{"id":2866,"date":"2020-10-17T17:37:44","date_gmt":"2020-10-17T17:37:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/10\/17\/ruminations-on-the-dative-of-disclosure\/"},"modified":"2020-10-17T17:37:44","modified_gmt":"2020-10-17T17:37:44","slug":"ruminations-on-the-dative-of-disclosure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2020\/10\/17\/ruminations-on-the-dative-of-disclosure\/","title":{"rendered":"Ruminations on the Dative of Disclosure"},"content":{"rendered":"

Steven Nemes comments on my long Husserl entry<\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

[Robert] Sokolowski\u2019s reflections in his Introduction to Phenomenology<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2000) are also helpful. He maintains that the transcendental ego is not substantially different than the empirical ego. In other words, the transcendental ego is not some different substance from the empirical ego, i.e. the [animated] human body. It is simply this empirical ego considered from the point of view of its being a dative of disclosure, a mihi<\/em> to whom the world is disclosed. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I don't consider this helpful. To be blunt, I consider it confused.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Husserl<\/a>The claim seems to be that the transcendental ego is just the empirical ego when the latter is considered as that to which the world and the objects in it appear, including that very special object which  is one's animated body.  This gives rise to the question: Who is doing the considering?  That is, who is it by whose consideration the empirical ego acquires the property of being the dative of disclosure?<\/span><\/p>\n

It has to be me.  But it cannot be me qua object, since qua object I am not the dative, but the accusative of disclosure.  I am one of the objects that appears. So it has to be me qua subject, qua dative but not accusative of disclosure.  And let us be clear that there cannot be a dative without a nominative. There cannot be an appearing-to that is not an appearing-to something.  There could, however, be an appearing that is wholly non-relational: things just appear, are revealed, manifest themselves, but not to a subject.* But if there is an appearing-to, then there must be that to which the appearance appears. No dative without a nominative.  Either non-relational appearing or we go 'whole hog' with Husserl: ego-cogito-cogitata qua cogitata<\/em>.
<\/span><\/p>\n

From this is follows that the duality self as subject-self as object<\/em> is (a) inexpungeable, and (b) located within the ego.  The duality cannot be collapsed into an abstract unity, nor can the subjectivity of the subject be referred to someone or something external to the ego. I am a subject intrinsically<\/em>, not relationally, not in virtue of being considered to be a subject. That is to say: the transcendentality of the ego cannot accrue to it ab extra<\/em> by the the empirical ego's consideration of itself as transcendental.  Hysteron proteron<\/em>! This puts the cart before the horse:**  it is because I am a transcendental ego that I can apperceive myself as a human being in nature.  As a human being, I simply lack the power to function transcendentally, to execute acts including acts of apperception. 
<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, there cannot be two egos. The empirical ego is an ego only by analogy (equivocation?)  The true ego is the transcendental ego.  I am being faithful to Husserl here.
<\/span><\/p>\n

So I don't see that Sokolowski, or rather Sokolowski as presented by Nemes, contributes anything to the solution of the problem I posed in my long post. <\/span><\/p>\n

________________<\/span><\/p>\n

*This, I take it, is Heidegger's  notion of phenomenon which differs markedly from Husserl's.<\/span><\/p>\n

**Joke: A philosopher took up residence in a bordello, thinking to enlighten the 'sex workers.' He soon left disillusioned after he found that he could not put Descartes before the whores.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Steven Nemes comments on my long Husserl entry: [Robert] Sokolowski\u2019s reflections in his Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge University Press, 2000) are also helpful. He maintains that the transcendental ego is not substantially different than the empirical ego. In other words, the transcendental ego is not some different substance from the empirical ego, i.e. the [animated] … Continue reading “Ruminations on the Dative of Disclosure”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[67,79,523,328],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2866","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-husserl","category-idealism-and-realism","category-phenomenology","category-self-self-awareness-self-reference"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2866","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2866"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2866\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2866"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2866"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2866"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}