{"id":5030,"date":"2017-11-15T14:17:05","date_gmt":"2017-11-15T14:17:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/11\/15\/what-is-eds-puzzle\/"},"modified":"2017-11-15T14:17:05","modified_gmt":"2017-11-15T14:17:05","slug":"what-is-eds-puzzle","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2017\/11\/15\/what-is-eds-puzzle\/","title":{"rendered":"What is Ed’s Puzzle?"},"content":{"rendered":"

This just in from London:<\/span><\/p>\n

             A man called \u2018Socrates\u2019 is running and Socrates is debating. <\/span><\/p>\n

Clearly if anyone verifies \u2018a man called \u2018Socrates\u2019, and if \u2018a man who is debating\u2019 verifies that same person, then the conjunction appears to be true. And any number of men can be called \u2018Socrates\u2019, and be running and debating. But there\u2019s the puzzle. The sense, the meaning, the semantics of \u2018Socrates\u2019 seems simply to ensure sameness of reference, or rather sameness of predication<\/em>. \u2018Is running\u2019 and \u2018is debating\u2019 must be true of the same individual. But then the sense of the name is the same, whoever the sentences are verified of. Which paradoxically contradicts the classical theory of proper names, namely that a proper name cannot apply to different individuals in the same sense<\/em>. Mill, A System of Logic<\/em>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Thus man<\/em> is capable of being truly affirmed of John, George, Mary, and other persons without assignable limit; and it is affirmed of all of them in the same sense; for the word man expresses certain qualities, and when we predicate it of those persons, we assert that they all possess those qualities. But John is only capable of being truly affirmed of one single person, at least in the same sense. For, though there are many persons who bear that name, it is not conferred upon them to indicate any qualities, or any thing which belongs to them in common; and can not be said to be affirmed of them in any sense at all, consequently not in the same sense.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

BV:  More puzzling than Ed's puzzle is the puzzle of what Ed's puzzle is supposed to be.  Call the latter 'the meta-puzzle.' I will try to solve it.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is a datum that there are many men and animals who rejoice under the name 'Socrates.' When we philosophers invoke the name in philosophical contexts, we refer to the famous teacher of Plato. But there is also Socrates Jones, the rather less distinguished fellow who failed to get tenure at Whatsamatta U. There is also  Socrates of Scranton, the resident bullshitter at the famous coffee house Insufficient Grounds<\/em>. And so on.<\/span><\/p>\n

In short, there are many men who bear the name 'Socrates.'  Consider any one of them. Any one of them could verify (make true) the conjunctive proposition:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A man called \u2018Socrates\u2019 is running and Socrates is debating.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

But then 'Socrates' in the second conjunct of the conjunctive proposition would appear not to refer to a particular person such as Socrates Jones in contradistinction from Socrates of Scranton, Socrates the teacher of Plato, etc.  The name refers to any one person who verifies or make true both halves of the conjunction.  This suggests to Ed, assuming I understand him,  that the semantic function of 'Socrates' in the second conjunct is exhausted by its anaphoric or back-referential function. If so, the semantic function of 'Socrates' is wholly intralinguistic.<\/span><\/p>\n

But let's not worry now about Ed's positive theory. Let's just ruminate over the puzzle he takes as (part of the) motivation for his positive theory.  We can set it forth as an aporetic dyad:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A. A proper name cannot apply to different individuals in the same sense<\/em>. (J. S. Mill)<\/span><\/p>\n

B. A proper name can apply to different individuals in the same sense<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The limbs of the dyad are logical contradictories. And yet both limbs are very plausible. <\/span><\/p>\n

Mill's point is that once we fix on a uniform usage of 'Socrates' to refer to one single thing such as the famous Greek philosopher who taught Plato, then that name in that sense cannot be used to refer to anything else.  Pretty obvious, eh? Otherwise there would be no proper names.  What makes a proper name proper is precisely that it cannot have more than one bearer.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ed's point is that a proper name can apply to different individuals in the very same sense in that the 'Socrates' used in the second conjunct has the very same sense as the 'Socrates' mentioned in the first conjunct.<\/span><\/p>\n

At this point Ed must tell me whether I have finally grasped his puzzle and thereby solved the meta-puzzle as to what his puzzle is.<\/span><\/p>\n

If he returns an affirmative answer to this question, then we can proceed. If and only if.<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
<\/a>On the Reference of Proper Names<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>What's in a pronoun?<\/a><\/div>\n
<\/a>Maverick Philosopher: The Function-Argument Schema in the Analysis of Propositions, Part II<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This just in from London:              A man called \u2018Socrates\u2019 is running and Socrates is debating.  Clearly if anyone verifies \u2018a man called \u2018Socrates\u2019, and if \u2018a man who is debating\u2019 verifies that same person, then the conjunction appears to be true. And any number of men can be called … Continue reading “What is Ed’s Puzzle?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[408],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5030","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-language-philosophy-of"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5030","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5030"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5030\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5030"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5030"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5030"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}