{"id":3067,"date":"2020-06-28T17:47:12","date_gmt":"2020-06-28T17:47:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/06\/28\/some-responses-to-tim-mosteller-re-existence\/"},"modified":"2020-06-28T17:47:12","modified_gmt":"2020-06-28T17:47:12","slug":"some-responses-to-tim-mosteller-re-existence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/06\/28\/some-responses-to-tim-mosteller-re-existence\/","title":{"rendered":"Some Responses to Tim Mosteller re: Existence"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following is from a work in progress by Tim Mosteller, posted with his permission.  I thank him for his critical engagement with my work. Here are some responses.  My corrections in red; my comments in blue.
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[A]<\/strong>2.3 The Bradleyen Regress Objection to Essential Exemplification1<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

So far, I have argued [in the sections above<\/span>] that existence is essential, and that our knowledge of it is derived from common sense experiences in the sections above.<\/span> Yet, the very idea that existence is essential exemplification is not without its challenges. I would like to consider one such challenge here, namely the challenge of the Bradleyen [Bradleyan<\/span>] regress regarding relations. If existence is essential exemplification, then there is a distinction between essence and existence and a relation involved.<\/span><\/p>\n

The argument against<\/span> [for<\/span>] the idea that existence exists has been argued<\/span> [presented<\/span>] by several recent philosophers. Two of them, William Vallicella and J.P. Moreland are realists about existence. They think that existence exists, and we can know it. Moreland\u2019s view is similar (although derived differently) from my view that existence is essential exemplification. Vallicella, although he agrees with Moreland\u2019s realism about existence, disagrees with Moreland (and me) that existence involves any sort of relation. Let me first sketch both Vallicella and Moreland\u2019s approaches to existence, and then show how Vallicella tries to argue against the idea that existence is essential exemplification by raising an argument against relations from William<\/span> [F. H<\/span>.] Bradley. <\/span><\/p>\n

[B]<\/strong>2.3.1 Moreland\u2019s Desideratic Approach<\/span><\/p>\n

This book is dedicated to J.P. Moreland. I\u2019ve learned a great deal about existence (and many other areas of metaphysics) from Moreland. His view of existence is essentially the same as the one I advocate in this book. However, Moreland does not derive his view of existence from common sense experience in the way that Klubertanz does. Moreland\u2019s approach starts from theoretical desiderata and builds the theory from there. Moreland\u2019s approach to understanding existence is derived from the following theoretical desiderata. A theory of existence must be:<\/span><\/p>\n

1) Consistent with and explain what actually does and does not exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

2) Consistent with and explain what could have existed but either does not exist or is not believed to exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

3) Allow for the fact that existence itself exists (not be self-refuting).<\/span><\/p>\n

4) Not violate the fundamental laws of logic.<\/span><\/p>\n

5) Allow for the existence of acts of knowing (Moreland and Craig 2003, pp. 188-189). <\/span><\/p>\n

Moreland elaborates on these desiderata for a theory of existence, in a response to the question of whether existence is a property and following Kant\u2019s argument that existence is not a property, Moreland claims that to assert \u2018x is real\u2019 \u201cdoes add something to x because there is, in fact, a real difference between existence and nonexistence\u201d (p. 190). <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: This is a point of Moreland's  I agree with, although I don't read Kant as denying it. Kant does not say that being or existence (Sein<\/em>) is not a property; what he says is that it is not a real predicate (reales Praedikat<\/em>), and what he means is that existence is a not a property that adds anything to the realitas<\/em> or quidditas<\/em> or whatness of  a thing.  Moreland and I agree that existence makes all the difference in the world; it is just that the difference it makes is not a quidditative one.<\/span> "To be or not to be; that is the question!"<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Moreland then proceeds by considering an existential statement<\/em> \u201cTigers exist.\u201d And from this derives a distinction between the property of being a tiger and the belonging of that property to an individual, e.g. Tony. From this, he concludes, \u201cThe claim that tigers exist is the claim that the essence of being a tiger (the what of being a tiger) is actually exemplified by or belongs to something (the that or fact of an individual tiger existing)\u201d (p. 190), and then generalizes to the claim that existence is \u201cthe entering into the nexus of exemplification.\u201d Moreland then shows that this view fits the five desiderata of a theory of existence. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: This is not a clear way of putting it because that which actually exemplifies the property of being a tiger is not the fact of an individual tiger existing, but a particular which, when it exemplifies the property in question, constitutes the fact of an individual tiger existing. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

