{"id":2761,"date":"2021-01-01T16:57:48","date_gmt":"2021-01-01T16:57:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/01\/01\/steven-nemes-review-of-dietrich-von-hildebrands-ethics-some-questions\/"},"modified":"2021-01-01T16:57:48","modified_gmt":"2021-01-01T16:57:48","slug":"steven-nemes-review-of-dietrich-von-hildebrands-ethics-some-questions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/01\/01\/steven-nemes-review-of-dietrich-von-hildebrands-ethics-some-questions\/","title":{"rendered":"Steven Nemes’ Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Ethics<\/i>: Some Questions"},"content":{"rendered":"

The review<\/a> is a well written and very fair summary of von Hildebrand's book. (I read portions of the latter in graduate school days but I do not currently have it in my library.)  Here is the review's main critical passage together with my remarks.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

[Von] Hildebrand\u2019s arguments for the objectivity of value therefore seem unsuccessful. It is true that one experiences an object as possessing some value which motivates a particular form of response to it. But it is another matter whether one has grasped a value in the object on its own or in the object as it is related to oneself in experience. Food is experienced as delicious, but there is no property of gustatory value inhering objectively in chicken tikka masala. It can be appetizing to one but not to another. Or consider that human beings love fruit, but dogs and cats generally do not. <\/span><\/p>\n

BV: Nemes invokes the fact that for beings capable of gustatory experience, what is appetizing\/delicious\/tasty can vary across individuals in a species, and across species.  This is because the property of being appetizing is not an intrinsic property of the edible or potable item, but involves a relation to the consumer.  I have been called 'Old Asbestos Tongue' on account of the pleasure I derive from fiery comestibles.  The positive or negative gustatory value resides not in the comestible itself, but in the relation between consumer and comestible between, say, 'Old Asbestos Tongue' and the jalapeno pepper.  My constitution is such as to allow for the enjoyment of what others will find highly disagreeable. Hence, de gustibus non est disputandum<\/em>. There is nothing to dispute since there is no fact of the matter.  It is 'subjective' in one sense of this polysemous term.
<\/span><\/p>\n

But how negotiate the inferential move from <\/span><\/p>\n

1) That which has<\/em> the value of tasting good often varies from individual to individual and from species to species
<\/span><\/p>\n

to<\/span><\/p>\n

2) The value<\/em> of tasting good is subjective, not objective.<\/span><\/p>\n

This looks to be an illicit slide. (1), which is plainly true, is consistent with the negation of (2).  For it could be that the value of tasting good is objectively the same for all despite different edibles being tasty to different people or animals.
<\/span><\/p>\n

That is to say: tasting good<\/em> could be an objective value despite the fact that different edible items have this value for different people.  The perceiver-relativity of taste, which makes taste subjective, is consistent with the objectivity of gustatory values.
<\/span><\/p>\n

If values are essences and essences are ideal objects that subsist independently of our value responses (Wertantworten<\/em>), as von Hildebrand maintains, then, while different perceivers find different things appetizing\/delicious\/tasty, this needn't affect the value itself.  The tasting of an incendiary comestible involves a physical transaction; the intellectual intuition of the value does not. One does not taste the value, one tastes the jalapeno-laden enchilada; and one does not intellectually intuit  the enchilada, one tastes it.<\/span>
<\/span><\/p>\n

SN: Similarly, a purported moral value can be \u201cnoble\u201d in the eyes of the \u201cvirtuous\u201d but repellent to the \u201cprofligate.\u201d It could well be that the difference in perception is accounted for merely in terms of the different structures of the persons involved.
<\/span><\/p>\n

BV:  It is not the value as ideal object that is noble, but a person who has the value.  The person is noble in virtue of instantiating the value. The base are value-blind (wertblind<\/em>):  they cannot 'see' or appreciate the value that noble people instantiate.  But that fact is consistent with the value's objective existence in itself apart both from anyone's appreciating it and anything's instantiating it.
<\/span><\/p>\n

My point is that von Hildebrand has the resources to turn aside Nemes' objections. The latter are not rationally compelling. Give von Hildebrand's Platonism about values, Nemes' arguments are non sequiturs.  This is not to say that von Hildebrand's axiology is true; it is to say that Nemes hasn't refuted it.<\/span><\/p>\n

His review raises for me a fascinating question: does phenomenology by its very nature, and given that intentionality is its central motif, support realism or idealism?  For von Hildebrand and J-P Sartre the former; for Husserl the latter.  I should take this up in a separate entry.
<\/span><\/p>\n

For now I recommend that Nemes study chapter V, "Objectivity and Independence," in von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy<\/em>?<\/span>  <\/span><\/p>\n

\"Nemes<\/a>
<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The review is a well written and very fair summary of von Hildebrand's book. (I read portions of the latter in graduate school days but I do not currently have it in my library.)  Here is the review's main critical passage together with my remarks. [Von] Hildebrand\u2019s arguments for the objectivity of value therefore seem … Continue reading “Steven Nemes’ Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Ethics<\/i>: Some Questions”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[396,62,523,383],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2761","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-axiology","category-catholic-corner","category-phenomenology","category-von-hildebrand-dietrich"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2761","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2761"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2761\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2761"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2761"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2761"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}