{"id":5901,"date":"2017-01-01T13:40:02","date_gmt":"2017-01-01T13:40:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/01\/01\/identity-and-substitutivity\/"},"modified":"2017-01-01T13:40:02","modified_gmt":"2017-01-01T13:40:02","slug":"identity-and-substitutivity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/01\/01\/identity-and-substitutivity\/","title":{"rendered":"Identity and Quasi-Epistemic Contingency"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Opponent sends the following puzzle to vex us:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Story: there was someone called 'a', and there was someone called 'b'.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is all we have of the story. Let the predicate F be 'The story is consistent with a<\/em><\/span>
not being identical with ___'. Then clearly Fa<\/em> is false, and Fb<\/em> is true. <\/span><\/p>\n

This is the case even if a<\/em>, in fact, is identical with b<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Is there a puzzle here?  It may be only a malformed attempt at a puzzle. We are presented with a very short story consisting of exactly two claims.  We are given no information as to whether the person called 'a' is the same as or different from the person called 'b.'  So the story allows for the possibility that the person called 'a' is not the same as the person called 'b.'  This is the case even if, in fact, outside the story, it is not the case that a = b.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is not clear that there is a puzzle here since the following propositions are logically consistent:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A. Within the story, it is possible that the person called 'a' is not the same as the person called 'b.' <\/span>
B.  It is the case that a = b.<\/span>
C. For any x, y, if x = y, then necessarily, x = y.  (Kripke's Necessity of Identity thesis)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

It is the presence of the story operator in (A) that saves the triad from inconsistency.<\/span><\/p>\n

Suppose 'Axwell' and 'Buswell' are the two names in the story and that both refer to an existing man, the same man.  That a = b is no part of the story.  Given only what we know from the story it is possible that a<\/em> not be identical to b<\/em>.  But this possibility is something like an epistemic possibility which, as such, cannot be used to show the real (non-epistemic) possibility that a not be identical to b in reality.<\/span><\/p>\n

So on this New Year's Day I tax the Noble Opponent with a metabasis eis allo genos<\/a> (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2),<\/strong> which is something like a Rylean category mistake: he shifts illicitly from a story-immanent perspective to a story-transcendent perspective. Within the story there is a story-immanent contingency as to both the identity and the difference of the referents of the names.  But this is a sort of epistemic contingency consequent upon the fact that literary fiction leaves much indeterminate: the literary characters have all and only the properties assigned to them in the story.  <\/span><\/p>\n

So it looks as if the Opponent may be conflating a sort of epistemic contingency with real contingency.  He does not have the makings of a sound argument for the claim  that real-world identities are contingent, contra Kripke.<\/span><\/p>\n

By contrast, the following triad is plainly inconsistent.  This is the case whether we take names to be Kripkean rigid designators or Russellian definite descriptions in disguise. <\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A*. Possibly, it is not the case that a = b.<\/span>
B. It is the case that a = b.<\/span>
C. For any x, y, if x = y, then necessarily, x = y.  <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
<\/a>Theism Meets Metaphysical Naturalism<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>Modal Axioms<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>Maverick Philosopher: Contingent and Necessary<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>Tropes as Truth-Makers? Or Do We Need Facts?<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>Nothing is Written in Stone<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>Bertrand Russell: Empiricism is Self-Refuting. Is He Right?<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>The Decline of the Culture of Free Discussion and Debate<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Opponent sends the following puzzle to vex us: Story: there was someone called 'a', and there was someone called 'b'. This is all we have of the story. Let the predicate F be 'The story is consistent with anot being identical with ___'. Then clearly Fa is false, and Fb is true.  This is … Continue reading “Identity and Quasi-Epistemic Contingency”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[233,346,408,235],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5901","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-fiction-and-fictionalism","category-identity-and-individuation","category-language-philosophy-of","category-modal-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5901","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5901"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5901\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5901"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5901"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5901"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}