[B]<\/strong>2.3.2 Vallicella\u2019s Paradigmatic Approach<\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella develops his theory in two parts. First, he claims that a theory of existence \u201cbe anchored in an actual existent so that the theory of existence is at the same time both a theory of existence and a theory of an actual existent\u201d (p. 8). <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: That is a conclusion I arrive at, not a starting point of the theory.  What animates my inquiry is the following question. Given that existence belongs to individuals and can be predicated of them, how are we to understand the existence of a concrete individual? What is it for an individual to exist? <\/em> To motivate this question, I argue against four theories of existence. For example, I argue that existence cannot be a property of individuals (a first-level property) if properties are defined as instantiable entities. That is to say: no individual exists in virtue of instantiating existence.  I also argue against the dominant Frego-Russellian positition that existence is not a second-level property, a property of properties.  I show, for example, that the existence of Socrates cannot be understood as some property's having the second-level property of being instantiated.
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Second, he proceeds to show the failure of several attempts at a theory of existence (e.g. First Level Property, \u2018No Difference\u2019, Property of Property, and Mondial Attribute Theories). Upon offering arguments against each of these views, (Vallicella calls this a via negativa<\/em>), he begins by asking the reader to \u201cthink of ordinary individuals as concrete states of affairs of<\/span> [or<\/span>] facts\u201d (p. 160), which are contingent unities of their constituents. For example, he states \u201cthe fact of a\u2019s being F<\/em> is plausibly taken to have three constituents, a<\/em>, F-ness<\/em> and the asymmetrical tie of instantiation\u201d (p. 160). He then proceeds to present arguments to the conclusion of a paradigm theory of existence which is understood as: <\/span><\/p>\n

(PT) Necessarily, for any contingent individual x, x exists if and only if (i) there is a necessary y such that y is the paradigm existent, and (ii) y, as the external unifier of x's ontological constituents, directly produces the unity\/existence of x.\u201d (p. 2). <\/span><\/p>\n

BV: Roughly, I answer the question What is it for an individual to exist?<\/em> by arguing that the existence of a contingent individual is the contingent unity of its ontological constituents. For an individual to exist is for its constituents to be unified. This answer rests upon a preliminary, and hardly self-evident, assay of an ordinary or 'thick' particular as a a concrete state of affairs or fact in a sense very close to Gustav Bergmann and David Armstrong.   Such states of affairs are of course toto caelo<\/em> different from Chisholmian-Plantingian abstract state of affairs.  One cannot literally stumble over one of these, but one can stumble of over a rock which, on my ontological assay, is a concrete state of affairs, roughly, a particular-instantiating-properties.  Among ontological constituents are such items as thin<\/em> particulars, the instantiation nexus, and properties, which could be assayed as either universals or tropes.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

