I posed<\/a> the question in the aftermath of the election and because of the pleasure many of us are feeling at the Left's comeuppance:<\/span><\/p>\n Is there a righteous form of Schadenfreude<\/em> or is it in every one of its forms as morally objectionable as I make it out to be here<\/a>?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Edward Feser supplies<\/a> an affirmative Thomistic answer. Ed concludes:<\/span><\/p>\n Putting the question of hell<\/a> to one side, though, we can note that if schadenfreude<\/em> can be legitimate even in that<\/em> case, then a fortiori<\/em> it can be legitimate in the case of lesser instances of someone getting his just deserts, in this life rather than the afterlife. For example \u2013 and to take the case Bill has in mind — suppose someone\u2019s suffering is a consequence of anti-Catholic bigotry<\/a>, brazen corruption<\/a>, unbearable smugness<\/a>, a sense of entitlement, groupthink<\/a>, and in general from hubris virtually begging nemesis to pay a visit. When you\u2019re really asking for it<\/em>, you can\u2019t blame others for enjoying seeing you get it.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n
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