{"id":4677,"date":"2018-03-20T06:22:47","date_gmt":"2018-03-20T06:22:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/03\/20\/further-pyrrhonian-ponderings-are-there-two-kinds-of-assent\/"},"modified":"2018-03-20T06:22:47","modified_gmt":"2018-03-20T06:22:47","slug":"further-pyrrhonian-ponderings-are-there-two-kinds-of-assent","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/03\/20\/further-pyrrhonian-ponderings-are-there-two-kinds-of-assent\/","title":{"rendered":"Further Pyrrhonian Ponderings: Are There Two Kinds of Assent?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Michael Frede urges a distinction between two kinds of assent. The one he calls "just having a view," and the other "making a claim, taking a position." ("The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge" in Philosophy in History<\/em>, eds. Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner, Cambridge UP, 1984, p. 261.)<\/span><\/p>\n

Now suppose there are these two kinds of assent.  The Skeptic would then have the resources to rebut a fairly obvious criticism, namely, that he himself dogmatizes in a number of ways, that he himself is doxastically committed despite his avowed aim of living adoxastos<\/em>, without beliefs.<\/span><\/p>\n

A critic might urge the following:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

He who treads the Skeptic Path is committed to the value of ataraxia<\/em>, and this value-commitment obviously transcends his present impressions.  It is the organizing principle behind his therapeutic procedures and his entire way of life, a way of life he recommends to his future self and to others. It is what his quasi-medicinal treatments are for<\/em>. Ataraxia<\/em> is the goal, the 'final cause,' of the therapy.  So here we have a doxastic-axiological commitment that is part and parcel of the Skeptic Way.  The Skeptic would appear to be involved in some form of self-deception were he to say that it only seems to him here and now that ataraxia<\/em> is a high goal or that it is a high goal only for him.  Plainly, he is advocating his way of life for his future self and for other selves.  He is a partisan for his way of life and is at odds with the partisans of other ways of life. <\/span><\/p>\n

This shows that the Skeptic Way  is not viable: the Skeptic essays to live without belief, but one cannot live without beliefs and commitments, including beliefs about the supposed defects of alternative ways of life.  One needs all sort of beliefs about ataraxia<\/em>, its nature, its value, its relation to happiness, our capacity to achieve it, the means of achieving it, its superiority to other states thought to be conducive to happiness, and so on.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

A similar problem arises with the respect to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC).  Is the Skeptic committed to it or not? Does he accept it or not?  It seems he must accept it. After all, he needs it. Ataraxia<\/em> is supposed to supervene upon the suspension of judgment. Suspension, however, arises from the state of evidential equipoise when it is seen that the arguments for thesis and antithesis balance and cancel out. The background assumption, of course, is that a thesis and its negation cannot both be true. The Skeptic appears committed to the truth of (LNC) as part of his therapeutic procedure.<\/span><\/p>\n

So our Skeptic appears to have at least this one belief, namely, that (LNC) is true.  He cannot live without beliefs.  There is a line from Husserl's diary I have long loved: Alle Leben ist Stellungnehmen<\/em>, "All living is the taking of a position."  One cannot live 'positionlessly.' Or so say I.<\/span><\/p>\n

If Frede is right, however, the Skeptic can plausibly rebut this line of criticism.  He thinks one can have a view without making a claim or taking a position.  If so, then one can withhold assent from all claims and position-takings while yet assenting in a different sense.<\/span><\/p>\n

I am afraid I don't buy it. Let me see if I can explain why. The question in one form is whether one can validily move from<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1) It seems to me, here and now, that p<\/span><\/p>\n

to <\/span><\/p>\n

2) It seems to me, here and now, that p is true.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I say the move is valid: necessarily, if it seems that p, then it seems that p is true.  Similarly, to accept (believe, judge, affirm, assert, assent) that p is to accept (believe judge, affirm, assert, assent) that p is true.  No doubt my acceptance of p as true is consistent with p's being false, just as its seeming-to be-true that p is consistent with p's being false. The point is that to accept is to accept-as-true. There is no accepting-as-false.  Necessarily, if it seems to me here and now  to be true that p, then is seems to me here and now that p is true.<\/span><\/p>\n

So I say there is one one kind of assent, and that no kind of assent is noncommittal. <\/span><\/p>\n

Belief is oriented toward truth whether or not it attains truth. Knowledge is also oriented toward truth, but in a different way. Necessarily, if S knows that p, then p is true. There is no false knowledge. But there is false belief.  But both knowledge and belief aim at truth. It is just that knowledge always, and indeed necessarily, hits the mark, whereas one's being in a belief state with respect to a proposition is no gurantee that the proposition is true. <\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
<\/a>Facts, Opinions, and Common Core<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>A Peace Worth Wanting? Problems with Pyrrhonian <i>Ataraxia<\/i>: Passivity and Porcinity<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Michael Frede urges a distinction between two kinds of assent. The one he calls "just having a view," and the other "making a claim, taking a position." ("The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge" in Philosophy in History, eds. Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner, Cambridge UP, 1984, p. 261.) … Continue reading “Further Pyrrhonian Ponderings: Are There Two Kinds of Assent?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4677","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ancient-skepticism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4677","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4677"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4677\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4677"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4677"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4677"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}