Then what I argue via complicated (and perhaps less-than-perfectly-pellucid) arguments, arguments that none of the reviewers or commentators had the stomach to penetrate and evaluate, is that nothing internal to a concrete individual (a concrete state of affairs) can secure the unity which is what its existence consists in.  There is no internal unifier on pain of Bradley's regress, a regress I take to be both infinite and vicious. This points us in the direction of an external unifier of a concrete individual's ontological constituents. But for the external unifier to be more than a posit for explanatory purposes, I tried to show that a concrete fact both is and is not the sum of its constituents. It is<\/em> because there in nothing in the fact beyond its constituents, say, thin particular, instantiation nexus, and properties. It is not<\/em> because a fact is more than the sum of its constituents.  The sum can exist without the fact existing; ergo, the fact is more than the sum. But the ground of this 'more' cannot be located within the fact.  So if we remain on the level of facts, we are stuck with a contradiction: a fact is and is not the sum of its constituents. Since this contradiction cannot be allowed to stand, it must be removed. That is the office of the external unifier. This by way of a sketch of how I arrive at (PT) above.  Es ist nicht aus der Pistole geschossen<\/em>, to cop a line from Hegel. I didn't just shoot (PT) out a pistol.<\/span>
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[B]<\/strong>2.3.3. A Brief Evaluation of Moreland and Vallicella\u2019s Approaches.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreland\u2019s approach to a theory of existence has the following strengths. 1) It gives us clear desiderata for any theory of existence. 2) It draws from a consideration of ordinary language statements by means of which we refer to things in ordinary experience. 3) It connects directly to an overall realism about properties\/universals. Similarly, Vallicella\u2019s approach to existence is logically rigorous, carefully argued and extremely thorough. It also points to something \u201cthe paradigm\u201d which might be consistent with Christian theism. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: It is consistent with Christian theism.
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However, neither Vallicella nor Moreland\u2019s approach begin with the ordinary data of sense experience. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: Tim misrepresents me here. I begin with a pre-theoretical datum, namely, that things exist, and I hold that that, contrary to what the Frege-Russell and the mondial attribute theories maintain,  existence belongs to these individuals given in sense perception, where 'belongs' is a pre-theoretical term  that gives rise to the question, What is it for a concrete individual given in sense perception to exist?<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This need not count against the conclusions in their arguments, which should stand or fall on their own merits. However, it might count against a robust theory of existence if that theory does not consider the data of ordinary sense experience as a contributing feature to what we know about the nature of existence. In other words, it is theoretically possible to have a coherent and logically rigorous account of existence but fail to connect that theory with the data that is derived from our experience of existence. While neither Vallicella nor Moreland explicitly reject the \u201cexterior route\u201d from Klubertanz, discussed above, the omission of such an approach in an account of existence from two thinkers whose views of existence is nearly identical to this approach seems puzzling to me. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: I am sympathetic to Tim's puzzlement,  but I might never have finished the book had I delved into, rather than side-stepped, two important sides of the whole problematic of existence. One is how we know existence; the other is the interplay of existence and time.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Although Moreland and Vallicella are both realists about existence, Vallicella maintains that the idea of existence as essential exemplification (Moreland\u2019s view and the one that I defend here) falls prey to a \u201cBradleyen [Bradleyan<\/span>] regress\u201d argument against relations. Let us look at that argument and offer some rejoinders to it.<\/span><\/p>\n

[A]<\/strong>2.4 Existence\u2019s Regress?<\/span><\/p>\n

[B]<\/strong>2.4.1. Agreement with Moreland<\/span><\/p>\n

Although Vallicella offers a strong criticism of Moreland\u2019s and my view of existence, there is a great deal of agreement about existence. First, Vallicella agrees with Moreland that existence is not a property of individuals. This was a view held by Frege and Russel<\/span> [Russell<\/span>] claiming that \u201cexistence is a second-order property . . . based on the idea that seemingly singular existential and negative existential sentence [s<\/span>] like \u2018Bill Gates exists\u2019 and \u2018Ronald McDonald does not exist\u2019 are, in their deeper logical form, general existential and negative existential claims" (Nelson, 2012). Vallicella calls this view "Fressell\u2019s" view. He claims that Fressell "Holds that existence cannot be a property of individuals any more than numerousness can be" (Vallicella 2004, p. 28). <\/span><\/p>\n

Second, Vallicella also agrees with Moreland that existence cannot be an ordinary property of individuals pace<\/em> Kant. Kant made a distinction between two sorts of predicates:<\/span><\/p>\n

i. real or descriptive predicates which describe what a thing is, e.g. hard, sweet, round, heavy, etc . . . , and<\/span><\/p>\n

ii. modal predicates or non-descriptive predicates which describe the "mode" or manner of a thing's being, e.g. existence, possible, necessary, etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kant held that for any concept (C) of object (O) one does not enlarge one's understanding of O through C by saying that O exists. Both Moreland and Vallicella agree with Kant here. <\/span><\/p>\n

Third, Vallicella and Moreland agree that existence is not a classificatory property.<\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella states, "Existence cannot be a property that classifies or sorts objects into the existent and the nonexistent" (p. 29).<\/span><\/p>\n

Fourth, they both agree that existence makes a real, indeed an "abysmal," difference to a thing that exists (p. 29). Vallicella claims that "existence does not contribute to the whatness of a thing" (p. 29) but adds "the thatnesss without which the whatness would be nothing at all" (p. 29): "a veritable abyss separates being and nonbeing" (p. 29). Vallicella quotes Moreland "It follows that '[t]here is a fundamental difference between essence (whatness) and existence (thatness)" (Moreland 137). This implies that a (contingent) individual cannot be identified with its existence. <\/span><\/p>\n

Fifth, finally they both agree that existence itself exists. Quoting Moreland again, Vallicella writes, "[i]f existence itself does not exist, then nothing else could exist in virtue of having existence" (Moreland, 135). Moreland is following Reinhardt Grossman whom Vallicella also quotes as saying: "If existence did not exist, then nothing would exist" (Grossman, 1983 p. 405).<\/span><\/p>\n

