{"id":6300,"date":"2016-08-14T17:14:45","date_gmt":"2016-08-14T17:14:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/08\/14\/visual-and-propositional-contents-of-that-clauses\/"},"modified":"2016-08-14T17:14:45","modified_gmt":"2016-08-14T17:14:45","slug":"visual-and-propositional-contents-of-that-clauses","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/08\/14\/visual-and-propositional-contents-of-that-clauses\/","title":{"rendered":"Visual and Propositional Contents of That-Clauses: An Aporetic Hexad"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">Edward of the Logic Museum bids us ruminate upon the following aporetic hexad:<\/span><\/p>\n<ol style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">We agree that visual and propositional content can be the same. The content-clause \u2018that a man was dead\u2019 specifies a content that can be seen (\u2018the armour-bearer saw (or seemed to see) that a man was dead\u2019) or told (\u2018the armour-bearer was told that a man was dead\u2019).<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol start=\"2\" style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">If so, content can be veridical or not. What we were told (that a man was dead) would be false if no man was dead. And it can visually appear so (\u2018seemed to see\u2019), without it being so (perhaps the man is unconscious).<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol start=\"3\" style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">Content clauses can be general (\u2018a man was alive\u2019) or singular (\u2018the same man is dead\u2019).<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol start=\"4\" style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">Two contents can imply a third. If true (A) that a man was alive, and true (B) that <em>the same<\/em> man is dead, then true (C) that a man who was alive is now dead.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol start=\"5\" style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">From (1) above, the same must be true if the contents are visual. If there are visual contents corresponding to A and B, then these together imply C.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ol start=\"6\" style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">But there cannot be two such visual contents A and B, because for the inference to work, the visual content must contain something corresponding to \u2018the same\u2019, in \u2018that the same man is dead this afternoon\u2019.&#0160; But there is no such content. Suppose the armour-bearer sees a man alive at midday, who he takes to be Saul, but who in fact is Saul\u2019s identical twin. Then he sees Saul dead in the afternoon. But the first visual content would be the same if it were Saul, or his twin. That is the whole point of identical twins being \u2018identical\u2019, i.e. they look exactly the same. So it is perfectly possible for two visual contents to be veridical, yet with the third content (that a man who was alive is now dead) false.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">The 6 claims above cannot all be true. Clearly some must be true, and we probably have to choose between 1 and 5. Either there are some propositional contents which do not have visual correlates (1 is false), or there is some \u2018singular\u2019 ingredient in some visual contents, which generate inferences such as above. But that is implausible. How can a visual content ever contain the information that some object is identical to the object of a content perceived earlier?&#0160; We might believe that, or infer it, or know it for other reasons. But there is nothing in the content itself that signifies identity.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">Note there is no epistemological point is at issue. I am not asking how we know that people are the same or not. Rather, what are the logical connections between contents, and are those connections incompatible with the phenomenology of visual content?<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">You have mastered the aporetic method, Ed. &#0160;This is a very hard nut to crack.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">Perhaps I was premature to agree with you about (1). &#0160;Premature <em>excogitation<\/em>? &#0160;I can easily <em>believe<\/em> that the dead man is the same as the man who was alive at midday, but I cannot <em>see<\/em> that the dead man is the same as the man who was alive at midday. &#0160; And this for the reason you gave. &#0160;In this case, the visual content is poorer than the propositional content.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">But I don&#39;t understand why you say that there is no epistemological point at issue. &#0160;After all, your point, I think, is that the phenomenology of visual &#0160;content does not reveal diachronic numerical identity. &#0160;Identity is not empirically detectable.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino;\">See the next post in the queue.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Edward of the Logic Museum bids us ruminate upon the following aporetic hexad: We agree that visual and propositional content can be the same. The content-clause \u2018that a man was dead\u2019 specifies a content that can be seen (\u2018the armour-bearer saw (or seemed to see) that a man was dead\u2019) or told (\u2018the armour-bearer was &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/08\/14\/visual-and-propositional-contents-of-that-clauses\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Visual and Propositional Contents of That-Clauses: An Aporetic Hexad&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[346,541],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6300","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-identity-and-individuation","category-propositions"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6300","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6300"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6300\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6300"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6300"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6300"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}