{"id":2936,"date":"2020-08-17T19:03:10","date_gmt":"2020-08-17T19:03:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/08\/17\/existence-unity-possibility-and-actuality-1\/"},"modified":"2020-08-17T19:03:10","modified_gmt":"2020-08-17T19:03:10","slug":"existence-unity-possibility-and-actuality-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/08\/17\/existence-unity-possibility-and-actuality-1\/","title":{"rendered":"Existence, Unity, Possibility, and Actuality: Are There Merely Possible Individuals?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Steven Nemes by e-mail:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Here\u2019s a question for you about existence, perhaps one you could discuss on the blog.<\/span><\/p>\n

In your book, you argue that existence is ontological unity. I think that\u2019s right. But a merely possible this-such is a unity as much as an actual this-such. What then distinguishes merely possible existence from actual existence?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

To put it precisely, the existence of a contingent being is the contingent unity of its ontological constituents.  Such a being is appropriately referred to as a this-such or as a concrete individual.  I assume that existence and actuality are the same: to exist = to be actual. I also assume that existence and Being are the same: to exist = to be.  Thus I reject the quasi-Meinongian thesis forwarded by Bertrand Russell in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics<\/em> (449) according to which there ARE items that do not EXIST. 
<\/span><\/p>\n

It follows from these two assumptions that there are no individuals that are merely possible. For if there were merely possible individuals, they would have Being, but not existence.
<\/span><\/p>\n

Objection.<\/strong>   "This very table that I just finished building, was, before I built it, a merely possible table.  One and the same table went from being merely possible to being actual.  No temporal individual becomes actual unless it, that very individual, was previously possible.  Now the table is actual; hence it, that very individual, had to have been previously a merely possible table. A merely possible table is a table, but one that does not exist."<\/span><\/p>\n

Reply.<\/strong> "I deny that a merely possible table is a table.  'Merely possible' here functions as an alienans<\/em> adjective like 'decoy' in 'decoy duck.'  A decoy duck is not a duck, but a hunk of wood made to appear, to a duck, as a duck. A merely possible table is not a table, but the possibility that there come to exist a table that satisfies a certain description.  <\/span><\/p>\n

The possibility of there coming to exist a table of such-and-such a description could be understood as a set of properties, or as perhaps a big conjunctive property. Either way, the possibility would not be a possible individual.<\/span><\/p>\n

I deny the presupposition of your question, Steven, namely, that "a merely possible this-such is a unity as much as an actual this-such."  What you are assuming is that there are merely possible individuals. A merely possible individual is a nonexistent individual, and on the view I take in my existence book, there are no nonexistent individuals. 
<\/span><\/p>\n

The next post — scroll up — will help you understand the subtlety of this problematic.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Steven Nemes by e-mail: Here\u2019s a question for you about existence, perhaps one you could discuss on the blog. In your book, you argue that existence is ontological unity. I think that\u2019s right. But a merely possible this-such is a unity as much as an actual this-such. What then distinguishes merely possible existence from actual … Continue reading “Existence, Unity, Possibility, and Actuality: Are There Merely Possible Individuals?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,346,235,98],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2936","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-identity-and-individuation","category-modal-matters","category-unity-of-a-complex"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2936","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2936"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2936\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2936"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2936"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2936"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}