[B]<\/strong>2.4.2 Disagreement with Moreland<\/span><\/p>\n

To recap, in his book Universals<\/em>, Moreland states, "i) existence is the "having of a property" or ii) "being had by a property" (Moreland 2001, p. 157). Here in this book I have offered a view similar to Moreland\u2019s but based on common sense experiences to the conclusion that existence is essential exemplification. Vallicella criticizes this understanding of existence as essential exemplification by focusing on Moreland\u2019s disjunction that existence is the:<\/span><\/p>\n

i) "having of a property" <\/span><\/p>\n

or <\/span><\/p>\n

ii) "being had by a property."<\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella claims that i) is clear, and ii) is unclear. He claims that ii) should read "being had of a property" (Vallicella p. 30) to make explicit the relational nature of existence on Moreland's view. <\/span><\/p>\n

In another place Moreland says, "existence is either the belonging of some property or the being belonged to by a property or, more simply, the entering into the nexus of exemplification" (Moreland and Craig 2003, p. 191). This seems to make more explicit Vallicella's interpretation of Moreland's view of existence and the relation of exemplification. Vallicella states that according to Moreland, existence is "the relation of exemplification" (Vallicella 2004, p. 30) and "existence itself exists because existence itself is the universal exemplification relation which is itself exemplified" (p. 30-31). Having established that according to Moreland existence is a relation of exemplification (what I have been calling \u201cessential exemplification), Vallicella proceeds to offer of a criticism of this relation. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: It is not clear to me why Mosteller speaks of essential exemplification. What works does 'essential' do here?  Presumably he does not think that all properties are had essentially as opposed to accidentally. In fact, on an ontological scheme involving bare\/thin particulars, such as Moreland's, then all first-level properties are had accidentally. What makes a bare particular bare is not its having no properties, but its having no properties essentially.  The bareness of a bare particular is its lacking a nature: such particulars are purely particular!<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

[B]<\/strong>2.4.3. The Bradleyan Objection<\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella's "Bradleyan Objection" is this: if existence is the universal\/essential exemplification relation (EX) (p. 32), then for any particular existing thing, for example: Tony-the-tiger (T-t-t) will equal the following: <\/span><\/p>\n

i. bare particular (individuator), plus<\/span><\/p>\n

ii. EX (exemplification relation), plus<\/span><\/p>\n

iii. property of being a tiger. <\/span><\/p>\n

The problem Vallicella sees is that i + ii + iii "do not add up to Tony-the-tiger." This conclusion follows because of these reasons: <\/span><\/p>\n

1. T-t-t is not a sum but a unity.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. EX unifies i and iii together.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. EX unifies itself with i and iii.<\/span><\/p>\n

4. If EX unifies i and ii, then EX unifies itself with i and ii.<\/span><\/p>\n

5. Given 4, the view "succumbs to Bradley's famous regress argument against external relations\u201d (p. 31): an infinite regress of relations will follow.<\/span><\/p>\n

6. Thus, "EX is a relation external to its terms" (p. 31). <\/span><\/p>\n

7. Thus, "Each of the three ontological constituents [i, ii and iii] can exist without the other two even if none of them can exist apart from all the others." (p. 31)<\/span><\/p>\n

[A]<\/strong>2.5 Rejoinders to the Bradleyen [Bradleyan<\/span>] Objection<\/span><\/p>\n

[B]<\/strong>2.5.1 Is EX an internal or an external relation?<\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella's understanding of Moreland's concept of existence as a relation need not be one that is external to its terms, given the distinction between external and internal relations. [Awkward sentence. Rewrite. It is not V's understanding that is exter nal to its terms . . . .<\/span>] The exemplification relation (EX) need not be an external<\/em> relation. It is possible that it could be understood as an internal<\/em> relation. <\/span><\/p>\n

A relation is an internal<\/em> relation (IR) just in case: if x is IR to y, then x cannot exist without y.  Or to put it another way, if x does not stand in IR to y, then x no longer exists as x (or is not at all). For example, Aristotle pointed out that a hand separated from a man is no longer a hand.2<\/sup><\/a> Being a hand is internally related to the whole man. The relata in an internal relation depend for their existence on their relation to the whole, or on the existence of the relation itself. <\/span><\/p>\n

