{"id":2896,"date":"2020-09-19T17:42:10","date_gmt":"2020-09-19T17:42:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/09\/19\/does-everything-contingent-have-a-ground-of-its-existence\/"},"modified":"2020-09-19T17:42:10","modified_gmt":"2020-09-19T17:42:10","slug":"does-everything-contingent-have-a-ground-of-its-existence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/09\/19\/does-everything-contingent-have-a-ground-of-its-existence\/","title":{"rendered":"Does Everything Contingent Have a Ground of its Existence?"},"content":{"rendered":"

What is it to be contingent?  There are at least two nonequivalent definitions of 'contingency' at work in philosophical discussions.  I will call them the modal definition and the dependency definition.<\/span><\/p>\n

Modal Contingency.<\/em>  X is modally contingent =df<\/sub> x exists in some but not all metaphysically (broadly logically) possible worlds.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Since possible worlds jargon is very confusing to many, I will also put the definition like this:  <\/span><\/p>\n

\n

X is modally contingent =df<\/sub> x is possibly nonexistent if existent and possibly existent if nonexistent.  <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

For example, I am modally contingent because I might not have existed: my nonexistence is metaphysically possible.  Unicorns, on the other hand, are also modally contingent items because they are possibly existent despite their actual nonexistence.  It take it that this is what Aquinas meant when he said that the contingent is what is possible to be and possible not to be.  If x is contingent, then (possibly x is and possibly x is not). Don't confuse this with the contradictory, possibly (x is and x is not).<\/span><\/p>\n

Note that the contingent and the actual are not coextensive.  Unicorns are contingent but not actual, and God and the number 9 are actual but not contingent.  If you balk at the idea that unicorns are contingent, then I will ask you:  Are they then necessary beings? Or impossible beings?  Since they can't be either, then they must be contingent.  <\/em> Everything is either contingent or non-contingent, and everything non-contingent is either necessary or impossible.<\/span><\/p>\n

Note also that because unicorns are modally contingent but nonexistent, one cannot validly argue from their modal contingency to their having a cause or ground of their existence.  They don't exist; so of course they have no cause or ground of their existence.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Existential Dependency.<\/em>  Now for the dependency definition.  <\/span><\/p>\n

\n

X is dependently contingent =df<\/sub> there is  some y such that (i) x is not identical to y; (ii) necessarily, if x exists, then y exists; (iii) y is in some sense the ground or source of x's existence.  <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

We need something like the third clause in the definiens<\/em> for the following reason.    Any two distinct necessary beings will satisfy the first two clauses.  Let x be the property of being prime and y the number 9.  The two items are distinct and it is necessarily the case that  if being prime exists, then 9 exists.  But we don't want to say that the  the property  is contingently dependent upon the number.<\/span><\/p>\n

The two definitions of 'contingency' are not equivalent.  What is modally contingent may or may not be dependently contingent. Bertrand Russell and others have held that the universe exists as a matter of brute fact.  (Cf. his famous BBC debate with Fr. Copleston.)  Thus it exists and is modally contingent, but does not depend on anything for its existence, and so is not dependently contingent, contingent on<\/em> something.  It is not a contradiction, or at least not an obvious contradiction,  to maintain that the universe is modally contingent but not depend on anything distinct from itself. 'Contingent' and 'contingent upon' must not be confused.  On the other hand, Aquinas held that there are two sorts of necessary beings, those that have their necessity from another and those that have their necessity in themselves. God, and God alone, has his necessity in himself, whereas Platonica have their necessity from God. That is to say that they derive their esse<\/em> from God; they depend for their existence on God despite their modal necessity.  If, per impossibile<\/em>, God were not to exist, then the denizens of the Platonic menagerie would not exist either.    It follows that Platonica are dependently contingent even though modally necessary.<\/span><\/p>\n

In sum, modal contingency does not straightaway entail existential dependence, and modal necessity does not straightaway entail existential independence.<\/span><\/p>\n

So  it is not the case that, as some maintain, "the contingent is always contingent on something else<\/em>."   Or at least that is not obviously the case: it needs arguing.  One who maintains this absent the arguing ought to be suspected of confusing the two senses of 'contingency' and of making things far too easy on himself.  <\/span><\/p>\n

The following, therefore, is a bad argument as it stands: The universe is contingent; the contingent, by definition, is contingent on something else; ergo the universe is contingent on something else, and this all men call God.  It is a bad argument even apart from the 'this all men call God' part because the existence of the universe might well be a brute fact in which case it would be modally contingent but not dependent on anything distinct from it for its existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

What have I accomplished in this entry? Not much, but this much: I have disambiguated 'contingent' and I have shown that a certain cosmological argument fails.  In my book, A Paradigm Theory of Existence<\/a>, I present an onto-cosmological argument that fares somewhat better.  Mirabile dictu<\/em>, the book is now available in paperback for a reasonable price!  The bums at Kluwer never told me!
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What is it to be contingent?  There are at least two nonequivalent definitions of 'contingency' at work in philosophical discussions.  I will call them the modal definition and the dependency definition. Modal Contingency.  X is modally contingent =df x exists in some but not all metaphysically (broadly logically) possible worlds.   Since possible worlds jargon … Continue reading “Does Everything Contingent Have a Ground of its Existence?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[551,235],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2896","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-cosmological-arguments","category-modal-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2896","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2896"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2896\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2896"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2896"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2896"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}