on one of them, then we have the quaternio terminorum<\/em>, or four-term fallacy.)<\/span><\/p>\n

Here then is the problem.  Is it possible to uphold a broadly Fregean understanding of 'exist(s)' while also maintaining the univocity of 'exist(s)' across general and singular existentials?  A broadly Fregean understanding is one that links existence with number.  The locus classicus<\/em> is Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic<\/em>, 65: <\/span><\/p>\n

\n

In this respect existence is analogous to [hat Aehnlichkeit mit<\/em>] number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought.  Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

To affirm the existence of philosophers, then, is to affirm that the number of philosophers is one or more, and to deny the existence of philosophers is to affirm that the number of philosophers is zero.  But then what are we saying of Socrates when we say that he exists?  That the number of Socrateses is one or more?  That can't be right:  'Socrates' is a proper name (Eigenname<\/em>) not a concept-word (Begriffswort<\/em>) like 'philosopher.'  It makes no sense to say that the number of Socrateses is one or more.  And when I say, with truth, that Socrates might never have existed, I am surely not saying that the number of Socrateses might always have been zero.  <\/span><\/p>\n

London Ed doesn't see much of a problem here.  From his latest entry<\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

But why, from the fact that \u2018Socrates\u2019 is not a concept word, does it follow that there is no corresponding concept? [. . .] Why can\u2019t \u2018Socrates\u2019 be semantically compound? So that it embeds a concept like person identical with Socrates<\/em>, which with the definite article appended gives us \u2018Socrates\u2019? <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

From my point of view, Ed does not see the problem.  The problem is that if 'Socrates' expresses a concept, that concept can only be an haecceity concept, and there aren't any. It doesn't matter whether we call this concept 'Socrateity,' or 'person identical with Socrates.'<\/span><\/p>\n

Ask yourself: Is the haecceity H of Socrates contingent or necessary?  Socrates is contingent.  And so one might naturally think that his haecceity must also be contingent.  For it is the ontological factor that makes him be this<\/em> very individual and no other.  Haecceitas<\/em> = thisness.  No Socrates, no haecceity of Socrates.  But then you can't say that the existence of Socrates is the being-instantiated of his haecceity, and the non-existence of Socrates is the non-instantiation of his haecceity.  For that presupposes that his haecceity exists whether or not he exists.  Which is absurd.<\/span><\/p>\n

So haecceities must be necessary beings.  But now we have jumped from the frying pan into the fire.  Socrateity involves Socrates himself, that very individual, warts and all, mit Haut und Haar<\/em>.  It is not a conjunction of multiply instantiable properties.  This is why identity — absolute numerical identity –is brought into the definition of H as, for example, 'person identical with Socrates.'  Hence an haecceity of a contingent being cannot be a necessary being.<\/span><\/p>\n

The absurdity here is the attempt to make a necessarily existent abstract property out of a contingent concrete individual.  This is why I say that haecceity concepts\/properties are metaphysical monstrosities.<\/span><\/p>\n

It should also be pointed out that on a Fregean scheme, no concept is an object and no name is a predicate.  You cannot turn a name such as 'Socrates' into a predicate, which is what Ed is trying to do.<\/span><\/p>\n

So the problem remains unsolved.  On the one hand, 'exist(s)' appears univocal across general and singular existentials.  And yet how can we make sense of this if we are not allowed to bring in haecceity properties?<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>A Question About God and Existence<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Is God Beyond All Being?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>God and Socrates: Two Different Ways of Existing?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Arguing with Kripke over Existence<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Language and Reality<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Direct and Indirect Reference<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The general existential, 'Philosophers exist,' is reasonably construed as an instantiation claim: G. The concept philosopher has one or more instances. But a parallel construal seems to fail in the case of the singular existential, 'Socrates exists.'  For both of the following are objectionable: S1.  The concept Socrates has one or more instances. S2.  The … Continue reading “The Univocity of ‘Exist(s)’: Obsessing Further”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,408],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6650","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-language-philosophy-of"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6650","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6650"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6650\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6650"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6650"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6650"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}