{"id":4709,"date":"2018-03-08T12:38:04","date_gmt":"2018-03-08T12:38:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/03\/08\/kant-on-suicide-2\/"},"modified":"2018-03-08T12:38:04","modified_gmt":"2018-03-08T12:38:04","slug":"kant-on-suicide-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/03\/08\/kant-on-suicide-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Kant on Suicide"},"content":{"rendered":"

Is suicide ever morally permissible?<\/span><\/p>\n

Cutting against the Enlightenment grain, Kant delivers a resoundingly negative verdict. Suicide is always and everywhere morally wrong. This entry is part of an effort to understand his position. Unfortunately, Kant's treatment is exceedingly murky and one of his arguments is hard to square with what he says elsewhere. In his Lectures on Ethics<\/em> (tr. Infield, Hackett Publishing, no date), the great champion of autonomy seems to recommend abject heteronomy: <\/span><\/p>\n

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God is our owner; we are His property; His providence works for our good. A bondsman in the case of a beneficent master deserves punishment if he opposes his master's wishes. (154)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

\"Kant<\/a>It is hard to see how this coheres with Kant's talk of persons as ends in themselves in  Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/em> (AA 428). For Kant, rational beings, whether biologically human or not, are persons. Persons, unlike things, are ends in themselves. As such, they may not be used as mere means. I may not treat another person as a mere means nor may I so treat myself. For Kant there are duties to oneself and they take precedence over duties to others since "nothing can be expected from a man who dishonours his own person." (118) The highest duty to oneself is that of self-preservation. Suicide is contrary to this highest duty and is therefore morally impermissible in all circumstances. The prohibition against suicide is exceptionless.<\/span><\/p>\n

But how can a person be an end in itself if finite persons are created by God for his<\/em> purposes? How can persons be ends in themselves if God owns us and we are his property?  Is suicide wrong because it violates God's property rights? If anyone has property rights in my body, it would have to be me wouldn't it?  Is man God's slave? So man is both free and enslaved?<\/span><\/p>\n

Furthermore, if it is morally permissible for God to use finite persons as mere means to his end, self-glorification, say, then how could it be wrong for a person to treat himself as a mere means when he commits suicide?<\/span><\/p>\n

We can put the underlying puzzle as a aporetic dyad:<\/span><\/p>\n

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1) My dignity, worth, autonomy, freedom, and irreplaceable uniqueness as a person derive from my having been created in the image and likeness of an absolutely unique free being who is the eminently personal source of all Being, truth, and value.  My higher origin and destiny elevate me infinitely far above the rest of creation.  I am animal, but also a spirit, and thus not merely an animal. I cannot be understood naturalistically as merely a more highly evolved animal.<\/span><\/p>\n

2) If I am created by God both as a material being and as a person, then I cannot be an end in myself possessing autonomy and the other attributes mentioned.  For if God creates and sustains me moment by moment in every aspect of my being, then also in my being a subject, a self-determining person. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

What I have just sketched is a form of the ultimate paradox of divine creation<\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n

Note that the freedom mentioned in (1) is not the compatibilist "freedom of the turnspit" as Kant derisively calls it, but the freedom of a (noumenal) agent who has the power to initiate a causal chain ex nihilo<\/em> by performing an act that he could have refrained from performing, and is therefore morally responsible for performing.  This rich non-compatibilist notion of freedom implies a god-like power in man that no merely natural (phenomenal) being possesses or could possess. This freedom points to a divine origin and is the respect in which we bear the image of God within us.  The freedom of the human creature mirrors the freedom of the creator.<\/span><\/p>\n

But how is this freedom and dignity and personal uniqueness, which we cannot possess except as God's creatures, logically compatible with our creature status? Presupposed is  a robust conception of creation as creatio continuans<\/em> according to which the entire being<\/em> of the creature is sustained ongoingly by divine power  (Any less robust a conception would injure the divine sovereignty.) How can the inviolable interiority of a person maintain itself in the face of God's creative omniscience?<\/span><\/p>\n

Some will say that the paradox is a contradiction and both limbs cannot be true. Other will say that the paradox is a mystery: both limbs are true, but we cannot in this life understand how they could both be true.<\/span><\/p>\n

