{"id":5820,"date":"2017-01-29T12:34:18","date_gmt":"2017-01-29T12:34:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/01\/29\/nominalism\/"},"modified":"2017-01-29T12:34:18","modified_gmt":"2017-01-29T12:34:18","slug":"nominalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/01\/29\/nominalism\/","title":{"rendered":"Nominalism and an Identity Theory of Predication"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Worthy Opponent comments,<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

We nominalists hold that 'God is good' is true when what is signified by 'God' and what is signified by 'good' are numerically one and the same thing.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I stumble over this. <\/span><\/p>\n

\"Honor\u00e9_Daumier<\/a>Apparently, it is The Opponent's view that a sentence such 'Socrates is good' is true when what is signified by 'Socrates' and what is signified by 'good' are numerically one and the same thing. I don't understand. 'Good,' unlike 'Socrates,' is a common term: it applies to many individuals. So there cannot be numerically one thing that both 'Socrates' and 'good' signify. 'Socrates' signifies one thing; 'good' signifies many things.<\/span><\/p>\n

If, contrary to fact, there were only one good thing, then it would make some<\/em> sense to say that 'Socrates is good,' which is by its surface grammar a predication, could be read as asserting the numerical identity of Socrates with the one good thing.  But if Socrates is good, or seated, or conversing with Theaetetus, this is only contingently the case. So how analyze the possibly true 'Socrates is not good' on the assumption that there is only one good thing?  We would have to say that Socrates is distinct from himself — which is absurd.  For if, in actuality, Socrates is good in virtue of being identical to the one good thing, then, in the possible counterfactual situation in which he — the very same individual —  is not good, he would have to be numerically diverse from the one good thing, namely, himself!<\/span><\/p>\n

The same argument goes through even if there are many good things. For the Opponent's claim is that Socrates is good in virtue of being identical to one of the many good things. Call this good thing G.  The claim is that 'Socrates is good' is an identity proposition in disguise, and that its deep logical form is: S = G.<\/span><\/p>\n

The problem is that 'Socrates is good' is contingently true. But 'S = G' is not contingently true. So the predication is not an identity proposition in disguise.  <\/span><\/p>\n

This looks to be a pretty powerful objection.<\/span><\/p>\n

I am assuming something that is well-nigh self-evident, but which I fear the Illustrious Opponent will deny, namely, that if a = b, then this is non-contingently the case.  In other words, I am assuming that if a<\/em> = b<\/em>, then there is no possible situation in which a<\/em> and b<\/em> both exist but are numerically distinct.<\/span><\/p>\n

Curiously, the Opponent's theory works in one case and one case only. But he has to admit the divine simplicity.  So assume that God exists, that God is essentially good, and that God is identical to his attributes, and that therefore God alone is good in this sense. If God is identical to his attributes, then God = the one and only good thing. (Socrates is good only in an analogical and derivative sense.) In this one case, 'God is good' is an identity proposition in disguise.  <\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
<\/a>Peter van Inwagen, "A Theory of Properties," Exposition and Critique<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>Review of Barry Miller, A Most Unlikely God<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a><i>Luke<\/i> 2:21: Can the Not-Yet-Existent be Named?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>Is God Beyond All Being?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Worthy Opponent comments, We nominalists hold that 'God is good' is true when what is signified by 'God' and what is signified by 'good' are numerically one and the same thing. I stumble over this.  Apparently, it is The Opponent's view that a sentence such 'Socrates is good' is true when what is signified … Continue reading “Nominalism and an Identity Theory of Predication”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[346,83,84],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5820","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-identity-and-individuation","category-nominalism-and-realism","category-predication"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5820","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5820"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5820\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5820"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5820"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5820"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}