{"id":6559,"date":"2016-03-28T13:16:14","date_gmt":"2016-03-28T13:16:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/03\/28\/is-moral-relativism-dead\/"},"modified":"2016-03-28T13:16:14","modified_gmt":"2016-03-28T13:16:14","slug":"is-moral-relativism-dead","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/03\/28\/is-moral-relativism-dead\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Moral Relativism Dying?"},"content":{"rendered":"

In a recent Atlantic<\/em> article we read:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

. . . the prevailing thought of the second decade of the 21st century is not like the mid-to late-20th century. Law, virtue, and a shame culture have risen to prominence in recent years, signaling that moral relativism may be going the way of the buggy whip.<\/span><\/p>\n

[. . .]<\/span><\/p>\n

In The New York Times last week, David Brooks argued that while American college campuses were \u201cawash in moral relativism\u201d as late as the 1980s, a \u201cshame culture\u201d has now taken its place. The subjective morality of yesterday has been replaced by an ethical code that, if violated, results in unmerciful moral crusades on social media.<\/span><\/p>\n

A culture of shame cannot be a culture of total relativism. One must have some moral criteria for which to decide if someone is worth shaming.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I find the article confused, but in an instructive way.  What is dying is not moral relativism but moral fallibilism.  And what is on the rise is not moral absolutism but  moral dogmatism.  People are becoming more dogmatic in their moral commitments.  But this is consistent with being a moral relativist.  Or so I shall argue.  There are two distinction-pairs in play and they 'cut perpendicular' to each other. Absolute-relative is one pair; dogmatic-fallible the other. This makes for four combinations.  <\/span><\/p>\n

A. Dogmatic moral absolutism.<\/em>  Moral values and disvalues and the truths that record them are absolute: not relative to individuals, cultures, historical epochs, social classes, racial or ethnic groups, or any other index.  So if slavery is morally wrong, it is wrong period, which implies that it is wrong always and everywhere and for everyone.  What makes one dogmatic in one's moral absolutism, however, is the further claim to know these values and truths with certainty, and\/or the readiness to act upon them uncompromisingly, by say shouting down opponents.<\/span><\/p>\n

B.  Fallibilistic moral absolutism.<\/em>  Moral values  are absolute, but the fallibilist admits that moral judgments<\/em> are fallible or subject to error. Consider the claim that a pre-natal human being is greater in value than a healthy adult dolphin.  An absolutist will hold that this claim, if true, is absolutely true.  But if the absolutist is a fallibilist he will admit that he could be wrong about whether it is true.  The fallibilist can be expected to tolerate those who disagree while the dogmatist can be expected to be intolerant.<\/span><\/p>\n

C. Dogmatic moral relativism.<\/em>  Presumably everyone reading this will agree that slavery is a great moral evil.  It is a fact, however, that it was not held to be a great evil at all times and in all places.  This fact inclines some  to maintain that moral values are relative, to historical epochs, say.  Suppose Tom is an historical relativist about moral values, but Tim is not any sort of moral relativist.  They can both be uncompromisingly committed to opposing slavery even unto shaming and shunning those who think otherwise.  This shows, I think, that a moral relativist can be just as dogmatic (non-fallibilist) as a moral absolutist.<\/span><\/p>\n

I conclude from this that a rise in moral dogmatism should not be confused with a decline in moral relativism.  Moral relativism may be on the decline; but this cannot be shown by citing a rise in moral dogmatism.<\/span><\/p>\n

D. Fallibilistic moral relativism.<\/em>   This is a consistent position.  One might hold that that moral values are culturally relative  while also holding that one could be wrong about which putative values within one's culture are the binding values within one's culture, or without agreeing how to rank order competing values within one's culture.  For example, liberty and equality are both values. Suppose they are not absolute but relative to Western culture.  One can still have doubts about whether liberty trumps equality or vice versa.  If Tom says that liberty trumps equality, and Tom is a fallibilist, then Tom will be open to arguments to the contrary. <\/span><\/p>\n

Atlantic article here<\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Fallibilism and Objectivism<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>The Decline of the Culture of Free Discussion and Debate<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Einstein, Relativity, and Relativism<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In a recent Atlantic article we read: . . . the prevailing thought of the second decade of the 21st century is not like the mid-to late-20th century. Law, virtue, and a shame culture have risen to prominence in recent years, signaling that moral relativism may be going the way of the buggy whip. [. … Continue reading “Is Moral Relativism Dying?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[396,60,361],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6559","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-axiology","category-ethics","category-relativism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6559","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6559"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6559\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6559"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6559"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6559"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}