{"id":3398,"date":"2020-01-20T13:40:04","date_gmt":"2020-01-20T13:40:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/01\/20\/the-infirmity-of-reason-1\/"},"modified":"2020-01-20T13:40:04","modified_gmt":"2020-01-20T13:40:04","slug":"the-infirmity-of-reason-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/01\/20\/the-infirmity-of-reason-1\/","title":{"rendered":"Could it be Reasonable to Affirm the Infirmity of Reason?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Any reasons one adduces in support of the thesis of  the infirmity of reason will share in the weakness of the faculty whose weakness is being affirmed.  Is this a problem for the proponent of the thesis? Does he contradict himself? Not obviously: he might simply accept the conclusion that the reasoning in support of the thesis is inconclusive.<\/span><\/p>\n

Suppose I argue that, with respect to all substantive philosophical theses, there there are good arguments  pro<\/em> and good arguments contra<\/em>, and that these arguments 'cancel out.'  Now my thesis is substantive, and so my thesis applies to itself, whence it follows that my meta-thesis has both good arguments for it and good arguments against it, and that they cancel out.<\/span><\/p>\n

Where is the problem? I am simply applying my meta-philosophical skepticism to itself, as I must if I am to be logically consistent.  Now I could make an exception for my meta-thesis, but that, I think, would be intolerably ad hoc<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

I am not dogmatically affirming the infirmity of reason; I am merely stating that there are reasons to accept it, reasons that are not conclusive.<\/span><\/p>\n

Deeper into this topic:<\/span><\/p>\n

Seriously Philosophical Theses and Argument Cancellation<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Thought, Action, Dogma, and De Maistre: The Infirmity of Reason<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Any reasons one adduces in support of the thesis of  the infirmity of reason will share in the weakness of the faculty whose weakness is being affirmed.  Is this a problem for the proponent of the thesis? Does he contradict himself? Not obviously: he might simply accept the conclusion that the reasoning in support of … Continue reading “Could it be Reasonable to Affirm the Infirmity of Reason?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[502,20,128],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3398","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-infirmity-of-reason","category-metaphilosophy","category-reason-and-rationality"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3398","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3398"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3398\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3398"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3398"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3398"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}