{"id":5202,"date":"2017-09-25T14:04:12","date_gmt":"2017-09-25T14:04:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/09\/25\/god-necessity-and-truth\/"},"modified":"2017-09-25T14:04:12","modified_gmt":"2017-09-25T14:04:12","slug":"god-necessity-and-truth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/09\/25\/god-necessity-and-truth\/","title":{"rendered":"God, Necessity, and Truth"},"content":{"rendered":"

Jacques e-mails:<\/span><\/p>\n

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You think that if God exists, He exists necessarily, and if He does not exist, He does not exist necessarily.  But suppose that God does not exist.  We agree, I think, that we can't rationally rule out the possibility?  For instance, you've often argued that our evidence doesn't settle the question of theism versus atheism.  But then, supposing that God doesn't exist, and supposing that He might not exist in the actual world (for all we know), isn't it evident that regardless there are lots of truths?  For instance, even if God does not exist, it would still be true that He does not exist, or that He does not exist necessarily.  I'm not sure that you'd agree with this, but if you would, shouldn't you also agree that if God does not exist, there are some truths?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

That is not quite what I said. I accept what I call Anselm's Insight<\/em>: if God exists, then he exists necessarily; if he does not exist, then necessarily he does not exist.  What does not exist necessarily might be contingent; what necessarily does not exist is impossible. I know you understand the idea; it is just that your formulation suffers from scope ambiguity. Anselm's Insight, then, is that God is either necessary or impossible. He is necessarily non-contingent. (The non-contingent embraces both the necessary and the impossible.) In the patois<\/em> of possible worlds, either he exists in every, or in no, world. If you wonder why I don't capitalize 'he,' it is because I hold that while piety belongs in religion, it does not belong in philosophy of religion.<\/span><\/p>\n

Agreed, we cannot rationally rule out the possibility of God's nonexistence. I would say we cannot rationally rule it out or rule it in. "But then, supposing that God doesn't exist, and supposing that He might not exist in the actual world (for all we know), isn't it evident that regardless there are lots of truths? "<\/span><\/p>\n

I would rewrite your sentence as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n

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It is epistemically possible that God not exist. Nevertheless, it is evident that there are truths.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I agree with the rewrite.  It is evident that there are truths, but for all we can claim to know, God does not exist. But this leaves open how God and truth are related.  Here are five different views:<\/span><\/p>\n

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1) There is truth, but there is no God.<\/span><\/p>\n

2) There is truth, and there is God, but God is not the ontological ground of truth.<\/span><\/p>\n

3) There is truth, there is God, and truth ultimately depends on the existence of God. There is truth because<\/em> there is God.<\/span><\/p>\n

4) There is no truth, because<\/em> there is no God.<\/span><\/p>\n

5) There is God, but no truth.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Ad (1)<\/em>. This I would guess is the view of  many. There are truths, and among these truths is the truth that God does not exist.  This, I take it, would be the standard atheist view.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ad (2)<\/em>. This, I take it, would be the standard theist view among analytic philosophers.  Consider a philosopher who holds that God is a necessary being and also holds that it is necessarily the case that there are some truths, but would deny the truth of the subjunctive conditional, If, per impossibile, God were not to exist, then truths would not exist either.<\/em> <\/span><\/p>\n

Ad (3)<\/em>. This is the view that I am inclined to accept.  Thus I would affirm the subjunctive conditional lately mentioned. The difference between (2) and (3) is subtle. On both sides it is held that both God and truths are necessary, but the Augustinian — to give him a name — holds that God is the ultimate  'source' of all truth and thus all intelligibility, or, if you prefer, the ultimate 'ground' of all truth and intelligibility.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ad (4)<\/em>. This is Nietzsche's view.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Ad (5)<\/em>. I have the impression that certain post-Nietzschean POMO-heads hold this. It is view not worth discussing.<\/span><\/p>\n

I should think only the first three views have any merit.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Each of the three has difficulties and none of the three can be proven.<\/span><\/p>\n

I will mention quickly a problem for the admittedly plausible first view.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Among the truths there are necessary truths such as the laws of logic. Now a truth is a true truth-bearer, a true proposition, say. Nothing can have a property unless it exists. (Call this principle Anti-Meinong). So no proposition can have the property of being true unless the proposition exists. A necessary truth is true in every metaphysically possible world. It follows that a necessarily true proposition exists in every possible world including worlds in which there are no finite minds.  But a proposition is a thought-accusative that cannot exists except for a mind.  If there is no God, every mind is contingent. A contradiction ensues: there is a world W such that, in W, there exists a thought-accusative that is not the thought-accusative of any mind.<\/span><\/p>\n

Here are some ways an atheist might 'solve' the problem:<\/span><\/p>\n

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a) Deny that there are necessary truths.<\/span><\/p>\n

b) Deny that truth is any sense a property of propositions.<\/span><\/p>\n

c) Deny Anti-Meinong.<\/span><\/p>\n

d) Deny that propositions are thought-accusatives; accept some sort of Platonism about propositions.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

But each of these denials involves problems of its own which I would have no trouble unpacking.<\/span><\/p>\n

 What say you, Jacques?<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
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<\/a>Maverick Philosopher: God, Truth, Reality Denial: A Response to Some Questions<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>Maverick Philosopher: Luk\u00e1\u0161 Nov\u00e1k on Use and Mention<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Jacques e-mails: You think that if God exists, He exists necessarily, and if He does not exist, He does not exist necessarily.  But suppose that God does not exist.  We agree, I think, that we can't rationally rule out the possibility?  For instance, you've often argued that our evidence doesn't settle the question of theism … Continue reading “God, Necessity, and Truth”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[143,235,228],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5202","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-god","category-modal-matters","category-truth"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5202","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5202"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5202\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5202"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5202"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5202"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}