Are there any (non-trivial*) valid arguments that satisfy the following conditions: (i) The premises are all purely factual in the sense of purporting to state only what is<\/em> the case; (ii) the conclusion is normative\/evaluative? Alasdair MacIntyre gives the following example (After Virtue<\/em>, U. of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 55):<\/span><\/p>\n 1. This watch is inaccurate.<\/span><\/p>\n Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n 2. This is a bad watch.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n MacIntyre claims that the premise is factual, the conclusion evaluative, and the argument valid. (The argument is an enthymeme the formal validity of which is ensured by the auxiliary premise, 'Every inaccurate watch is a bad watch.') The validity is supposed to hinge on the functional character of the concept watch<\/em>. A watch is an artifact created by an artificer for a specific purpose: to tell time accurately. It therefore has a proper function, one assigned by the artificer. (Serving as a paperweight being an example of an improper function.) A good watch does its job, serves its purpose, fulfills its proper function. MacIntyre tells us that "the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch . . ." and that "the criterion of something's being a watch and something's being a good watch . . . are not independent of each other." (ibid<\/em>.) MacIntyre goes on to say that both criteria are factual and that for this reason arguments like the one above validly move from a factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.<\/span><\/p>\n Speaking as someone who has been more influenced by the moderns than by the ancients, I don't see it. It is not<\/em> the case that "the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch . . . ." A watch is "a portable timepiece designed to be worn (as on the wrist) or carried in the pocket." (Merriam-Webster) This standard definition allows, as it should, for both good and bad watches. Note that if chronometric goodness, i.e., accuracy, were built into the definition of 'watch,' then no watch would ever need repair. Indeed, no watch could<\/em> be repaired. For a watch needing repair would then not be a watch. <\/span><\/span><\/span> MacIntyre is playing the following game, to put it somewhat uncharitably.<\/span><\/p>\n He smuggles the evaluative attribute good<\/em> into his definition of 'watch,' forgets that he has done so thereby generating the illusion that his definition is purely factual, and then pulls the evaluative rabbit out of the hat in his conclusion. It is an illusion since the rabbit was already there in the premise. In other words, both (1) and (2) are evaluative. So, while the argument is valid, it is not a valid argument from a purely factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.<\/span><\/p>\n So if the precise question is whether one can validly move from a purely factual or descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion, then MacIntyre's example fails to show that this is possible.<\/span><\/p>\n What MacIntyre needs is the idea that some statements are both factual and evaluative. If (1) is both, then (2) — This is a bad watch — follows and MacIntyre gets what he wants. But if (1) is both, then (1) is not purely factual. The question, however, was whether there is a valid immediate inference from the purely factual to the normative\/evaluative. The answer to that, pace<\/em> MacIntyre, is in the negative. Is Man a Functional Concept?<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n But now suppose that, with respect to functional concepts, the move from fact to value is logically kosher because functional concepts embed criteria of evaluation. Then this discussion is relevant to ethics, the normative study of human action, only if man<\/em> is a functional concept. Aristotle maintains as much: man qua<\/em> man has a proper function, a proper role, a proper 'work' (ergon<\/em>). This proper function is one he has essentially, by his very nature, regardless of whatever contingent roles a particular human may instantiate, wife, father, sea captain. Thus, " 'man' stands to 'good man' as 'watch' stands to 'good watch' . . . ." (56) Now if man qua<\/em> man has a proper and essential function, then to say of a particular man that he is good or bad is to imply that he has a proper and essential function. But then to call a man good is also to make a factual statement. (57)<\/span><\/p>\n The idea is that being human is a role that includes certain norms, a role that each of us necessarily instantiates whether like it or not. There is a sort of coalescence of factual individual and norm in the case of each human being just as, in Aristotle's ontology, there is a sort of coalescence of individual and nature in each primary substance. <\/span><\/p>\n But does man qua man have a proper role or function? The moderns fight shy of this notion. They tend to think of all roles, jobs, and functions of humans as freely adopted and contingent. Modern man likes to think of himself as a free and autonomous individual who exists prior to and apart from all roles. This is what Sartre<\/a> means when he says that existence precedes essence: Man qua man has no pre-assigned nature or essence or proper function: man as existing individual makes himself what ever he becomes. Man is not God's artifact, hence has no function other than one he freely adopts.<\/span><\/p>\n Although Aristotle did not believe in a creator God, it is an important question whether an Aristotle-style healing of the fact-value rift requires classical theism as underpinning. MacIntyre seems to think so. (Cf. p. 57) Philippa Foot demurs. Interim Conclusion<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n If the precise question is whether one can validly (but non-trivially) move from a purely factual or descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion, I have yet to see a clear example of this. But one ought to question the strict bifurcation of fact and value. The failure of entailment is perhaps no surprise given the bifurcation. The Aristotelian view, despite its murkiness, remains a contender. But to be a contender is not to be a winner. The Aristotelian view is murky because it seems to imply that a bad man is not a man, just as a bad watch is not a watch. If it is built into the concept watch<\/em> that it tell time accurately, then a watch that is either slow or fast is not watch, which is plainly false if not absurd, implying as it does that no watch could ever need repair. Clearly, there is nothing in the concept watch<\/em> to require that a watch be accurate. There are good watches and bad watches. Similarly, there are good men and bad men. If to be a man is to exercise the proper function of a man, then there would be no need for correctional institutions.<\/span><\/p>\n ___________________<\/span><\/p>\n *A trivial argument from 'is' to 'ought' exploits the explosion principle, i.e., ex contradictione quodlibet. <\/em>If anything follows from a contradiction, then from a contradictory premise set of factual claims any normative claim follows. Are there any (non-trivial*) valid arguments that satisfy the following conditions: (i) The premises are all purely factual in the sense of purporting to state only what is the case; (ii) the conclusion is normative\/evaluative? Alasdair MacIntyre gives the following example (After Virtue, U. of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 55): 1. This watch is … Continue reading “After MacIntyre: On Deriving Ought<\/i> from Is<\/i>“<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[22,396,459,440],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2760","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aristotle","category-axiology","category-metaethics","category-normativity"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2760","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2760"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2760\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2760"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2760"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2760"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
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