{"id":2558,"date":"2021-06-10T16:40:10","date_gmt":"2021-06-10T16:40:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/06\/10\/is-existence-completeness\/"},"modified":"2021-06-10T16:40:10","modified_gmt":"2021-06-10T16:40:10","slug":"is-existence-completeness","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/06\/10\/is-existence-completeness\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Existence Completeness?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Marco Santambrogio, "Meinongian Theories of Generality," Nous<\/em>, December 1990, p. 662:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

. . . I take existence to mean just this: an entity, i, exists iff there is a determinate answer to every question concerning it or in other words, for every F(x) either F[x\/i] or ~F[x\/i] holds.  The Tertium Non Datur<\/em> is the hallmark of existence or reality.  This is entirely in the Meinong-Twardowski tradition.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

In other words, existence is complete determinateness or completeness: Necessarily, for any x, x exists if and only if x is complete, i.e., satisfies the property version of the Law of Excluded Middle (tertium non datur<\/em>).  Now I have long maintained that whatever exists is complete, but I have never been tempted by the thesis that whatever is complete exists.  By my lights, there has to be more to existence than completeness. If I am right, existence cannot be reduced to, or identified with, completeness.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reader Grigory Aleksin just now reports that the late Dale Jacquette to whom I pay tribute here<\/a> has a similar view:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
Definition of Existence:<\/em>" For any object O, O exists, has being or is an entity, if and only if O has a maximally consistent property combination."<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
Definition of a Maximally Consistent Property Combination:<\/em>" A property combination PC for any logically possible object O is maximally consistent if and only if, for any logically possible extraontological property F, either F is in PC or non-F (the complement of F) is in PC, but not both"<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
Thus he holds that:<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
" A combinatorial ontology holds that existence is nothing more or [nor] less than completeness and consistency, or what is also called maximal consistency. The definition, properly understood and applied, provides a unified analysis of the concept of being for all entities, including existent objects, actual states of affairs and the actual world. "<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
"An extraontological property, as the name implies, is a property that by itself does not entail anything about an object\u2019s ontic status, and that is not instantiated unless the relevant property combination is maximally consistent. To maintain that existence does not characterize any object says, in short form, that the object\u2019s property combination is maximally consistent with no predicational gaps only if, for any extraontological property or property complement, the combination includes either the extraontological property or its complement, but not both."<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
The existence-is-completeness doctrine has a interesting consequence which, to my mind, amounts to a reductio ad absurdum<\/em>:<\/span><\/div>\n
\"Why<\/a> \"Jacquette<\/a>What Jacquette is telling us is that any maximally consistent combination of properties or states of affairs exists just in virtue of being maximally consistent.  I see two problems with this.  <\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
The first problem is that his view entails that every possible world is actual, in which case no possible world is absolutely actual.   Accordingly, every possible world is at best actual-at-itself and not actual, full stop. We end up with a view very much like David Lewis's. Why do I say this? Well, if we consider all the possible combinations of states of affairs, there will not just be one that is maximally consistent and complete and thus existent, but many. <\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
The second problem for Jacquette is that every maximally consistent combination of states of affairs  is necessarily actual.  So not only is every possible world actual at itself, but every such world is necessarily actual at itself.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
Are these two problems really problems? (Are they bugs or features?)  They are problems for me because I have contrary intuitions. By my lights, there can be only one actual world, and that world is both absolutely actual and contingently actual.  Furthermore, there is no necessity that any<\/em> world be actual. There might have been no world at all as Jacquette understands 'world': Possibly, no maximally consistent combination of states of affairs exists.  It might have been like this: there is God, who exists of metaphysical necessity, and an infinity of maximally consistent combinations of states of affairs, but none of these combos exists in reality outside the divine mind. <\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
This is equivalent to saying that, while existence entails completeness, completeness does not entail existence. Something must be superadded to a maximally consistent and complete combination of extraontological properties to make it exist.  That something is existence.  The superaddition to a complete essence of existence is what is known in theological terms as creation, at least on one view of divine creation.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
I say that there is more to existence than completeness; Jacquette denies what I affirm.  Is there any way to decide this rationally?  <\/span><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Marco Santambrogio, "Meinongian Theories of Generality," Nous, December 1990, p. 662: . . . I take existence to mean just this: an entity, i, exists iff there is a determinate answer to every question concerning it or in other words, for every F(x) either F[x\/i] or ~F[x\/i] holds.  The Tertium Non Datur is the hallmark of existence or … Continue reading “Is Existence Completeness?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[345,142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2558","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-creation","category-existence"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2558","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2558"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2558\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2558"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2558"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2558"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}