{"id":6238,"date":"2016-09-08T14:34:16","date_gmt":"2016-09-08T14:34:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/09\/08\/truthmaker-maximalism-and-the-misery-of-philosophy\/"},"modified":"2016-09-08T14:34:16","modified_gmt":"2016-09-08T14:34:16","slug":"truthmaker-maximalism-and-the-misery-of-philosophy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/09\/08\/truthmaker-maximalism-and-the-misery-of-philosophy\/","title":{"rendered":"Truthmaker Maximalism and The Misery of Philosophy"},"content":{"rendered":"

According to one of my aphorisms<\/a>, <\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Philosophy is magnificent in aspiration but miserable in execution.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Part of what makes philosophy a miserable subject is that none of its conclusions is conclusive<\/em>.  Herewith, a little example.  But first some background.<\/span><\/p>\n

A truthmaker maximalist is one who maintains that every truth has a truthmaker.  So it doesn't matter whether a truth is necessary or contingent, universal or particular or singular, affirmative or negative, analytic or synthetic, etc.:  it has a truth maker.  There are no exceptions.  The contrary of a truthmaker maximalist is a truthmaker nihilist:  one who maintains that no truth has a truthmaker — not because no truth is true, but because no truth needs something in the world to 'make' it true.  I incline toward truthmaker optimalism:  some but not all truths need truthmakers. But our topic is truthmaker maximalism.<\/span><\/p>\n

Don't confuse maximalism with the thesis that every truth has its own unique, bespoke<\/a>, truthmaker.  The maximalist is not committed to a 1-1 correspondence between truths and truthmakers.  Example.  On a factualist approach to truthmakers, they are facts.  So on factualism, the truthmaker of 'Al is fat' is the fact of Al's being fat<\/em>.  But this fact also makes true other truths such as 'Someone is fat' and its logical entailments such as 'Someone is fat or Fred is dead.'<\/span><\/p>\n

Now let's consider a counterexample to truthmaker maximalism.  This is from the excellent SEP entry Truthmakers<\/a> by Fraser MacBride.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

2.1.2 Could there be nothing rather than something?<\/span><\/h4>\n

Here's another shot across the bows, this time from [David] Lewis. Take the most encompassing negative existential of all: absolutely nothing exists. Surely this statement is possibly true. But if it were true then something would have to exist to make it true if the principle that every truth has a truth-maker is to be upheld. But then there would have to be something rather than nothing. So combining maximalism with the conviction that there could have been nothing rather than something leads to contradiction (Lewis 1998: 220, 2001: 611). So unless we already have reason to think there must be something rather than nothing\u2014as both Armstrong (1989b: 24\u20135) and Lewis (1986: 73\u20134) think they do\u2014maximalism is already in trouble.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Setting up the problem as an inconsistent triad:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A.It is necessarily true that: Every truth has a truthmaker.<\/span><\/p>\n

B. It is possibly true that:  Nothing exists<\/span><\/p>\n

C. It is not possibly true that: Nothing exists and something exists.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Since (C) is non-negotiable, either (A) or (B) must be rejected.  MacBride thinks that (B) is "surely" true, and that therefore (A) is "in trouble."   But MacBride's "surely" is surely bluster.  <\/span><\/p>\n

It is impossible that nothing exist.  For if that had been the case, then it would have been<\/em> the case, which is to say that it would have been true<\/em> that nothing exists, whence it follows that there would have been something after all, namely, the truth that nothing exists.<\/span><\/p>\n

Or think of it this way.  Had nothing at all existed, that would have been the way things are, a most definite way things are that excludes infinitely many other ways things might have been.  This way things are, had nothing existed, is something, not nothing.  So it is impossible that there might have been nothing at all.<\/span><\/p>\n

Parmenides vindicatus est<\/em>. <\/span><\/p>\n

Is the argument I just gave compelling?  No.  Philosophy is a miserable subject.<\/span><\/p>\n

The misery of philosophy is rooted in the misery of man and the infirmity of his reason.  But we know our misery. Therein lies an indication of our greatness.  The knowledge of our ignorance and of our misery elevates us above every other sentient being.<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Will the Real Truth-Maker of 'Al is Fat' Please Stand up?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Tropes as Truth-Makers? Or Do We Need Facts?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>The Truthmakers of Truths About Truths<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Correspondence and Truthmaking<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

According to one of my aphorisms,  Philosophy is magnificent in aspiration but miserable in execution. Part of what makes philosophy a miserable subject is that none of its conclusions is conclusive.  Herewith, a little example.  But first some background. A truthmaker maximalist is one who maintains that every truth has a truthmaker.  So it doesn't … Continue reading “Truthmaker Maximalism and The Misery of Philosophy”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[20,228],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6238","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-metaphilosophy","category-truth"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6238","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6238"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6238\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6238"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6238"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6238"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}