{"id":3850,"date":"2019-04-15T16:40:58","date_gmt":"2019-04-15T16:40:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2019\/04\/15\/presentism-and-existence-entailing-relations-a-problem-and-fesers-solution\/"},"modified":"2019-04-15T16:40:58","modified_gmt":"2019-04-15T16:40:58","slug":"presentism-and-existence-entailing-relations-a-problem-and-fesers-solution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2019\/04\/15\/presentism-and-existence-entailing-relations-a-problem-and-fesers-solution\/","title":{"rendered":"Presentism and Existence-Entailing Relations: A Problem and Feser’s Solution"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

The is is the second installment in my critique of Edward Feser's defense of presentism in his latest book, Aristotle's Revenge<\/em>.  Here<\/a> is Part I of the critique.<\/span><\/p>\n

…………………………………….<\/span><\/p>\n

It is plausibly maintained that all relations are existence-entailing. To illustrate from the dyadic case: if R relates a<\/em> and b<\/em>, then both a<\/em> and b<\/em> exist.   A relation cannot hold unless the things between which or among which it holds all exist.  A weaker, and hence even more plausible, claim is that all relations are existence-symmetric: if R relates a<\/em> and b<\/em>, then either both relata exist or both do not exist. Both the stronger and the weaker claims rule out the possibility of a relation that relates an existent and a nonexistent. So if Cerberus is eating my cat, then Cerberus exists. And if I am thinking about Cerberus, then, given that Cerberus does not exist, my thinking does not relate me to Cerberus.  This implies that  intentionality is not a relation, strictly speaking, though it is, as Franz Brentano says, relation-like (ein Relativliches<\/em>).<\/p>\n

But if presentism is true, and only temporally present items exist, then no relation connects a present with a non-present item, whether a wholly past item or a wholly future one. This seems hard to accept for the following reason.<\/p>\n

I ate lunch  an hour ago. So the event of my eating (E) is earlier than the event of my typing (T). How can it be true that E bears the earlier than<\/em> relation to T, and T bears the later than<\/em> relation to E, unless both E and T exist? But E is non-present. If presentism is true, then E does not exist.  It's not just that E does not exist now, which is trivially true, but that E does not exist at all. And if E does not exist at all,  then E does not stand in the earlier than<\/em> relation to T which does exist, and not merely in the present-tensed sense of 'exists,' but in the sense in which E does not exist.   If, on the other hand, there are events that exist but are non-present, then presentism is false.<\/span><\/p>\n

The principle that all genuine relations are existence-symmetric seems inconsistent with presentism.  Now which of these two principles is more reasonably believed?  I should think it is the first.<\/p>\n

How might the presentist respond? Since E does not exist on his view, while T does, and E is earlier than T, he must either (A) deny that all relations are existence-symmetric, or (B) deny that earlier than<\/em> is a relation. He must either allow the possibility of genuine relations that connect nonexistents and existents, or deny that T stands in a temporal relation to E.<\/p>\n

To  fully savor the problem we  cast it in the mold of an aporetic tetrad:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1. All genuine relations are either existence-entailing or existence-symmetric.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. Earlier than<\/em> is a genuine relation.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Presentism: only temporally present items exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

4. Some events are earlier than others.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Each limb of the tetrad is exceedingly plausible.  But they cannot all be true:  any three, taken together, entail the negation of the remaining limb.  For example, the first three entail the negation of the fourth.  To solve the problem, we must reject one of the limbs.  Now (4) cannot be rejected because it is a datum.<\/span><\/p>\n

Will you deny (1) and say that there are relations that are neither existence-entailing nor existence-symmetric?  I find this hard to swallow because of the following argument.  (a) Nothing can have properties unless it exists.  Therefore (b) nothing can have relational properties unless it exists. (c) Every relation gives rise to relational properties:  if Rab<\/em>, then a<\/em> has the property of standing in R to b<\/em>, and b<\/em> has the property of standing in R to a.  Therefore, (d) if R relates a<\/em> and b<\/em>, then both a<\/em> and b<\/em> exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

Will you deny (2) and say that earlier than<\/em> is not a genuine relation?  What else could it be?<\/span><\/p>\n

Will you deny presentism and say that that both present and non-present items exist?  Since it is obvious that present and non-present items cannot exist in the present-tense sense of 'exists,'  the suggestion has to be that present and non-present (past or future) items exist in a tenseless sense of 'exist.'  But what exactly does this mean? 'Eternalism' is also problematic and I am not endorsing it. <\/span><\/p>\n

The problem is genuine, but there appears to be no good solution, no solution that does not involve its own difficulties.<\/span><\/p>\n

But if there is a solution it would have to be by rejecting presentism since it is the least credible of the four propositions above.<\/span><\/p>\n

Feser's Response<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Feser maintains that objections to presentism along the foregoing lines rest on the assumption that "for a relation to hold between two things, they both have to exist now<\/em>." (301) But this is not the operative assumption. The operative assumption is simply that for an n-adic relation to hold between or among n relata, all the relata have to exist, period. They have to exist simpliciter; they don't have to exist now<\/em>.  The eternalist can easily satisfy the demand by saying that events E and T exist simpliciter despite E's being earlier than T.  Whatever problems eternalism has, it has this going for it: it can explain how a past event can stand in a relation to a present event.  <\/span><\/p>\n

It is important to bear in mind that the presentist too must make use of the notion of existence simpliciter.  The thesis of presentism is not the logical truth that whatever exists (present-tense) exists now.  It is the thesis that whatever exists simpliciter exists now.  Equivalently: only present items exist simpliciter.  From this it follows that wholly past items such as the event of my having eaten lunch do not exist simpliciter. But then the objection is up and running.<\/span><\/p>\n

I conclude that Feser has not defused the objection to presentism from trans-temporal relations.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The is is the second installment in my critique of Edward Feser's defense of presentism in his latest book, Aristotle's Revenge.  Here is Part I of the critique. ……………………………………. It is plausibly maintained that all relations are existence-entailing. To illustrate from the dyadic case: if R relates a and b, then both a and b … Continue reading “Presentism and Existence-Entailing Relations: A Problem and Feser’s Solution”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,204],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3850","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-time-and-change"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3850","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3850"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3850\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3850"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3850"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3850"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}