{"id":6051,"date":"2016-11-11T05:04:59","date_gmt":"2016-11-11T05:04:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/11\/11\/after-macintyre-can-a-normative-conclusion-be-derived-from-purely-factual-premises\/"},"modified":"2016-11-11T05:04:59","modified_gmt":"2016-11-11T05:04:59","slug":"after-macintyre-can-a-normative-conclusion-be-derived-from-purely-factual-premises","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/11\/11\/after-macintyre-can-a-normative-conclusion-be-derived-from-purely-factual-premises\/","title":{"rendered":"After MacIntyre: Can a Normative Conclusion be Derived from Purely Factual Premises?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Are there any valid arguments that satisfy the following conditions:  (i) The premises are all factual  in the sense of purporting to state only what is<\/em> the case; (ii) the conclusion is normative\/evaluative?  Alasdair MacIntyre gives the following example (After Virtue<\/em>, U. of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 55):<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1. This watch is inaccurate.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

2. This is a bad watch.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

MacIntyre claims that the premise is factual, the conclusion evaluative, and the argument valid.  The validity is supposed to hinge on the functional character of the concept watch<\/em>.  A watch is an artifact created by an artificer for a specific purpose: to tell time accurately.  It therefore has a proper function, one assigned by the artificer.  (Serving as a paperweight being an example of an improper function.)  A good watch does its job, serves its purpose, fulfills its proper function. MacIntyre tells us that "the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch . . ." and that "the criterion of something's being a watch and something's being a good watch . . . are not independent of each other." (Ibid.)  MacIntyre goes on to say that both sets of criteria are factual and that for this reason arguments like the one above validly move from a factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.<\/span><\/p>\n

Speaking as someone who has been more influenced by the moderns than by the ancients, I don't quite see it.  It is not the case that both sets of criteria are factual. The criteria for something's being a good watch already contain evaluative criteria.  For if a good watch is one that tells time accurately, then that criterion of chronometric goodness involves a standard of evaluation.  If I say of a watch that it is inaccurate, I am not merely describing it, but also evaluating it.  MacIntyre is playing the following game, to put it somewhat uncharitably.<\/span><\/p>\n

He smuggles the evaluative attribute good<\/em> into his definition of 'watch,' forgets that he has done so thereby generating the illusion that his definition is purely factual, and then pulls the evaluative rabbit out of the hat in his conclusion.  It is an illusion since the rabbit was already there in the premise.  In other words, both (1) and (2) are evaluative.  So, while the argument is valid, it is not a valid argument from a purely factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.<\/span><\/p>\n

So if the precise question is whether one can validly move from a purely factual or descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion, then MacIntyre's example fails to show that this is possible.<\/span><\/p>\n

I think what MacIntyre needs is the idea that some statements are both factual and evaluative.  If (1) is both, then the argument is valid, but then it is not an argument from a purely<\/em> factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
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<\/a>Waiting for St. Benedict. Various Withdrawal Options<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>SCOTUS and Benedict<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>The Parable of the Leaky Cup<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Are there any valid arguments that satisfy the following conditions:  (i) The premises are all factual  in the sense of purporting to state only what is the case; (ii) the conclusion is normative\/evaluative?  Alasdair MacIntyre gives the following example (After Virtue, U. of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 55): 1. This watch is inaccurate. Therefore … Continue reading “After MacIntyre: Can a Normative Conclusion be Derived from Purely Factual Premises?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[459],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6051","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-metaethics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6051","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6051"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6051\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6051"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6051"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6051"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}