{"id":5129,"date":"2017-10-19T13:26:06","date_gmt":"2017-10-19T13:26:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/10\/19\/brentano-on-the-charge-of-excessive-rigorism\/"},"modified":"2017-10-19T13:26:06","modified_gmt":"2017-10-19T13:26:06","slug":"brentano-on-the-charge-of-excessive-rigorism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/10\/19\/brentano-on-the-charge-of-excessive-rigorism\/","title":{"rendered":"Franz Brentano on the Charge of Excessive Rigorism"},"content":{"rendered":"

On his Facebook Page, Vlastimil V<\/a>. quotes Franz Brentano, approvingly, I think:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

It is certain that no man can entirely avoid error. Nevertheless, avoidable or not, every erroneous judgement is a judgement that ought not to have been made, a judgement in conflict with the requirements of logic, and these cannot be modified. The rules of logic are not to be given up merely because of the weakness of our powers of reasoning. Similarly, the rules of ethics are not to be given up because of weakness of will. If a man is weak willed, ethics cannot cease to demand from him that he love what is known to be good, prefer what is known to be better, and place the highest good above all else. Even if one could show (and one cannot) that there are circumstances under which no one could remain true to the highest good, there would not be the slightest justification for setting aside the requirements of ethics.<\/strong> The one and only correct rule would remain evident and unalterably true: Give preference in every case to that which is better. (emphasis added)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Brentano is out to rebut the charge of excessive rigorism laid at his door step; his rebuttal, however, I find unconvincing.<\/span><\/p>\n

Let's examine the passage sentence by sentence.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is certain that no man can entirely avoid error.<\/em>  <\/span><\/p>\n

True! So far, so good.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, avoidable or not, every erroneous judgement is a judgement that ought not to have been made, a judgement in conflict with the requirements of logic, and these cannot be modified.<\/em>  <\/span><\/p>\n

Ambiguous. What is the force of the 'ought not' here? Is it agential or non-agential?  I agree with Brentano if he is speaking of non-agential oughts. Permit me to explain.<\/span><\/p>\n

It seems to me there are states of affairs that ought to be even in situations in which there are no moral agents with power sufficient to bring them about, and states of affairs that ought not be even in situations in which there are no moral agents with power sufficient to prevent them. In other words, there are non-agential oughts. Here are some examples of non-agential ought statements, statements that express an ought to be or an ought not to be as opposed to an ought to do or an ought not to do.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

There ought to be fewer diseases than there are.<\/span><\/p>\n

There ought never to have been any natural disasters.<\/span><\/p>\n

There ought to be morally perfect people.<\/span><\/p>\n

There ought to be perfectly logical people.<\/span><\/p>\n

Human life ought never to have arisen.  <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

One can imagine someone like David Benatar making the last claim. He would be saying that it would have been better had human life never arisen. And this despite the fact that no agent on his naturalist scheme could have prevented human life from arising. It even makes sense to say that it would have been better had nothing ever existed at all. Perhaps this view can be laid at Schopenhauer's door step: Ens et malum convertuntur<\/em>. To be is bad.  Being itself is bad to the bone. Nothingness would have been preferable.<\/span><\/p>\n

There is a sense in which I ought to be morally perfect whether or not it is in my power to become morally perfect.  And the same holds for my being logically perfect.  This  sense is axiological but not deontic. My being morally perfect is a better state of affairs than my being morally imperfect as I am. And this despite the fact that it is not in my power to perfect myself.<\/span><\/p>\n

Similarly, the rules of ethics are not to be given up because of weakness of will.<\/em> <\/span><\/p>\n

True, as long as the strong-willed have the ability to abide by the rules. <\/span><\/p>\n

If a man is weak willed, ethics cannot cease to demand from him that he love what is known to be good, prefer what is known to be better, and place the highest good above all else.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

True, but see preceding comment. <\/span><\/p>\n

Even if one could show (and one cannot) that there are circumstances under which no one could remain true to the highest good, there would not be the slightest justification for setting aside the requirements of ethics.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Here is where I disagree.  Consider 'One ought to be morally perfect.' This sentence expresses an axiological requirement but (arguably) not a moral obligation because it is simply not in any human's power to perfect himself, nor is it in any finite person's power or any group of finite person's power to perfect him.<\/span><\/p>\n

The bolded sentence conflicts with the principle that Ought implies Can. I cannot stand under a moral obligation to do what which I do not have the power to do. Now I do not have the power to perfect myself morally. Therefore, contra Brentano, one is justified, not in setting aside the requirements of ethics, but in so amending them that that reflect what is concretely possible for humans to achieve. <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On his Facebook Page, Vlastimil V. quotes Franz Brentano, approvingly, I think: It is certain that no man can entirely avoid error. Nevertheless, avoidable or not, every erroneous judgement is a judgement that ought not to have been made, a judgement in conflict with the requirements of logic, and these cannot be modified. The rules … Continue reading “Franz Brentano on the Charge of Excessive Rigorism”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[396,87,60],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5129","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-axiology","category-brentano","category-ethics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5129","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5129"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5129\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5129"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5129"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5129"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}