{"id":5929,"date":"2016-12-23T14:11:27","date_gmt":"2016-12-23T14:11:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/12\/23\/of-birth-and-barcan\/"},"modified":"2016-12-23T14:11:27","modified_gmt":"2016-12-23T14:11:27","slug":"of-birth-and-barcan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2016\/12\/23\/of-birth-and-barcan\/","title":{"rendered":"Of Birth and Barcan"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Opponent writes,<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

"Death is not an end to existence, but the process of becoming non-concrete. Birth is the making concrete of something that has existed since the beginning of time and will exist until the end of time." (Reina Hayaki)<\/span><\/p>\n

This is one way of interpreting the Barcan formula (possibly for some x Fx implies for some x possibly Fx).  If the formula is true, there are no \u2018contingent objects\u2019, i.e. no objects that exist in some worlds but not others.<\/span><\/p>\n

My position is that there are contingent entities (as well as contingent identities<\/em>). I imagine you will be less sympathetic to this, however. Interested in your thoughts.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The Opponent is misrepresenting Professor Hayaki's view.  On a careful reading of her article<\/a>, the quotation above is not her view but expresses a temporal analog of the modal view of Linsky and Zalta that she is opposing.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Barcan<\/a>Be that as it may.  Let's consider the Barcan formula by itself.<\/span><\/p>\n

The formula is that Possibly, something is F<\/em> implies Something is possibly F<\/em>.  The modality in question is 'broadly logical' in Plantinga's sense.  Some call it 'metaphysical.'   <\/span><\/p>\n

By my modal intuitions, the formula is false.  A trio of  'possible' counterexamples.<\/span><\/p>\n

A. Sally wants a baby.  But there is no actual baby such that Sally wants it<\/em>.  Sally wants to have<\/em> a baby, i.e, give birth to a baby, her own baby, one that does not yet exist.  What Sally wants is possible. So, possibly, some baby is such that Sally wants it.  But it doesn't follow that some actual baby is possibly such that Sally wants it. For every actual baby is such that Sally does not want it.<\/span><\/p>\n

B. It is possible that there be a sinless man.  But it does not follow that one of the men who exist is possibly sinless.  <\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

C. Possibly, some sloop satisfies Ortcutt's exacting specifications.  (It is possible that there be such a sloop.)  But it doesn't follow that some existing sloop (without modifications) is possibly such as to satisfy Ortcutt's exacting specifications.  For it could be that every sloop that exists fails to satisfy our man.<\/span><\/p>\n

I am assuming actualism: there are no merely possible objects.  The truth of Possibly, something is F<\/em> does not commit us to the existence of a merely possible individual that is F. 'Possibly, something is a matter transmitter,' for example, does not commit us to the existence of a merely possible matter transmitter.  I should think it commits us only to the existence of a conjunctive property that is possibly instantiated.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Barcan formula may hold for necessary beings such as the number 7.  But it fails for contingent beings.<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course I hold that there are contingent beings.  Whether there are contingent identities is another topic entirely.  One topic at a time. <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Opponent writes, "Death is not an end to existence, but the process of becoming non-concrete. Birth is the making concrete of something that has existed since the beginning of time and will exist until the end of time." (Reina Hayaki) This is one way of interpreting the Barcan formula (possibly for some x Fx … Continue reading “Of Birth and Barcan”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[235],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5929","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-modal-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5929","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5929"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5929\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5929"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5929"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5929"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}