{"id":2736,"date":"2021-01-29T07:52:06","date_gmt":"2021-01-29T07:52:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/01\/29\/a-discussion-with-lukas-novak-about-transcendental-idealism-and-the-transcendental-ego\/"},"modified":"2021-01-29T07:52:06","modified_gmt":"2021-01-29T07:52:06","slug":"a-discussion-with-lukas-novak-about-transcendental-idealism-and-the-transcendental-ego","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/01\/29\/a-discussion-with-lukas-novak-about-transcendental-idealism-and-the-transcendental-ego\/","title":{"rendered":"A Discussion with Lukas Novak about Transcendental Idealism and the Transcendental Ego"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The extended comment thread below began life in the comments to Why Did I Move Away from Phenomenology?<\/a> (13 October 2020)<\/span><\/p>\n

………………………..<\/span><\/p>\n

Dear Bill,<\/span><\/p>\n

You have exactly nailed my fundamental problem with transcendental idealism by this:<\/span><\/p>\n

What is this transcendental ego if it is the purely subjective source of all ontic validity, Seinsgeltung<\/em>? Does it exist? And in what sense of 'exist'? It cannot exist as a constituted object for it is the subjective source of all constitutive performances (Leistungen<\/em>). But if it is not an indubitable piece of the world, then it cannot exist at all.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Of course, transcendental idealists will standardly respond something along the lines like:<\/span><\/p>\n

The problem that you raise in this post only arises because you are asking the question, \u201cWhat is the transcendental ego?\u201d and expecting an answer which posits some kind of object or other;<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

but the problem is that the question asked does not "expect some kind of object", it simply asks whether the transcendental ego is something at all<\/em>, whether it recedes [proceeds?] from pure nothingness, or not. Transcendental idealism is an effort to find some room between reality and nothingness, an attempt to declare this basic dichotomy as a mere artifact of the "natural attitude" – as if pure logic could be thus confined.<\/span><\/p>\n

Now I wonder: you label it "Aporetic Conclusion". Why? Isn't it rather a reductio<\/em> of transcendental idealism, leaving a clear way out – viz. a rejection of TI? Why can't we just conclude that "transcendental ego" is an incoherent notion and revert back to noetic realism, where both the subject and the object are just ordinary parts of the world?<\/span><\/p>\n

Another great spot-on complaint of yours is that in phenomenology, we never get the real thing: we never get real transcendence, real objectivity etc., everything is merely constituted-as-such-and-such. I would add here: which deprives us of our epistemic rights to make any claims whatsoever about what the objective matter-of-fact really is with matters we are talking about (the nature of transcendental ego, the mechanisms of constitution, etc., whatever). In all seriously meant philosophical claims a phenomenologist is making statements about what the object of his talk (such as transcendental ego, the various structures and mechanisms claimed to be "described" etc.) is, really<\/em>, an sich<\/em> – and not merely qua constituted by the particular phenomenologist's ego<\/em>. For else — why should such subjective constructs be of any relevance to philosophy, or to me?<\/span><\/p>\n

In other words, the self-destructivity of transcendental idealism reveals itself not only with respect to the transcendental ego, whose Seinsgeltung<\/em> cannot be merely constituted-by-the-ego but somehow original or genuine; but also with respect to the meta-question, what kind of objectivity is claimed for the transcendental idealist's philosophical statements. Either it is genuine objectivity, but then TI claims its own falsity, or a mere constituted objectivity, and then such statements are not part of philosophical discourse concerning life, universe and everything. In both cases we arrive at the conclusion that TI cannot ever be consistent and thoroughgoing: there must be a residual of realism, i.e. of a claimed capability to cognize reality as it is in itself, rather than merely qua-constituted, qua-a-priori-formed etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

But perhaps you would not be willing to go thus far in your critique?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Posted by: Luk\u00e1\u0161 Nov\u00e1k | Tuesday, October 20, 2020 at 12:22 PM<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Dear Luk\u00e1\u0161,<\/span><\/p>\n

