{"id":3995,"date":"2019-01-20T14:36:28","date_gmt":"2019-01-20T14:36:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2019\/01\/20\/assertion-and-truth-in-itself\/"},"modified":"2019-01-20T14:36:28","modified_gmt":"2019-01-20T14:36:28","slug":"assertion-and-truth-in-itself","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2019\/01\/20\/assertion-and-truth-in-itself\/","title":{"rendered":"Assertion and Truth In Itself"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Ostrich reports that  he gave up on my transcendental argument from assertion to truth<\/a> when he came to this paragraph:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

To further unpack the concept of assertion, we note that whatever is asserted is asserted to be true independently of one's asserting it<\/em>. <\/span> Of course, it does not follow from one's asserting that p that p is<\/em> true independently of one's asserting it.  That's a further question. The point is rather that the act of assertion purports<\/em> to get at reality as it is in itself.  This is a matter of conceptual necessity: the act of assertion would not be what it is if it did have a built-in nisus or directedness toward truth. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

He grants that " it can be true that p even though no one asserts that p, or believes that p, or thinks that p.<\/span>" But he has trouble with "reality as it is in itself." <\/span><\/p>\n

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But \u2018the act of assertion purports to get at reality as it is in itself\u2019? And I still don\u2019t really understand the \u2018act\u2019 involved in asserting. I agree that uttering the utterance \u2018grass is green\u2019 is an act. Definitely an act. Is it an \u2018act of assertion\u2019? Well the utterance-act is performed against the backdrop of conventional meaning and so forth. The conventional or literal meaning of the English sentence \u2018grass is green\u2019 is that grass is green. So the utterer is aiming to communicate the proposition (in your sense of \u2018proposition\u2019) that grass is green. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

To assert that grass is green I must produce a token of a sentence (sentence-type) in some language that has the meaning that 'grass is green' has in English. So I can assert that grass is green by the assertive utterance of '<\/span>das Gras ist gr\u00fcn': I don't need to be speaking English. But let's stick to our mother tongue.
<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

We can use 'sentence' and 'sentence type' interchangeably. But we must scrupulously distinguish sentences\/sentence types from sentence tokens.  I use 'token' both as a noun and as a verb. One way to token a sentence is by uttering it. Another way is by writing it on a piece of paper. A third is by carving it into stone. And of course there are other more sophisticated ways of tokening or encoding a sentence.  To utter a sentence is to say it, whether sotto voce<\/em>, or loudly. But you have to use your tongue and vocal cords, etc.  An utterance is the act of an agent. The speaker is  the agent; the saying or speaking of the words composing a sentence is the act. We can use 'inscribe' to covering tokenings that do not require speech, as when I write 'Sally is drunk' on a piece of paper and hand it to you to convey to you the proposition that — wait for it — Sally is drunk!  I can do that in such away that it constitutes an assertion and is taken by you to be one.  <\/span><\/span>And let's be clear that by sentences in this discussion we mean sentences in the indicative mood.  I discern no difference between such a sentence and a declarative sentence.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Are you with me so far?<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Now suppose I assert that grass is green and I do so in English.  To do this I must produce a token of 'Grass is green' either by utterance or by inscription or in some other way such as sign language.   I produce this token with the intention of (i) expressing a proposition or thought and (ii) conveying it to my hearer or reader.  I intend by my act of communication to convey to my hearer  or reader what I take to be a truth, where a truth is a true proposition.  <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

To assert is to assert something.  We must distinguish the asserting from that which is asserted.  That which is asserted is the proposition. Now what I assert, I assert to be true. That's analytic: I am merely unpacking (analyzing) the concept of assertion.
<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Now stop and think about that. It would make no sense to say that what one asserts, one asserts to be false. Of course, one can assert that a certain proposition is false. For example, I can assert that the proposition Trafalgar Square is in Brighton <\/em>is false. But this is no counterexample to my claim since I assert it to be true that the proposition in question is false.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, not everything I assert to be true IS true in reality. But that does not alter the fact that whenever one makes an assertion, the proposition one asserts is asserted to be true.  Every sincere assertion aims at truth whether or not it hits the target. Every sincere assertion is truth-directed as a matter of conceptual necessity.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

To assert, then, is to assert to be true. But not only that. What I assert to be true I assert to be true independently of my asserting it or anyone's asserting it.  What is true independently of anyone's asserting it is true in itself. What is true in itself is true in reality.  What is true in reality is true extramentally and extralinguistically. 
<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

We can therefore say that anyone who makes an assertion purports to say something true about reality as it is in itself.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Alles klar?<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Ostrich reports that  he gave up on my transcendental argument from assertion to truth when he came to this paragraph: To further unpack the concept of assertion, we note that whatever is asserted is asserted to be true independently of one's asserting it.  Of course, it does not follow from one's asserting that p … Continue reading “Assertion and Truth In Itself”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[636,228],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3995","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-assertion","category-truth"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3995","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3995"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3995\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3995"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3995"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3995"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}