On the contrary, a relation is an external relation (ER) just in case: if x is ER to y, then x can exist without y. Or to put it another way, if x does not stand in ER to y, then x can still exist as x. For example, consider an eraser removed from a pencil, it can still be what it is without its relation to the whole. The parts can of the pencil can exist without their dependence on the whole. <\/span><\/p>\n

Moreland's view of existence could be interpreted as seeing the exemplification relation, EX, as an internal relation to the whole. EX would not exist without being in the relation to the other two. If EX is exemplified, then EX exists. A proponent of existence as \u201cessential exemplification\u201d could simply say that if anything exists, then EX is exemplified. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV:  EX cannot be an internal relation since if a exemplifies F-ness, this is merely contingently the case: a can exist without exemplifying F-ness, and F-ness can exist without being exemplified by a. Don't forget: a is a bare particular.<\/span><\/p>\n

There also seems to be a confusion between EX as a universal relation and a particular instance of this relation.  It is true that if EX is exemplified, then EX exists. But there is no necessity that EX be exemplified in any particular case.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

[B]<\/strong>2.5.2 Is EX necessarily an external relation?<\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella seems to be claiming that the relationship of i, ii and iii can be contingent and thus EX must be related externally. But why must this follow? T-t-t can be a contingent being even if it is necessary that existence involves i, ii and iii. So, even though it is true that EX doesn't necessitate that T-t-t exist, this does not mean that necessarily EX is external to the other terms. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: What makes a contingent thick particular contingent is the contingent unity of its constituents. If EX were an internal relation, then every thick particular would be a necessary being.<\/span>
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Some internal relations are necessarily had by contingent beings. It might be necessary that if a hand is to be a hand, it must stand in an internal relation to a man, but it is not necessary that the man (or the hand) exist. The man (or hand) can be contingent, even if it is necessary that if the man is exemplified, his parts stand in an internal relation to him as a whole. So, it might be necessary that if EX is to be EX, it must stand in an internal relation to the other two relata (an indivuduator\/bare particular and some property\/universal\/essence), but that does not mean that the whole complex is necessary. So, while it is true that "there is no necessity that a<\/em> exemplify F-ness<\/em>" this simply implies that a<\/em> exemplifying F-ness <\/em>is contingent, but it doesn't<\/em> imply that the relation of exemplification between a<\/em> and F-ness <\/em>is external or necessary. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: Unfortunately, this makes no sense to me: "external or necessary"?  Again, there seems to be a confusion between the universal exemplification relation and a particular relatedness brought about by EX's relating of a<\/em> and F-ness, say.  There is no necessity that EX relate a<\/em> and F-ness. It is external to both of these terms.  But one could say that the particular relatedness which is the fact of a's being F<\/em> would not be what it is without a, F-ness, and their particular relatedness.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

[B]<\/strong>2.5.3 How should we understand Bare Particulars and the EX relation?<\/span><\/p>\n

There is a second way that Vallicella offers a summary and critique of the essential exemplification (EE) view of existence and the regress problem which misunderstands bare particulars. If Moreland's view is correct, this may militate against the regress problem. Here is Vallicella's argument. <\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella claims that on the EE view, for a particular being, say Tony-the-tiger (T-t-t), exists then three things are present: <\/span><\/p>\n

i. bare particular, <\/span><\/p>\n

ii. EX (the exemplification relation), and <\/span><\/p>\n

iii. the property of being a tiger (which Vallicella calls F-ness).<\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella adds that i, ii and iii are externally related, and this will generate the Bradleyan regress problem. Here is why.<\/span><\/p>\n

We can imagine a possible world (W1) where only one particular exists: Tony-the-tiger. This will entail: i. a (bare particular) ii. EX (exemplification relation) and iii. F-ness (property of being a tiger). But, we can also imagine a second possible world, W2: with two particulars: <\/span><\/p>\n

p1. Bugs Bunny: Bare particular a<\/em> exemplifies G <\/em>(being a bunny).<\/span><\/p>\n

p2. Joanie the tigress: F-ness <\/em>(being a tiger) exemplified by b<\/em> (with a "different" bare particular than the one had by a<\/em>).<\/span><\/p>\n