It is indeed a pleasure to find you in agreement with me since you are one of the smartest people I know. I hope you and your family are well. I have fond memories of my time in Prague and the Czech Republic.<\/span><\/p>\n

>>Transcendental idealism is an effort to find some room between reality and nothingness, an attempt to declare this basic dichotomy as a mere artifact of the "natural attitude" – as if pure logic could be thus confined.<<<\/span><\/p>\n

That's right. In Sartre, for example, consciousness is no-thing, thus nothing. A "wind blowing towards objects" but blowing from no direction and without any cause or ground. Hence the title *Being and Nothingness.* But of course consciousness is in some sense something since without it no objects would appear. So consciousness is both something and nothing — which certainly looks like a contradiction.<\/span><\/p>\n

Butchvarov, too, is tangled up in this problem.<\/span><\/p>\n

Central to Heidegger's thinking is the ontological difference between das Sein und das Seiende<\/em> (taken either collectively or distributively). But if Being is other than every being, and from the whole lot of them taken together, then Being is nonbeing, nichtseiend. So Sein und Nichts are the same, although not dialectically as in Hegel. But das Nichts ist kein nichtiges Nichts; it is not a nugatory nothing, but some sort of reality, some sort of positive Nothing — which is structurally the same problem we find in Husserl, Sartre, and Butchvarov.<\/span><\/p>\n

Also structurally similar is the notorious 'horse paradox' in Frege: "The concept HORSE is not a concept."<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Posted by: BV | Tuesday, October 20, 2020 at 01:32 PM<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Dr. Novak:<\/span><\/p>\n

>>Now I wonder: you label it "Aporetic Conclusion". Why? Isn't it rather a reductio of transcendental idealism, leaving a clear way out – viz. a rejection of TI? Why can't we just conclude that "transcendental ego" is an incoherent notion and revert back to noetic realism, where both the subject and the object are just ordinary parts of the world?<<<\/span><\/p>\n

Fair question, and the right one to ask. But not easy to answer. Since you are a scholastic realist, perhaps I can soften you up by citing Aristotle, De Anima<\/em> 431b20: "in a sense the soul is all existing things." Here perhaps is the charter for all subsequent transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, the soul is not merely the life principle of a particular animal organism. It is the transcendental subject to which the body and its states appear as well as the animal's mental states such as fear, lust, etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

If this is right, then the subject cannot be "just an ordinary part of the world."<\/span><\/p>\n

I need to hear more about your "noetic realism." Presumably you do not mean we are just parts of the material world and that all of our intellectual and spiritual functions can be accounted for naturalistically. Perhaps you will agree with me that not even sentience can be explained adequately in terms of physics, chemistry and other positive sciences.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Posted by: BV | Tuesday, October 20, 2020 at 02:09 PM<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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>>Another great spot-on your complaint that in phenomenology, we never get the real thing: we never get real transcendence, real objectivity etc., everything is merely constituted-as-such-and-such. I would add here: which deprives us of our epistemic rights to make any claims whatsoever about what the objective matter-of-fact really is with matters we are talking about (the nature of transcendental ego, the mechanisms of constitution, etc., whatever). In all seriously meant philosophical claims a phenomenologist is making statements about what the object of his talk (such as transcendental ego, the various structures and mechanisms claimed to be "described" etc.) is, really, an sich<\/em> — and not merely qua<\/em> constituted by the particular phenomenologist's ego. For else — why should such subjective constructs be of any relevance to philosophy, or to me?<\/span><\/p>\n

In other words, the self-destructivity of transcendental idealism reveals itself not only with respect to the transcendental ego, whose Seinsgeltung<\/em> cannot be merely constituted-by-the-ego but somehow original or genuine; but also with respect to the meta-question, what kind of objectivity is claimed for the transcendental idealist's philosophical statements. Either it is genuine objectivity, but then TI claims its own falsity, or a mere constituted objectivity, and then such statements are not part of philosophical discourse concerning life, universe and everything. In both cases we arrive at the conclusion that TI cannot ever be consistent and thoroughgoing: there must be a residual of realism, i.e. of a claimed capability to cognize reality as it is in itself, rather than merely qua-constituted, qua-a-priori-formed etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

