{"id":5354,"date":"2017-08-09T16:44:28","date_gmt":"2017-08-09T16:44:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/08\/09\/is-it-epistemically-certain-that-whatever-begins-to-exist-is-caused\/"},"modified":"2017-08-09T16:44:28","modified_gmt":"2017-08-09T16:44:28","slug":"is-it-epistemically-certain-that-whatever-begins-to-exist-is-caused","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/08\/09\/is-it-epistemically-certain-that-whatever-begins-to-exist-is-caused\/","title":{"rendered":"Is It Epistemically Certain that Whatever Begins to Exist is Caused?"},"content":{"rendered":"

I wrote that <\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1) Whatever begins to exist is caused<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

is not epistemically certain. I don't deny that (1) is true; I deny that it can be known with certainty.  (As I explained earlier, truth and certainty are different properties.) And then I wrote that <\/span><\/p>\n

\n

If an argument is presented for (1), then I will show that the premises of that argument are not, all of them, certain.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

That is to say: if you try to show that (1) is certain by producing a valid deductive argument all of the premises of which are certain, an argument that transmits the certainty of its premises to its conclusion, then I will show that the premises of that argument are not, all of them, certain. I am using 'certain' as short for 'epistemically certain.' <\/span><\/p>\n

Lukas Novak responded<\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Let us play that game. I believe I have an argument to prove (1) that can be reduced exclusively to obvious conceptual truths. Let's go step by step; you say which premise you doubt and I will produce an argument for it.<\/span><\/p>\n

My kick-off:<\/span><\/p>\n

(1.1) Whatever does not have a cause and yet exists, exists necessarily.<\/span>
(1.2) Whatever begins to exist never exists necessarily.<\/span>
Ergo etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

Which one do you doubt?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I have no problem with (1.2).  I would say, however, that (1.1) is not certain.  The negation of (1.1) is: Something exists contingently without cause.<\/em>  This is not a formally self-contradictory proposition. So we cannot rule it out on formal-logical grounds alone the way we can rule out Something exists that does not exist<\/em>. It is therefore logically possible (narrowly logically possible) that (1.1) be false.<\/span><\/p>\n

Is (1.1) a conceptual truth as Lukas appears to be maintaining?  Well, can we know it to be true by sheer analysis of the concept uncaused existent<\/em>?  Not as far as I can see. Analyzing that concept, all I get is: existent that is not the effect of any cause or causes. That every EFFECT has a cause is a conceptual truth, but not that every EVENT has a cause, or that every EXISTENT has a cause.<\/span><\/p>\n

If Lukas is right, then it is epistemically certain<\/em> that the physical universe, which is modally contingent (i.e., not necessary and not impossible) cannot be a brute fact.  So if Lukas is right, then it is epistemically certain that the physical universe cannot exist both contingently and without a cause.<\/span><\/p>\n

Here is where I disagree. I believe that the physical universe (together with finite minds) exists, exists contingently, and is caused. But I don't believe that we can know this to be the case with certainty.<\/span><\/p>\n

It may be that Lukas is thinking along the lines of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.<\/span><\/p>\n

Garrigou-Lagrange thinks that one violates the Law of Non-Contradiction if one says of a contingent thing that it is both contingent and uncaused.  He thinks this is equivalent to saying:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A thing may exist of itself and simultaneously not exist of itself. Existence of itself would belong to it, both necessarily and impossibly. Existence would be an inseparable predicate of a being which can be separated from existence. All this is absurd, unintelligible. (Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought<\/em>, tr. Patrick Cummins, O. S. B., Ex Fontibus 2012, p. 65) <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Suppose that a contingent existent is one that is caused to exist by a self-existent existent.  If one then went on to say that such an existent is both contingent and uncaused, then one would embrace a logical contradiction.  But this presupposes that contingency implies causal dependency.<\/span><\/p>\n

And therein lies the rub.  That the universe is contingent I grant.  But how does one get from modal contingency to the universe's causal dependence on a causa prima<\/em>?  If one simply packs dependency into contingency then one begs the question.  What is contingent needn't be contingent upon anything. <\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
<\/a>Disagreement in Philosophy: Notes on Ji\u0159\u00ed Fuchs<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>On the Logical Independence of Person and Proposition<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I wrote that  1) Whatever begins to exist is caused is not epistemically certain. I don't deny that (1) is true; I deny that it can be known with certainty.  (As I explained earlier, truth and certainty are different properties.) And then I wrote that  If an argument is presented for (1), then I will … Continue reading “Is It Epistemically Certain that Whatever Begins to Exist is Caused?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[240,142,362],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5354","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-certainty","category-existence","category-scholasticism-new-and-old"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5354","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5354"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5354\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5354"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5354"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5354"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}