{"id":6192,"date":"2016-09-24T13:19:48","date_gmt":"2016-09-24T13:19:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/09\/24\/graham-priest-on-alexius-von-meinong\/"},"modified":"2016-09-24T13:19:48","modified_gmt":"2016-09-24T13:19:48","slug":"graham-priest-on-alexius-von-meinong","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/09\/24\/graham-priest-on-alexius-von-meinong\/","title":{"rendered":"Graham Priest on Alexius von Meinong"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dave Lull sends us to a short piece<\/a> by Graham Priest which will serve as an introduction to the Austrian philosopher and his characteristic views for those who know nothing of either.<\/span><\/p>\n

As I write in my Philosophy Always Resurrects its Dead<\/a>,<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Gilbert Ryle once predicted with absurd confidence, "Gegenstandstheorie<\/em> . . . is dead, buried, and not going to be resurrected."  (Quoted in G. Priest, Towards Non-Being<\/em>, Oxford, 2005, p. vi, n. 1.) Ryle was wrong, dead<\/em> wrong, and shown to be wrong just a few years after his cocky prediction.  Variations on Meinong's Theory of Objects flourish like never before due to the efforts of such brilliant philosophers as Butchvarov, Castaneda, Lambert, Parsons, Priest, Routley\/Sylvan, and Zalta, just to mention those that come first to mind. And the Rylean cockiness has had an ironic upshot: his logical behaviorism is temporarily dead while Meinongianism thrives.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

What accounts for Meinong's  comeback according to Priest? <\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Why has this change taken place? A hard question. Undoubtedly many factors are involved. Certainly, one important one is that the arguments against noneism are, indeed, bad. Another is that Russell\u2019s theory of descriptions, as applied to names, is now itself history, despatched by Saul Kripke\u2019s onslaught in the 1970s. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Not quite.<\/span><\/p>\n

The arguments are uncompelling, but not bad.  Let's look at a couple.<\/span><\/p>\n

One of Russell's objections to Meinong was that the denizens of Aussersein<\/em>, i.e., beingless objects, are apt to infringe the Law of Non-Contradiction.  Suppose a Meinongian subscribes to the following principle:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Unrestricted Satisfaction<\/em> (US):  Every definite description is such that some object satisfies it. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

For any definite description we can concoct, there is a corresponding object or item, in many cases a beingless object or item.  From (US) we infer that some object satisfies the definite description, 'the existent round square.'  This object is existent, round, and square.  So the existent round square exists, which is a contradiction.  This is one Russell-type argument.<\/span><\/p>\n

A similar argument can be made re: the golden mountain.  By (US), not only is some object the golden mountain, some object is the existent golden mountain. This object is existent, golden, and a mountain.  So the existent golden mountain exists, which is false, though not contradictory.  This is a second Russell-type argument.<\/span><\/p>\n

Are these arguments  compelling refutations of Meinong's signature thesis?  No, but they are certainly not bad arguments.  Here is one way one might try to evade the Russellian objections, a way similar to one  Meinong himself treads.  Make a distinction between nuclear properties and extranuclear properties.  (See Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects<\/em>, Yale UP, 1980, p. 42) Nuclear properties are those that are included in an object's Sosein<\/em> (so-being, what-being, quiddity).  Extranuclear properties are those that are not so included. The distinction can be made with respect to existence.  There is nuclear existence and extranuclear existence.  'Existent' picks out nuclear existence while 'exists' picks out extranuclear existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

This distinction blocks the inference from 'The existent round square is existent, round, and square' to the 'The existent round square exists.'  Similarly in the golden mountain case. You will be forgiven for finding this distinction between nuclear and extranuclear existence  bogus.  It looks to be nothing more than an ad hoc<\/em> theory-saving move. <\/span><\/p>\n

But there may be a better Meinongian response.   The Russellian arguments assume an Unrestricted Characterization Principle:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

UCP:  An object exemplifies each of the properties referenced in the definite description it satisfies.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

From (US) we get the object, the existent golden mountain, and the object, the existent round square.  But without (UCP) one cannot move to the claim that the existent golden mountain exists or to the claim that the existent round square exists.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Meinongian can therefore defeat the Russellian arguments by substituting a restricted characterization principle for (UCP).  And he can do this without distinguishing between nuclear and extranuclear existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Did Kripke "despatch" Russell's theory of descriptions.  More chutzpah on Priest's part.  You are nothing but a blind partisan if you fail to acknowledge the problems with Kripke's views.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for Kripke himself, he never took the time to understand Meinong's actual views.  See my Kripke's Misrepresentation of Meinong<\/a>.  A first-rate entry!<\/span><\/p>\n

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\"\"<\/a>Vera Menchik<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dave Lull sends us to a short piece by Graham Priest which will serve as an introduction to the Austrian philosopher and his characteristic views for those who know nothing of either. As I write in my Philosophy Always Resurrects its Dead, Gilbert Ryle once predicted with absurd confidence, "Gegenstandstheorie . . . is dead, … Continue reading “Graham Priest on Alexius von Meinong”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[482],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6192","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-meinong-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6192","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6192"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6192\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6192"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6192"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6192"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}