But perhaps you would not be willing to go thus far in your critique?<<<\/span><\/p>\n

You raise a good objection. For example, when Husserl makes a claim about outer perception, that it is intentional, presumptive, that it presents its object directly without images or epistemic intermediaries, etc., he means these claims to be eidetic not factual. He aims to make claims that are true even if there are no cases of outer perception. He is concerned with the essence of perception, the essence of memory, of imagination, etc. Now these essences and the propositions about them are ideal objects that cannot depend on factical subjectivity for their Seinsinn<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Posted by: BV | Tuesday, October 20, 2020 at 02:49 PM<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Dr. Novak by e-mail (27 January 2021):<\/span><\/p>\n

I take also this opportunity to finally respond to your reactions to my<\/span><\/div>\n
comment on your post<\/span><\/div>\n
https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.typepad.com\/maverick_philosopher\/2020\/10\/why-did-i-move-away-from-phenomenology.html<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
— I apologize I did not manage to do so in time — you know, I am <\/span>always behind my schedule with my work…<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
L.N.:<\/span><\/div>\n
>>Now I wonder: you label it "Aporetic Conclusion". Why? Isn't it<\/span><\/div>\n
>>rather a reductio of transcendental idealism, leaving a clear way<\/span><\/div>\n
>>out – viz. a rejection of TI? Why can't we just conclude that<\/span><\/div>\n
>>"transcendental ego" is an incoherent notion and revert back to<\/span><\/div>\n
>>noetic realism, where both the subject and the object are just<\/span><\/div>\n
>>ordinary parts of the world?<<<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
B.V.:<\/span><\/div>\n
> Fair question, and the right one to ask. But not easy to answer.<\/span><\/div>\n
> Since you are a scholastic realist, perhaps I can soften you up by<\/span><\/div>\n
> citing Aristotle, De Anima<\/em> 431b20: "in a sense the soul is all<\/span><\/div>\n
> existing things." Here perhaps is the charter for all subsequent<\/span><\/div>\n
> transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, the soul is not merely the<\/span><\/div>\n
> life principle of a particular animal organism. It is the<\/span><\/div>\n
> transcendental subject to which the body and its states appear as<\/span><\/div>\n
> well as the animal's mental states such as fear, lust, etc.<\/span><\/div>\n
><\/span><\/div>\n
>If this is right, then the subject cannot be "just an ordinary part<\/span><\/div>\n
>of the world."<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
LN: Obviously, this hinges on the meaning of "ordinary". I certainly don't<\/span><\/div>\n
propose reducing cognition and appetition to something merely material<\/span><\/div>\n
or sub-animal. But why cannot genuine, unreduced cognition and<\/span><\/div>\n
appetition be part of the reality just as pebbles of quartz are?<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
I agree that soul is a subject of cognitions and appearances and<\/span><\/div>\n
appetitions. But why "transcendental"? Why must it be pushed out of<\/span><\/div>\n
the picture, so to speak? When I say "I cognize myself", isn't the "I"<\/span><\/div>\n
both the real, intramundane subject who does the cognizing, and the<\/span><\/div>\n
object of this cognizing?<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
BV: >I need to hear more about your "noetic realism." Presumably you do<\/span><\/div>\n
>not mean we are just parts of the material world and that all of our<\/span><\/div>\n
>intellectual and spiritual functions can be accounted for<\/span><\/div>\n
>naturalistically. Perhaps you will agree with me that not even<\/span><\/div>\n
>sentience can be explained adequately in terms of physics, chemistry<\/span><\/div>\n
>and other positive sciences.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
LN: Of course I agree with all that. By "noetic realism" I mean that<\/span><\/div>\n
cognition is (i) non-representationalist (i.e., terminating at reality<\/span><\/div>\n
itself, not at some representations of reality — against Locke etc.);<\/span><\/div>\n
and (ii) receptive, i.e., assimilative to, and measured by, the<\/span><\/div>\n
object, not vice versa (against all sorts of idealism). Note that (i)<\/span><\/div>\n
does not imply that cognition cannot err, nor does it exclude the<\/span><\/div>\n
existence of mental representations as of that _by means of which_<\/span><\/div>\n
(as opposed to _that which_) we cognize. And it also does not exclude<\/span><\/div>\n
that reality-qua-cognized may in certain respects differ from<\/span><\/div>\n
