{"id":4754,"date":"2018-02-21T12:09:35","date_gmt":"2018-02-21T12:09:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/02\/21\/once-more-on-whether-consciousness-could-be-an-illusion\/"},"modified":"2018-02-21T12:09:35","modified_gmt":"2018-02-21T12:09:35","slug":"once-more-on-whether-consciousness-could-be-an-illusion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/02\/21\/once-more-on-whether-consciousness-could-be-an-illusion\/","title":{"rendered":"Once More on Whether Consciousness Could be an Illusion"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following just in from a Scandinavian reader:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Thank you for your great blog, I\u2019ve been a regular reader for some time!<\/span><\/p>\n

You have often made the point, that it is incoherent to say that consciousness in an illusion, because it is a presupposition to the distinction between appearance and reality. In an interesting article defending the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion, Keith Frankish has a response to this. (\u201cIllusionism as a Theory of Consciousness\u201d, Journal of Consciousness Studies<\/em>, 23, 11-12, 2016, pp. 11-39.) I\u2019m not convinced, but I have the feeling that I don\u2019t even understand what Frankish is saying here. (Well, if Frankish is right, this feeling is an illusion, so I should be alright.)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Here<\/a> is a recent version of my argument in which I have that brilliant sophist, Daniel Dennett, in my sights:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Consciousness cannot be an illusion for the simple reason that we presuppose it when we distinguish between reality and illusion.  An illusion is an illusion to<\/em> consciousness, so that if there were no consciousness there would be no illusions either.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is because illusions have a sort of parasitic status. They are ontological parasites, if you will, whose being is fed by a host organism.   But let's not push the parasitological comparison too far. The point is that, while there are illusions, they do not exist on their own. The coyote I wrongly take  to be a domestic dog exists in reality, but the domestic dog does not. But while the latter does not exist in reality, it is not nothing either.   The dog is not something in reality, but it is something for consciousness. If in the twilight I jump back from a twisted root on the trail, mis-taking it for a rattlesnake, the visual datum cannot possibly be regarded as nothing since it is involved in the explanation of why I jumped.  I jumped because I saw (in the phenomenological sense of 'see') a rattlesnake. Outright hallucinations such as the proverbial pink rat of the drunkard are even clearer examples. In dreams I see and touch beautiful women. Do old men have nocturnal emissions over nothing? <\/span><\/p>\n

Not existing in reality, illusions of all sorts, not just perceptual illusions, exist for<\/em> consciousness. But then consciousness cannot be an illusion. Consciousness is a presupposition of the distinction between reality and illusion. As such, it cannot be an illusion. It must be real. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Back to my reader:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Frankish says that this \u201dno appearance-reality gap\u201d objection to illusionism is \u201dfar from compelling\u201d. His reason seems to be something like this: According to illusionism, when we are having, say, a greenish experience, we introspectively represent ourselves as having a greenish experience, and this can be done without having a greenish experience. This is because \u201cthe content of introspective representations is determined by non-phenomenal, causal or functional factors\u201d. So when one sees green, and there something it is like to see green for that person, he is in fact mistaken; there is nothing it is like to see green. The mistake is generated by a non-veridical introspective representation. The \u201cfeelyness\u201d of this is an illusion. But the illusion itself is not a case of phenomenal consciousness, because it is possible to represent oneself as having a state of phenomenal consciousness, without actually having such a state. And thus the \u201cno appearance-reality gap\u201d objection to illusionism fails.<\/span><\/p>\n

Is must confess that I don\u2019t understand this point. Even if phenomenal consciousness is an illusion generated by non-veridical representations, there is still this illusion of seeming left, and thus the \u201cno appearance-reality gap\u201d objection is not refuted. Am I missing something?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I haven't read the article in question so I will have to go by the reader's report.  From what he says, the account sounds like question-begging gibberish: "when we are having, say, a greenish experience, we introspectively represent ourselves as having a greenish experience, and this can be done without having a greenish experience." Unsinn!<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Here is a Killer Quote<\/a> from Thomas Nagel  directed against Dennett that sums things up nicely:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

I am reminded of the Marx Brothers line: \u201cWho are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes?\u201d Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious\u2014that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle\u2019s words, \u201cmaintaining a thesis at all costs.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

That's right. When a line of reasoning issues in an absurdity such as the absurdity that consciousness and its deliverances are illusions, then what you have is a reductio ad absurdum<\/em> of one or more of the premises with which the reasoning began.  Dennett assumes physicalism and that everything can be explained in physical terms.  This leads to absurdity. But Dennett, blinded by his own brilliance — don't forget, he counts himself one of the 'brights'<\/a> – bites the bullet. He'd rather break his teeth than examine his assumptions.<\/span><\/p>\n

Another thing strikes me. Dennett makes much of Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest and scientific images. 'Image' is not quite the right word. An image is someone's image. But whose image is the scientific image? Who is its subject? It is arguably our image no less than the manifest image.  Nagel quotes Dennett as saying of the manifest image: "It\u2019s the world according to us<\/em>."  But the same, or something very similar, is true of the scientific image: it's the world in itself according to us<\/em>.  Talk of molecules, atoms, electrons, quarks, and strings is our talk just as much as talk of colors and plants and animals and haircuts and home runs.  <\/span><\/p>\n

The world of physics is the world as it is in itself according to us<\/em>.  Arguably, the 'according to us' gets the upper hand over the 'in itself,' relativizing what comes within the former's  scope much like Kant's transcendental prefix, Ich denke <\/em>relativizes what comes within its scope.<\/em>  Das 'ich denke' muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten koennen<\/em> . . . .  "The ''I think' must be able to accompany all my representations." (KdrV<\/em>, B 131-2)<\/span><\/p>\n

Arguably, the world of physics is a mind-involving construct arrived at by excluding the mental and abstracting away from the first-person point of view and the life world it reveals.  I am alluding to an phenomenological-idealist approach to the problem of integrating the first- and third-person points of view.  It has its own problems. But why is it inferior to a view like Dennett's which eliminates as illusory obvious data that are plainly not illusory?<\/span><\/p>\n

No philosophy is worth anything that gets the phenomenology wrong, or simply ignores the phenomenology. For that is where we must start if we are responsible philosophers, as opposed to apologist for theories we accept without critical examination.<\/span><\/p>\n

Time was when absolute idealism was the default position in philosophy. Think back to the days of Bradley and Bosanquet. But reaction set in, times have changed, and the Zeitgeist<\/em> is now against the privileging of Mind and for the apotheosis of Matter.  (But again, matter as construed by us. Arguably, the scientific realist reifies theoretical constructs that we create and employ to make sense of experience.)  Because idealism is out of vogue, the best and brightest are not drawn to its defense, and the brilliant few it attracts are too few to make much headway against the prevailing winds.<\/span><\/p>\n

Now I'll tell you what I really think. The problem of integrating the first- and third-person points of view is genuine and perhaps the deepest of all philosophical problems. But it is insoluble by us.  If it does have a solution, however, it certainly won't be anything like Dennett's.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although Dennett's positive theory is worthless, his excesses are extremely useful in helping us see just how deep and many-sided and intractable the problem is.  <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The following just in from a Scandinavian reader: Thank you for your great blog, I\u2019ve been a regular reader for some time! You have often made the point, that it is incoherent to say that consciousness in an illusion, because it is a presupposition to the distinction between appearance and reality. In an interesting article … Continue reading “Once More on Whether Consciousness Could be an Illusion”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[96,366],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4754","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-consciousness-and-qualia","category-dennett"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4754","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4754"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4754\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4754"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4754"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4754"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}