{"id":4036,"date":"2018-12-23T11:55:06","date_gmt":"2018-12-23T11:55:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/12\/23\/a-weird-fregean-ontological-argument\/"},"modified":"2018-12-23T11:55:06","modified_gmt":"2018-12-23T11:55:06","slug":"a-weird-fregean-ontological-argument","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2018\/12\/23\/a-weird-fregean-ontological-argument\/","title":{"rendered":"A Weird ‘Fregean’ Ontological Argument"},"content":{"rendered":"

London Ed asks:<\/span><\/p>\n

Which step of the argument below do you disagree with?<\/span><\/p>\n

a) If a sentence containing a proper name is meaningful, then the proper name is meaningful, i.e. it designates.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is a standard assumption about compositionality.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

BV: I have a  problem right here. I accept the compositionality of meaning. But a proper name can have meaning without designating anything.  As I see it, meaning splits into sense (Sinn<\/em>) and reference (Bedeutung<\/em>).  And I don't see any need to distinguish between reference and designation. So there can be a proper name that has meaning (sense) without designating anything. 'Vulcan' (the planet) is an example.   Here is another:
<\/span><\/p>\n

'Kepler died in misery.'  The sentence is meaningful; hence, by compositionality, 'Kepler' is meaningful.  Now assume that presentism is true and that only present items exist. Then Kepler does not exist.  (Of course he does not exist now; the presentist implication is that he does not exist at all<\/em>.)  If Kepler does not exist at all, then he cannot now be referred to or designated.  But when I now assertively utter 'Kepler died in misery,' I assert a proposition that is true now and is therefore meaningful now. It follows that the meaning of 'Kepler' is not exhausted by its designatum.  'Kepler' is not a mere Millian tag.  There may be Millian tags, but ordinary proper names are not such.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Now London Ed is, I think, a presentist. If so, he ought to be open to the above argument.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

b) If the proper name does not designate, the sentence containing it is not meaningful (contraposition).<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

BV: That is the case only if the meaning of a name = its referent, the thing designated.  That cannot be. Consider 'Vulcan does not exist.' It's true, hence meaningful. So 'Vulcan' has a meaning, by compositionality. If so, and if meaning = referent, then 'Vulcan' does not have meaning. Contradiction. Ergo, a proper name can have meaning without designating anything.  Negative existentials are a real problem for Millian theories of names.
<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

c) If \u2018God does not exist\u2019 is true, then \u2018God\u2019 does not designate.
<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

BV: No doubt.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

d) If \u2018God does not exist\u2019 is true, then \u2018God does not exist\u2019 is meaningless.
<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

BV: That is the case only on the assumption that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its reference, i.e., that the meaning of a name just is its designatum.  The assumption is false.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

e) \u2018God does not exist\u2019 is not meaningless. (it is something debated over many centuries, no firm conclusion so far)<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

BV: That's right!
<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

f) \u2018God does not exist\u2019 is meaningful, but not true (d and e above)<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

BV: That follows, but (d) is false.
<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

g) \u2018God does exist\u2019 is true (excluded middle)<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

 BV: Valid move, but again (d) is false. So argument unsound.
<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

h) Therefore God exists (disquotation)<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

BV: Valid inference, but again unsound.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

London Ed asks: Which step of the argument below do you disagree with? a) If a sentence containing a proper name is meaningful, then the proper name is meaningful, i.e. it designates. This is a standard assumption about compositionality. BV: I have a  problem right here. I accept the compositionality of meaning. But a proper … Continue reading “A Weird ‘Fregean’ Ontological Argument”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[408,271],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4036","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-language-philosophy-of","category-ontological-arguments"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4036","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4036"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4036\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4036"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4036"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4036"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}