reality-qua-out-there — but it is one and the same reality which is<\/span><\/div>\n
both out there and cognized.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
I would say we are indeed parts of the material world (we are bodies),<\/span><\/div>\n
but not "just parts" of it. We are not mere bodies, but spirited<\/span><\/div>\n
bodies. But a spirited body is a body, nevertheless. I am not sure if<\/span><\/div>\n
this dual nature of man can be analyzed in hylomorphic terms, but I<\/span><\/div>\n
insist with P.F.Strawson that both bodily and mental predicates are<\/span><\/div>\n
to be ascribed to one and the same subject (and unlike Strawson, I<\/span><\/div>\n
take this to be a feature of reality, not just of our conceptual<\/span><\/div>\n
scheme).<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
Best regards,<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
Lukas<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
BV to LN (28 January 2021): For you, the notion of a transcendental subject is incoherent and should be simply dropped. There is no genuine problem here as I think there is. For you, Husserl took a wrong turn, the transcendental turn, and went down a false path.   For you, the ultimate subject of conscious states is an "ordinary part of the world." But you don't mean this materialistically or physicalistically. You admit the "dual nature of man." Man is an animal, but not just an animal: he is also a spirit.  You are rightly skeptical of hylomorphic dualism. Are you then a substance dualist? It seems not since you <\/span><\/span>say that "both bodily and mental predicates are <\/span>to be ascribed to one and the same subject."  But what is this subject? Is it the body in nature?  The body is a material thing and the body, qua material, cannot think.  My brain doesn't think any more than my eye glasses see.   The latter are instruments of vision, the former an instrument of thought.  The brain cannot be the ultimate subject of experience.  The same goes for each of my body parts and for my body as a whole. I don't think with my liver or feel with my heart, which is just a pump made out of meat.  The liver is just a filter made of meat.  <\/span><\/p>\n
 <\/div>\n
Could the psyche be the ultimate ego?  No, it is an object of introspection not the subject that introspects. Similarly for the psychophysical complex. It is not the ultimate subject of experience.   You see where I am going with this. I am regressing to the ultimate condition of anything appearing. This ultimate condition is not to be found among the objects of consciousness. We say it is 'transcendental' though not in the Aristotelian-scholastic sense.   Whether or not it is an ego is a further question; but let's assume  that it is. <\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
I have just motivated  — in a sketchy way –  the introduction of the transcendental ego.   You don't accept this. You will say that one and the same intramundane subject is both cognizer and cognized.  So when I inspect my body, is my body inspecting my body, or some part of my body inspecting some other part of my body?  What part of the body has the power to do this?  Is my hand sensing the soles of my feet? No, I am sensing in tactile fashion the soles of my feet by the instrumentality of a hand.  Is this I a metaphysical self?  If it is, how can it be identical to the physical body?<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
You are trying to think of subjectivity in an objective\/objectivistic\/objectifying way like a good Aristotelian. But this approach seems as problematic as Husserl's transcendental idealism.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The extended comment thread below began life in the comments to Why Did I Move Away from Phenomenology? (13 October 2020) ……………………….. Dear Bill, You have exactly nailed my fundamental problem with transcendental idealism by this: What is this transcendental ego if it is the purely subjective source of all ontic validity, Seinsgeltung? Does it exist? … Continue reading “A Discussion with Lukas Novak about Transcendental Idealism and the Transcendental Ego”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[67,523,328,81],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2736","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-husserl","category-phenomenology","category-self-self-awareness-self-reference","category-transcendental-philosophy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2736","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2736"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2736\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2736"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2736"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2736"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}