{"id":4292,"date":"2018-08-24T13:23:02","date_gmt":"2018-08-24T13:23:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/08\/24\/more-on-divine-simplicity-and-modal-collapse\/"},"modified":"2018-08-24T13:23:02","modified_gmt":"2018-08-24T13:23:02","slug":"more-on-divine-simplicity-and-modal-collapse","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/08\/24\/more-on-divine-simplicity-and-modal-collapse\/","title":{"rendered":"More on Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse"},"content":{"rendered":"

This entry continues my ruminations<\/a> on whether the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) entails modal collapse (MC). The commenters in the earlier thread gave me no reason to think that DDS does not entail MC. But one of them sent me to Christopher Tomaszewski's paper<\/a> which is worth reading and deserves a response.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tomaszewski presents one of R. T. Mullins' arguments as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1) Necessarily, God exists.<\/span>
2) God is identical to God\u2019s act of creation.<\/span>
Therefore<\/span>
3) Necessarily, God\u2019s act of creation exists.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Tomaszewski claims that above argument is invalid and for the same reason that the following argument is invalid:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

7) Necessarily, God exists.<\/span>
8) God is identical to the Creator.<\/span>
Therefore<\/span>
9) Necessarily, the Creator exists.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Now the second argument is clearly invalid. It takes us from true premises to a false conclusion. God exists in every possible world. But in only some worlds does he instantiate the role of Creator. So it is not the case that the Creator exists in every possible world.<\/span><\/p>\n

Some find the Leibnizian patois of 'possible worlds' puzzling. I don't need it. The point can be made without it, as follows. God exists of metaphysical necessity. But he does not create of metaphysical necessity: creation is a contingent act. Therefore, it is not the case that, necessarily, God is the Creator. Had he created nothing, he would exist without being Creator.<\/span><\/p>\n

So the second of the two arguments is invalid. Now if the first argument has the same logical form as the second, then it too will be invalid.  But the first argument does not have the same logical form as the second.<\/span><\/p>\n

The form of the first is:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Necessarily, for some x, x = a.<\/span>
a = b.<\/span>
ergo<\/span>
Necessarily, for some x, x = b.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Clearly, this argument-form is valid, whence it follows that any argument having this form is valid. I am assuming that the individual constants 'a' and 'b' are Kripkean rigid designators: they denote the same object in every possible world in which the object exists.  I am also assuming Kripke's Necessity of Identity principle: For any x, y if x = y, then necessarily, x = y.  By instantiation, if a = b, then necessarily a = b. Now if necessarily a<\/em> exists, and a<\/em> cannot exist without being identical to b<\/em>, then necessarily b<\/em> exists.<\/span><\/p>\n

Contra Tomaszewski, the arguments have different forms. The first instantiates a valid form and is therefore valid while the second instantiates an invalid form and is therefore invalid.<\/span><\/p>\n

I expect someone to object that (2) above – God is identical to God\u2019s act of creation — is not an instance of the logical form a = b<\/em>, where the terms flanking the identity sign are Kripkean rigid designators. But I say they are; indeed they are strongly<\/em> rigid designators.  A rigid designator is a term that picks out the same item in every possible world in which the item exists. A strongly rigid designator is a term that picks out the same item in every possible world, period.  Thus the designatum of a strongly rigid designator is a necessary being.<\/span><\/p>\n

My claim, then, is that (2) is a statement of identity and that  'God' and 'God's act of creation' in (2) are both strongly rigid designators. My claim is entailed by DDS which says, among other things, that there is no real distinction in God between agent and action.  So if God is identical to his act of creating our universe, and God exists in every possible world, then the creation of our universe occurs in every possible world, which in turn entails modal collapse.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tomaszevski has an interesting response (pp. 7-8):<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

While God\u2019s act is indeed intrinsic (and therefore identical) to Him, \u201cGod\u2019s act of creation\u201d designates that act, not how it is in itself, but by way of its contingent effects. That is, whether \u201cGod\u2019s act of creation\u201d designates God\u2019s act depends on the existence of a creation which is contingent, and so the designation is not rigid. And since the designation is not rigid, the identity statement is not necessary, as it must be in order to validate the argument from modal collapse. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This response begs the question. For it assumes that the effect of the divine act of creation is contingent. But that is precisely the question!  If you just assume — as we all want to assume –  that creation is contingent, then of course there is no modal collapse. The issue, however, is whether one can adhere to that assumption while holding fast to DDS.  Besides, the second sentence in the above quotation makes little or no sense. The act of creation is individuated by the object of creation (our universe, say, in all its detail); an act of divine creation is nothing without its object.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Am I assuming what I need to prove (and thus begging the question) when I insist that (2) above is necessarily true and thus that the first argument is valid?  No, I am merely unpacking what DDS implies.  <\/span><\/p>\n

My conclusion is that Tomszevski has clarified the problem for us, but he has not refuted the above argument from DDS to MC.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This entry continues my ruminations on whether the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) entails modal collapse (MC). The commenters in the earlier thread gave me no reason to think that DDS does not entail MC. But one of them sent me to Christopher Tomaszewski's paper which is worth reading and deserves a response. Tomaszewski presents … Continue reading “More on Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[141,235],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4292","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-divine-simplicity","category-modal-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4292","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4292"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4292\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4292"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4292"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4292"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}