{"id":5312,"date":"2017-08-24T04:44:27","date_gmt":"2017-08-24T04:44:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/08\/24\/another-uncompelling-argument\/"},"modified":"2017-08-24T04:44:27","modified_gmt":"2017-08-24T04:44:27","slug":"another-uncompelling-argument","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/08\/24\/another-uncompelling-argument\/","title":{"rendered":"Another Uncompelling Argument in Illustration of Our Pascalian Predicament"},"content":{"rendered":"

This relates to my earlier discussion with Dr. Novak. See articles referenced infra<\/em>. A reader thinks the following syllogism establishes its conclusion:<\/span><\/p>\n

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a) What doesn't have necessity from itself is caused;<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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b) The contingent does not have necessity from itself;<\/span><\/p>\n

Ergo<\/span><\/p>\n

c) The contingent is caused.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

An argument establishes<\/em> its conclusion just in case: (i) the argument is deductive; (ii) the argument is valid in point of logical form; (iii) the premises are all of them objectively certain. Establish<\/em> is a very strong word; it is as strong as, and equivalent to, prove<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The argument above is a valid deductive argument, and the minor is true by definition. The major, however, is not objectively certain. In fact, it is not even true. The impossible doesn't have necessity from itself, but it has no cause since it doesn't exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

But a repair is easily made. Substitute for (a)<\/span><\/p>\n

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a*) Whatever exists, but does not have necessity from itself, is caused.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Then the argument, for all we know, might be sound. But it still does not establish its conclusion.  For the major, even if true, is not objectively certain.  Ask yourself:<\/span><\/p>\n

Is the negation of the repaired major a formal-logical contradiction? No. Is it an analytic proposition? No. Does it glow with the light of Cartesian self-evidence like 'I seem to see a tree' or 'I feel nauseous'? No.<\/span><\/p>\n

So how can Novak & Co. be objectively certain that (a*) is true?  This proposition purports to be about objective reality; it purports to move us beyond logical forms, concepts, and mental states. Nice work if you can get it, to cop a signature phrase from the late, great David M. Armstrong.  (For the record: I reject Armstrong's naturalism and atheism.)<\/span><\/p>\n

I conjecture that it is the overwhelmingly strong doxastic security needs of dogmatists that prevent them from appreciating what I am saying. They cannot tolerate uncertainty, and so they manufacture a certainty that isn't there.<\/span><\/p>\n

That being said, Dr. Novak may like my Pascalian conjecture that it is due to the Fall of Man that we are in this suboptimal epistemic predicament, the predicament of craving certainty without being able to attain it.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
<\/a>Is It Epistemically Certain that Whatever Begins to Exist is Caused?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>Are Any Substantive Philosophical Propositions Epistemically Certain?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This relates to my earlier discussion with Dr. Novak. See articles referenced infra. A reader thinks the following syllogism establishes its conclusion: a) What doesn't have necessity from itself is caused; b) The contingent does not have necessity from itself; Ergo c) The contingent is caused. An argument establishes its conclusion just in case: (i) … Continue reading “Another Uncompelling Argument in Illustration of Our Pascalian Predicament”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[240,287,362],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5312","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-certainty","category-pascal","category-scholasticism-new-and-old"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5312","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5312"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5312\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5312"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5312"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5312"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}