I have worked through a bit of Henry's Material Phenomenology<\/em>, but it is heavy-going due to the awful French Continental style in which it is written. The above-captioned Incarnation book is much clearer though still replete with the typical faults of French Continental writing: the overuse of rhetorical questions, the pseudo-literary pretentiousness and portentousness, the lack of clarity, the misuse of universal quantifiers, the historicist lust to outdo one's predecessors in radicality of questioning and to go beyond, always beyond. I could go on, and you hope I don't. But bad style can hide good substance. T<\/span>he ideas are fascinating, and as an old Husserl and Heidegger man I am well-equipped to follow the twists and turns of Henry's meandering through a deep and dark Gallicized <\/span>Schwarzwald<\/em>. My credentials also include having thought long and hard about the Incarnation and having published an article on it.*<\/span><\/p>\n Alright. Time to get to work. I am only up to p. 40 of Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh<\/em>, tr. Karl Hefty, Northwestern UP, 2015, orig. publ. in French in 2000, two years before Henry's death in 2000. So what follows are preliminary notes and queries and solicitations of help from Nemes and anyone else who knows this subject. This is an interpretive critical summary: I will put matters in my own way, sympathetically, but with an eye toward separating the sound from the dubious or outright unsound. <\/span><\/p>\n This book is about incarnation in two senses of the term and their relation. It is about incarnation and the Incarnation of Christian theology. <\/span><\/p>\n Like all living beings, we human beings are incarnate beings, beings of flesh. Most of us are apt to say that all living beings have bodies in a sense of 'body' that does not distinguish between living and non-living embodied beings. <\/span>To illustrate with an example of my own, suppose that a rock, a plant, an animal, and a man fall from a cliff at the same time. Apart from wind resistance, the four will fall at the same rate, 32 ft. per sec2<\/sup> in Earth's gravitational field and arrive at the ground at the same time. From the point of view of physics, the four are bodies in same sense of the term. And this despite their deep and undeniable differences. There is, therefore, a univocal sense of 'body' in which living and nonliving embodied beings are bodies.<\/span><\/p>\n So while it true that animals, and humans in particular, have lived<\/em> bodies, this important fact does not exclude their having bodies in the sense of physics and the natural sciences built upon physics. By lived<\/em> body, I don't just mean a living<\/em> body, an object that is alive in the sense of biology, but a subject of a life, a body that feels, enjoys, and suffers its embodiment. For Henry, however, <\/span><\/p>\n . . . an abyss separates forever the material bodies that fill the universe, on the one hand, and the body of an "incarnate" being such as man [a man!], on the other. (3)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n By "material bodies," H. means the bodies of non-living things. <\/span>Now if two things are separated by an abyss, that is naturally taken to mean that the two are mutually exclusive. So consider a stone and a man. Are they abysmally different? Granted, a stone unlike a man "does not sense itself or feel its own feeling . . . ."(3) Nor does it sense or feel or love or desire anything outside itself. Henry brings up Heidegger's point about touching in Being and Time<\/em>. (3-4) We say that a table up against a wall, making physical contact with it, 'touches' the wall. But of course this is quite unlike my touching the table, or my touching a cat, or two cats touching each other, or my touching myself. I sense the table by touching it; the table does not sense the wall when it 'touches' the wall. <\/span><\/p>\n What I have just written about touching in agreement with Heidegger is true, but I fear that Henry will push it too far. I would say that there is something common between the table's touching the wall and my touching the table. What is common is physical contact. In both cases we have two material bodies (in the sense of physics) in physical\/material contact. My tactile sensing of the table is not possible unless my material finger comes in contact with the table. The physical contact is necessary, though not sufficient, for the sensing. From the phenomenological fact that there is much more<\/em> to sentient touching or tactile sensing than there is to non-sentient physical contact, it does not follow that the two are toto caelo<\/em> different, or abysmally different, i.e., have nothing to do with each other. I hesitate to impute such a blatant non sequitur to Henry. Yet he appears to be denying the common element. <\/span>He seems to be making a mistake opposite to the one the materialist makes. The materialist tries to reduce sentient touching to merely physical contact and the causal processes it initiates,; our phenomenologist tries to reduce sentient touching to something wholly non-physical.<\/span><\/p>\n Henry seems to be endorsing a flesh-body dualism<\/em>. The matter of beings like us he calls flesh<\/em>, while the matter of stones and such he calls body<\/em>. And he seems to think of them as mutually exclusive. "To be incarnate is not to have a body . . . . To be incarnate is to have flesh . . . ." (4) Flesh is the "exact opposite" of body. (4) "This difference is so radical that . . . it is is very difficult, even impossible, actually to think it." We are told that the matter of bodies "ultimately escapes us." (4) The flesh-body dualism would thus appear to be epistemological as well as ontological. We have an "absolute and unbroken knowledge" of flesh but we are "in complete ignorance" "of the inert bodies of material nature." (5)<\/span><\/p>\n An obvious objection to this is that if we were in complete ignorance of the bodies of material nature, then we would not have been able to put a man on the moon. Our technological feats prove that we understand a great deal about material nature. But long before there was rocketry there was carpentry. Jesus was a carpenter. He knew how to nail wooden items together in effective and sturdy ways. The brutal Romans knew how to nail men like Jesus to wooden crosses. To nail flesh to wood is to nail the physically material to the physically material and to know what one is doing and to know the nature of the materials with which one is working. Finally, to speak of the material bodies as "inert," as Henry does, is certainly strange given their causal powers and liabilities. Chemical reagents in non-living substances and solutions are surely not 'inert.'