{"id":4812,"date":"2018-01-31T10:40:33","date_gmt":"2018-01-31T10:40:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/01\/31\/presentism-and-the-existence-requirement\/"},"modified":"2018-01-31T10:40:33","modified_gmt":"2018-01-31T10:40:33","slug":"presentism-and-the-existence-requirement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/01\/31\/presentism-and-the-existence-requirement\/","title":{"rendered":"Presentism and the Existence Requirement"},"content":{"rendered":"

Why do some find  the Existence Requirement self-evident? Could it be because of a (tacit) commitment to presentism?  <\/span><\/p>\n

Here again is the Existence Requirement:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

(ER) In order for something to be bad  for somebody, that person must exist at the time it is bad for him. (D. Benatar, The Human Predicament<\/em>, 111,115)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Assuming mortalism, after death a person no longer exists. It is easy to see that mortalism in conjunction with the Existence Requirement entails that being dead is not bad for the person who dies. (of course it might be bad for others, but this is not the issue.)  Our Czech colleague Vlastimil V., though he is not a mortalist, accepts this line of reasoning. For he finds (ER) to be well-nigh self-evident. Vlastimil's view, then, is that if one is a mortalist, then then one ought to hold that the dead are not in a bad way; they are not, for example, deprived of the goods they would have had had they been alive.<\/span><\/p>\n

Initially, I thought along the same lines. But now it seems less clear to me. For now I suspect that a tacit or explicit commitment to the questionable doctrine of presentism is what is driving the sense that (ER) is self-evident. Let's think about this.<\/span><\/p>\n

At a first approximation, presentism is the ontological thesis that only present items exist. But 'present' has several senses, so we'd better say that on presentism, only temporally<\/em> present items exist.  If so, then what is wholly past does not exist, and likewise for what is wholly future. But let's not worry about future items. And to avoid questions about so-called abstract objects, which either exist at all times or else timelessly, let us restrict ourselves to concreta. So for present purposes, pun intended,<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

P. Presentism is the ontological thesis that, for concrete items, only temporally present items exist.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Note that 'exist' in (P) cannot be present-tensed on pain of siring the tautology, Only what exists now exists now. The idea is rather that only what exists now exists simpliciter.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consider Tom Petty who died recently.  On mortalism, he no longer exists. On presentism, what no longer exists (i.e., what existed but does not now exist) does not exist at all. So on presentism, Petty does not exist at all. If so, dead Petty cannot be subject to harms or deprivations. <\/span><\/p>\n

It is beginning to look as if presentism is what is driving the Existence Requirement. For if presentism is true it is impossible that a person be subject to a harm or deprivation at a time at which he does not presently exist. For a time at which he does not presently exist is a time at which he does not exist at all. And if he does not exist at all, then he cannot be subject to harm or deprivation.  <\/span><\/p>\n

What if presentism is false? One way for it to be false is if the 'growing block' theory is true. We could also call it past-and-presentism. On this theory past and present items exist, but no future items exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

On the 'growing block' theory, dead Petty exists. (This is obviously not a present-tensed use of 'exists.') He does not exist at present, but he exists in the sense that he belongs to the actual world.  Once actual, always actual. Is this wholly clear? No, but it is tolerably clear and plausible. After all, we are making singular<\/em> reference to Petty, a concrete actual individual, as we speak, and this is a good reason to hold that he exists, not at present of course, but simpliciter.<\/span><\/p>\n

But what does this mean? It is not easy to explain. But if we don't have a notion of existence simpliciter, then we won't be able to make any of of the following substantive (non-tautological) claims:<\/span><\/p>\n

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A. Presentism: Only what exists now exists simpliciter.<\/span><\/p>\n

B. Past-and-Presentism: Only what exists now and what did exist exists simpliciter.<\/span><\/p>\n

C. Futurism: Only what exists in the future exists simpliciter.<\/span><\/p>\n

D. Eternalism: All past, present, and future items exist simpliciter.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

We understand these theories, more or less despite the questions they raise; we understand how the theories differ, and we understand that (C) is absurd. So we have an understanding of existence simpliciter. Perhaps we could say that x exists simpliciter just in case x  is actual as opposed to merely possible.<\/span><\/p>\n

I consider (B) preferable to (A). <\/span><\/p>\n

We don't want to say that a dead man becomes nothing after death since he remains a particular, completely determinate, dead man distinct from others. If the dead become nothing after death then all the dead would be the same. If your dead father and your dead mother are both nothing, then there is nothing to distinguish them.  I am assuming the reality of the past. The assumption is not obvious. An anti-realist about the past might say that the past exists only in memory and thus not in reality. But that strains credulity unless you bring God into the picture and put him to work, as presentist Alan Rhoda does in Presentism, Truthmakers, and God<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nor do we want to say that a person who dies goes from being actual to being merely possible. There is clearly a distinction between an actual past individual and a merely possible past individual.  Schopenhauer is an actual past individual; his only son Willy is a merely possible past individual.<\/span><\/p>\n

Now suppose that something like the 'growing block' theory is true. Then one would have reason to reject the Existence Requirement.  One would have reason to reject the claim that a thing can be a subject of harm\/deprivation only when it exists (present tense).  One could hold that Petty is deprived of musical pleasure on the strength of his having existed. Having existed, he exists simpliciter. Existing simpliciter, he is available to be the subject of harms, deprivations, awards, posthumous fame, and what all else.<\/span> <\/p>\n

Summary<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

If I am on the right track, one who subscribes to the Existence Requirement must also subscribe to presentism. But presentism is by no means self-evident. (ER) inherits this lack of self-evidence.  This supports my earlier claim<\/a> that the following aporetic triad is rationally insoluble:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1) Mortalism: Death ends a person's existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

2) Existence Requirement: For something to be bad for somebody, he must exist at the time it is bad for him.<\/span><\/p>\n

3) Badness of Death: Being dead is bad for the one who dies.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The Epicurean denies (3) and accepts (1) and (2). Benatar denies (2) and accepts (1) and (3). I say we have no rationally compelling reason to go either way. <\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
<\/a>Benatar on Annihilation and the Existence Requirement<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>Benatar, Death, and Deprivation<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>David Benatar on Death and the Challenge of the Epicurean Argument in its Hedonist Form<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Why do some find  the Existence Requirement self-evident? Could it be because of a (tacit) commitment to presentism?   Here again is the Existence Requirement: (ER) In order for something to be bad  for somebody, that person must exist at the time it is bad for him. (D. Benatar, The Human Predicament, 111,115) Assuming mortalism, after … Continue reading “Presentism and the Existence Requirement”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[184,397,142,204],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4812","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-death-and-immortality","category-epicureanism","category-existence","category-time-and-change"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4812","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4812"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4812\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4812"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4812"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4812"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}