According to Vallicella, the following can be considered. If W1 has a<\/em>, EX<\/em> and F-ness<\/em>, and W2 has a<\/em>, EX<\/em> and F-ness<\/em> (but separated), it follows that a<\/em>, EX<\/em> and F-ness<\/em> are related externally (or at least EX is related externally to a<\/em> and F-ne<\/em>ss). This external relation will therefore fall prey to the Bradleyan regress raised above. <\/span><\/p>\n

Does this follow? Consider the following objection to this version of Vallicella's Bradleyen regress argument based on how we should understand bare particulars.3<\/sup><\/a> One can understand bare particulars as simples which are numerically, but not intrinsically distinct. Therefore, in W2, F-ness<\/em> exemplified by b<\/em> is not intrinsically distinct from F-ne<\/em>ss exemplified by a<\/em> in W1. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: This is confused. We were first told that in W2, we have a, EX, and F-ness, "but separated."  We are now told that b is in W2.  I don' understand this.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

If there is merely numerical difference but not intrinsic difference between bare particulars a<\/em> and b<\/em> then the exemplification of F-ness<\/em> in b in W2 is not intrinsically different than the exemplification of F-ness<\/em> in W1. Thus, EX need not be understood as an external relation. Thus, to say that in W2, a<\/em>, EX and F-ness<\/em> exist but separately seems to beg some questions about bare particulars. Here is one such question. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: Sorry, but this is confused. It follows directly from he fact that a<\/em> is a bare particular that a<\/em> is externally related to any property it exemplifies.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Does Vallicella understand bare particulars in the same way that Moreland does? <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: Yes, he does.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Moreland\u2019s view of existence seems to be operating from the notion of bare particulars found in Gustav Bergmann, as Moreland quotes Bergmann, "Bare particulars neither are nor have natures. Any two of them are not intrinsically but only numerically different. That is their bareness. It is impossible for a bare particular to be "in" more than one ordinary thing … a bare particular is a mere individuator … it does nothing else" (Moreland 2001, p. 148). <\/span><\/p>\n

Vallicella seems to be treating bare particulars "as wholes, namely states of affairs with properties as constituents within them" (p. 155) as Moreland points out in a rejoinder to critics of his notion of bare particulars. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: That is a TOTAL misunderstanding.   It shows a complete failure to understand what I have very clearly stated.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

If bare particulars are, as Moreland argues, "simples with properties tied to them" (p. 155) and are "not intrinsically but only numerically different" as Bergmann claims, then to assert that F-ness<\/em> is tied to bare particular a<\/em> in W1 and F-ness<\/em> is tied to bare particular b<\/em> in W2 is to assert that a<\/em> and b<\/em> are merely numerically distinct but not intrinsically different. This would seem to imply that a<\/em> and b<\/em> could be swapped out with no resulting difference to Tony-the-tiger being Tony-the-tiger in W1 and Joanie-the-tigress being Joanie-the-tigress in W2. <\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: What are you saying? I have no idea.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Simply put, Moreland's understanding of bare particulars does not entail the kind of externality between i, ii and iii that Vallicella claims.<\/span><\/p>\n

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BV: The problem is not with Moreland's understanding of bare particulars, but with yours. Moreover, Moreland does not say what you are attributing to him. If you think that a bare particular and its properties are internally related, then you simply haven't grasped the notion of a bare particular.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

[A]<\/strong>3.0 From the Inside and Out?<\/span><\/p>\n

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1<\/a>\u0002<\/sup> Logic Alert! These next sections are difficult. If you are content with the understanding of existence as essential exemplification, then proceed to chapter 3. If you love really detailed, nitty gritty metaphysical arguments, then enjoy!<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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2<\/a>\u0002<\/sup> \u201c"For they cannot even exist if severed from the whole; for it is not a finger in any and every state that is the finger of a living thing, but a dead finger is a finger only in name \u2026 For it is not a hand in any and every state that is a part of man, but only when it can fulfil its work, and therefore only when it is alive; if it is not alive it is not a part" (Aristotle 1941, p. 799, 1035b25 Metaphysics<\/em> Bk. 7).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

3<\/a>\u0002<\/sup> See also Moreland 2001, pp. 14, 93-94, 102 and 155 for his discussion of the natures of bare particulars and their relations to universals.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The following is from a work in progress by Tim Mosteller, posted with his permission.  I thank him for his critical engagement with my work. Here are some responses.  My corrections in red; my comments in blue.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[487,142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3067","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-constituent-ontology","category-existence"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3067","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3067"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3067\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3067"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3067"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3067"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}