<\/span><\/p>\n But I think I know where Henry is headed: toward a transcendental<\/em> theory of sentience. Roughly, it is our transcendental auto-affectivity that is a condition of the possibility of our 'sensational' encounter with bodies. When I touch my table, the tactile sensation I experience cannot be explained by the physical contact of fingers and table, or at least it cannot be wholly explained in this way. For there is not just physical contact, there is also consciousness<\/em> of physical contact. To be precise, there is conscious physical contact<\/em>. The difference will emerge in a moment. Without consciousness there would be no sensing or feeling. An example of mine: a chocolate bar melting in a hot car does not feel the heat that causes it to melt. But a baby expiring in a hot car does feel the heat that causes it to expire. The baby's horrendous suffering cannot be explained (or not wholly explained) in physical, chemical, electrochemical . . . neuroscientific terms. I am alluding to what is called the Hard Problem in the philosophy of mind: the problem of integrating sensory qualia into a metaphysically naturalist worldview. It can't be done. The qualia cannot be denied, pace<\/em> Danny Dennett the Sophist, but neither can they be identified with anything naturalistically respectable.<\/span><\/p>\n Without consciousness, which can neither be eliminated nor naturalistically reduced, there can be no sensation or feeling. But what about this consciousness? Is it object-directed? Is it intentional consciousness? Or is it non-intentional consciousness? If every<\/em> consciousness is a consciousness of something, then, for me to be conscious of my felt sensations, my felt sensations would have to be objects of intentional states, objects to which outward-bound consciousness directs itself. But this is not phenomenologically the case: I feel my sensations by living through them: they are not objects of awareness but states of awareness, Erlebnisse<\/em>, lived experiencings. It is true that I can reflect on my knee pain, say, and objectify it, but it is only because I have pre-reflectively lived though the felt pain that I can reflect on it. Felt (knee) pain is not felt the way a knee is perceived in outer perception. The knee is an intentional object of an act of visual perception; the pain as pre-reflectively felt and suffered is not an object of inner objectifying perception.<\/span><\/p>\n So where is Henry headed? Toward a transcendentalization of the lived body. (Cf. p. 110) Intentionality by its very nature as consciousness of objects (genitivus objectivus<\/em>) 'expels' all bodies from the subjective sphere which, for a transcendental philosopher such as Husserl, is a transcendental, not a psychological, sphere. (The psychic is an intra-mundane region of beings; the transcendental is pre-mundane and pre-regional.) All bodies including human and animal bodies end up on the side of the object. But bodies so externalized cannot be sensing bodies. And without sensing bodies no body could be sensed. So the lived body must sense itself or affect itself. This auto-affection is the transcendental condition of the possibility of any merely material body's being sensed. My tactile sensing of my table is possible only because of my transcendentally prior sensing of myself as transcendental flesh. And so my pre-mundane self is not a mere transcendental I but also a transcendental body.<\/span><\/p>\n ……………………………….<\/p>\n * Vallicella, William F. (2002). Incarnation and Identity. Philo 5 (1):84-93.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" I have Steven Nemes to thank for introducing me to the thought of Michel Henry. I recall as a graduate student in the 'seventies having seen a big fat tome published in 1973 by Martinus Nijhoff entitled The Essence of Manifestation by one Michel Henry. I may have paged through parts of it back then, … Continue reading “Notes on the Introduction to Michel Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh<\/i>“<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[577,67,523,81,288],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2673","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-henry-michel","category-husserl","category-phenomenology","category-transcendental-philosophy","category-trinity-and-incarnation"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2673","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2673"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2673\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2673"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2673"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2673"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}<\/a>I now own three of Henry's books, not including the Manifestation tome for which Amazon is asking a paltry sum in the range of 300-400 semolians. (I could easily afford it, but my Italian frugality which got me to the place where I can buy any and all books I want, is protesting as we speak; she is one tight-pursed task mistress.) <\/span><\/p>\n
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