The paradox is at the root of Kant's uncompromising attitude toward the morality of suicide. He prohibits it without exception despite man's freedom and autonomy because of their derivation from God. We are ends in ourselves, which implies that it is wrong for anyone, including God, to treat us as mere means; yet we are God's property and for this reason not morally justified in disposing of ourselves.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant's Exceptionless Prohibition of Suicide as Essentially Christian and Unjustifiable Otherwise<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Christianity too issues a total and exceptionless prohibition against suicide. The classical (philosophical as opposed to theological) arguments of Augustine and Aquinas against suicide are, however, uncompelling, as the Christian Paul Ludwig Landsberg shows.  Thus he maintains<\/a> that <\/span><\/p>\n

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. . . the total prohibition of suicide can only be justified or even understood in relation to the scandal and the paradox of the cross.  It is true that we belong to God, as Christ belonged to God. It is true that we should subordinate our will to His, as Christ did.  It is true that we should leave the decision as to our life or death to Him.  If we wish to die, we have indeed the right to pray to God to let us die.  Yet we must always add: Thy will, not mine, be done.  But this God is not our master as if we were slaves.  He is our Father.  He is the Christian God who loves us with infinite love and infinite wisdom.  If He makes us suffer, it is for our salvation and purification.  We must recall the spirit in which Christ suffered the most horrible death. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Here, perhaps, is the key to our puzzle. The puzzle, again, is how the Sage of Koenigsberg, the Enlightenment champion of human freedom and autonomy, can maintain that, no matter how horrific the circumstances, one may never justifiably take one's own life. The key is the need to suffer for purification. The fallen world is as it were a penal colony and we must serve our time. Suicide is jailbreak and for that reason never justified.<\/span><\/p>\n

What I am suggesting is that if we read Kant's suicide doctrine in the light of Christianity it makes a certain amount of (paradoxical) sense, and that if one refuses to do this and reads it in a wholly secular light, then there is no justification for its exceptionless prohibition of suicide. I hope to test this thesis in further posts. <\/span><\/p>\n

Landsberg again:<\/span><\/p>\n

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All that we can say to the suffering man who is tempted to commit suicide, is this \u201cRemember the suffering of Christ and the martyrs.  You must carry your cross, as they did.  You will not cease to suffer, but the cross of suffering itself will grow sweet by virtue of an unknown strength proceeding from the heart of divine love.  You must not kill yourself, because you must not throw away your cross.  You need it.  And enquire of your conscience if you are really innocent. You will find that if you are perhaps innocent of one thing for which the world reproaches you, you are guilty in a thousand other ways.  You are a sinner.  If Christ, who was innocent, suffered for others and, as Pascal said, has also shed a drop of blood for you, how shall you, a sinner, be entitled to refuse suffering?  Perhaps it is a form of punishment.  But divine punishment has this specific and incomparable quality, that it is not revenge and that its very nature is purification.  Whoever revolts against it, revolts in fact against the inner meaning of his own life.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

\"Landsberg\"<\/a>Paul Ludwig Landsberg, geboren 1901 in Bonn, wurde 1927 Ordinarius f\u00fcr Philosophie und emigrierte 1933 zun\u00e4chst nach Spanien, dann nach Frankreich. Der Sch\u00fcler von Max Scheler und Edmund Husserl war w\u00e4hrend der franz\u00f6sischen Emigration eng mit dem Coll\u00e8ge de Sociologie verbunden und starb 1944 im Konzentrationslager Oranienburg.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Is suicide ever morally permissible? Cutting against the Enlightenment grain, Kant delivers a resoundingly negative verdict. Suicide is always and everywhere morally wrong. This entry is part of an effort to understand his position. Unfortunately, Kant's treatment is exceedingly murky and one of his arguments is hard to square with what he says elsewhere. In his Lectures … Continue reading “Kant on Suicide”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[58,60,270,472,349],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4709","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-christian-doctrine","category-ethics","category-kant","category-landsberg-paul-ludwig","category-suicide"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4709","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4709"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4709\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4709"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4709"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4709"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}