{"id":4545,"date":"2018-05-07T15:07:30","date_gmt":"2018-05-07T15:07:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/05\/07\/the-generalized-ought-implies-can-principle-and-novaks-objection\/"},"modified":"2018-05-07T15:07:30","modified_gmt":"2018-05-07T15:07:30","slug":"the-generalized-ought-implies-can-principle-and-novaks-objection","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/05\/07\/the-generalized-ought-implies-can-principle-and-novaks-objection\/","title":{"rendered":"The Generalized Ought-Implies-Can Principle and Nov\u00e1k’s Objection"},"content":{"rendered":"

This entry is an addendum to my Prague paper (see link below) in which I deploy a principle I call GOC, a principle that comes under withering fire in the ComBox from Dr. Luk\u00e1\u0161 Nov\u00e1k.  Here is my reformulation of his objection.  You will have to consult my Prague paper to see what I mean by 'really possible.' Neither of us are metaphysical naturalists, but we are assuming naturalism to be true for the sake of this discussion. The burden of my Prague paper is to show that metaphysical naturalism is not logically consistent with David Benatar's claim that "while some lives are better than others, none are (noncomparatively or objectively) good." (The Human Predicament<\/em>  67)<\/span><\/p>\n

1) Necessarily, if a state of affairs S ought to be, then S is really possible. (GOC)<\/span><\/p>\n

2) That no child starves is a state of affairs that ought to be. (Novak's plausible premise. It is supposed to hold whether or not naturalism is true.)<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore:<\/span><\/p>\n

3) That no child starves is really possible. (1, 2)<\/span><\/p>\n

But:<\/span><\/p>\n

4) That no child starves is not<\/em> really possible on naturalism. (Premise I share with Novak:  e.g., a child who is the sole survivor of a shipwreck washes ashore  on a deserted island where there is no food.)<\/span><\/p>\n

5) (3) and (4) are mutually contradictory.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore, by reductio ad absurdum<\/em>,<\/span><\/p>\n

6) Either (1) is false or (2) is false or (4) is false.<\/span><\/p>\n

7) (2) and (4) are both true. (Novak assumes)<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

8) (1) is false.<\/span><\/p>\n

How might I respond? Well, I agree that (4) is true.  And I have a separate argument for (1). So I argue that, on naturalism, (2) is false.  Thus I argue:<\/span><\/p>\n

1) Necessarily, if a state of affairs S ought to be, then S is really possible. (GOC)<\/span><\/p>\n

4) That no child starves is not<\/em> really possible on naturalism.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

~2) It is not the case that on naturalism no child's starving ought to be.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is the analog of the cases of the ought-to-do in which an agent cannot do X. If an agent cannot do X, then it is not the case that he ought to do X. <\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
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<\/a>Is the Quality of Life Objectively Evaluable on Naturalism?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This entry is an addendum to my Prague paper (see link below) in which I deploy a principle I call GOC, a principle that comes under withering fire in the ComBox from Dr. Luk\u00e1\u0161 Nov\u00e1k.  Here is my reformulation of his objection.  You will have to consult my Prague paper to see what I mean by … Continue reading “The Generalized Ought-Implies-Can Principle and Nov\u00e1k’s Objection”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[281,396,282,440],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4545","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-anti-natalism","category-axiology","category-benatar-david","category-normativity"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4545","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4545"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4545\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4545"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4545"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4545"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}