{"id":5524,"date":"2017-05-12T16:20:18","date_gmt":"2017-05-12T16:20:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/05\/12\/prudential-anti-natalism\/"},"modified":"2017-05-12T16:20:18","modified_gmt":"2017-05-12T16:20:18","slug":"prudential-anti-natalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/05\/12\/prudential-anti-natalism\/","title":{"rendered":"Prudential Anti-Natalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

Karl White writes:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

If one assumes life has a negative value, or at the very least is a problem that needs solving, then surely it would follow that antinatalism is the prudential course. If we are unable to discern a meaning or a solution to life, then there can hardly be any justification for dragging someone else into said dilemma kicking and screaming (literally), while we attempt to work out our own salvation or lack thereof. That's why I subscribe to a form of prudential antinatalism. This differs from the kind that says life is and always a negative thing, as for all I know there could be a pay-off at the end of it currently indiscernible to humans, but for want of indisputable proof then I cannot see any reason to expose someone else to the dilemma of life, or at least I personally cannot do it, given I cannot find any ultimate meaning or justification for my own existence, at this present time at least.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This entry will attempt to articulate and develop Mr. White's suggestion.<\/span><\/p>\n

What do we know? We do not<\/em> know whether human life has an overall positive or negative value. It could have a positive value despite appearances to the contrary. For example, it could be that after our sojourn through this vale of tears, the veil of ignorance will be lifted and we will find ourselves in a realm of peace and light in which every tear is dried and the sense of things is revealed. It could be that the vale of tears is also a vale of soul-making in which some of us  'earn our wings.'  But this is an article of faith, not of knowledge. We don't know whether there are further facts, hidden from us at present, in whose light the world as we experience it here and now will come to be seen as overall good.<\/span><\/p>\n

What we do<\/em> know is that the problem of the value of human existence is a genuine problem and thus one that needs solving.  It needs<\/em> solving presumably because it is not merely a theoretical problem in axiology but a problem with implications for practical ethics.  In particular: Is procreation morally permissible or not?<\/span><\/p>\n

But does it follow from what we know that anti-natalism is the prudential course?  Karl answers in the affirmative.  I don't know whether Karl is an extreme or a moderate anti-natalist, but I don't think it matters for the present discussion. Extreme anti-natalism is the view espoused by David Benatar according to which "it would be better if there were no more humans" (David Benatar and David Wasserman, Debating Procreation<\/em>, Oxford UP 2015, 13) from which axiological thesis there follows the deontic conclusion that "all procreation is wrong." (12)  A moderate anti-natalist could hold that most procreation is wrong.<\/span><\/p>\n

One assumption that Karl seems to be making is that, absent any redemption 'from above,' the value of life for most humans is on balance negative.  This assumption I find very plausible.  But note that it rests on a still deeper assumption, namely, that the value of life can be objectively assessed or evaluated.  This assumption is not obviously correct, but it too is plausible.  Here, then, is the argument. It is a kind of 'moral safety' argument. To be on the morally safe side, we ought not procreate.<\/span><\/p>\n

Argument for Prudential Anti-Natalism<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

1) There is an objective 'fact of the matter' as to whether or not human life is on balance of positive or negative value.<\/span><\/p>\n

2) Absent any redemption 'from above,' the value of life for most humans is on balance negative, that is, the harms of existence outweigh the benefits of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

3) We do not<\/em> know that the value of life for most humans is not on balance negative, i.e., that the harms of existence are compensated by the benefits of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

4) We do<\/em> know that bringing children into the world will expose them to physical, mental, and spiritual suffering, and that all of those so exposed will also actually suffer the harms of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

5) It is morally wrong to subject people to harms when it is not known that the harms will be compensated by a greater good.<\/span><\/p>\n

6) To have children is to subject them to such harms. Therefore:<\/span><\/p>\n

7) It is morally wrong to procreate.<\/span><\/p>\n

Now you have heard me say that there are no compelling arguments in philosophy, and this is certainly no exception.  I'll mention two possible lines of rebuttal.<\/span><\/p>\n

a) Reject premise (1) along Nietzschean lines as explained in my most recent Nietzsche post<\/a>.  It might be urged that any negative judgment on the value of life merely reflects the lack of vitality of the one rendering the judgment.  No healthy specimen takes suffering as an argument against against living and procreating!  I do not endorse this view, but I feel its pull. Related: Nietzsche and National Socialism<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

b) Reject (3). There are those who, standing fast in their faith, would claim to know by a sort of cognitio fidei<\/a> that children and life itself are divine gifts, and that in the end all the horrors and injustices of this life will be made good.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Karl White writes: If one assumes life has a negative value, or at the very least is a problem that needs solving, then surely it would follow that antinatalism is the prudential course. If we are unable to discern a meaning or a solution to life, then there can hardly be any justification for dragging … Continue reading “Prudential Anti-Natalism”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[281,396,60,39,77],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5524","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-anti-natalism","category-axiology","category-ethics","category-human-predicament","category-meaning-of-life"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5524","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5524"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5524\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5524"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5524"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5524"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}