{"id":2521,"date":"2021-07-24T14:26:06","date_gmt":"2021-07-24T14:26:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/07\/24\/how-should-we-use-intentional-object\/"},"modified":"2021-07-24T14:26:06","modified_gmt":"2021-07-24T14:26:06","slug":"how-should-we-use-intentional-object","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/07\/24\/how-should-we-use-intentional-object\/","title":{"rendered":"How Should We Use ‘Intentional Object’? Is the IO the Thing Itself?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dr. Buckner comments,<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

. . . we still need to agree on a clear definition of \u2018Intentional Object\u2019. Here are two other definitions I found.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tim Crane: what an intentional state is about.<\/em><\/span>
Merriam Webster: something whether actually existing or not that the mind thinks about.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

These are both very clear, and I suggest we adopt them. That is, if BV is thinking about (or \u2018of\u2019) the Washington Monument, then the Intentional Object of his thinking is the Washington Monument itself. If the Washington Monument is then blown into a billion pieces by high explosive and the remains scattered to the four points of the US, and it no longer exists, and if we agree that BV is still thinking about<\/em> the WM, then the Intentional Object is still the WM.<\/span><\/p>\n

Do you agree? <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

No.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

If we adopt both of  the definitions cited, Crane and Webster, then the intentional object (IO) of a mental act or intentional state is the item to which the act is directed, an item which may or may not exist without prejudice to the existence and specific directedness of the act. That is: the specific directedness of the act (which is phenomenologically accessible to the subject of the act via reflection*) is what it is whether or not the IO exists. So Buckner is telling us that if I am thinking of or about the WM over an interval of time during which, unbeknownst to me, the WM goes from existing to not existing, then the  WM itself is the IO both when it exists and after it ceases to exist.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

But this implies that my thinking becomes objectless when the WM ceases to exist. And that contradicts the thesis of intentionality according to which, necessarily, to think is to think of something.  In the form of a reductio ad absurdum<\/em>:<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

a) The intentional object = the thing itself, not some epistemic deputy or intermediary in the mind or between mind and thing.  In our example the IO = the WM , a massive marble obelisk that exists extramentally if it exists at all. (Bucknerian assumption for reductio<\/em>)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

b) No mental act exists without an intentional object. (Thesis of Intentionality)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

c) No mental act exists if the thing itself to which the act is directed does not exist.  (From (a) and (b))<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

d) My mental act of thinking of the WM does not exist if the WM does not exist. (From (c))<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

But<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

e) My mental act of thinking  of the WM continues to exist after the WM ceases to exist. (Phenomenological datum)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

f) (d) contradicts (e).<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

g) (a) is false: the IO is not identical to the thing itself. (By reductio ad absurdum<\/em>)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

_____________<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

*In other words, I know, with certainty, both that<\/em> I am thinking about something when I am thinking about something, and what<\/em> I am thinking about when I think about it.  Husserl's phenomenology is committed to this thesis (cf. Ideas<\/em> I, sec. 36) but it is notoriously denied by Ruth Garrett Millikan whose theory of intentionality is radically externalist. Cf. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories<\/em>, p. 92 ff.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dr. Buckner comments, . . . we still need to agree on a clear definition of \u2018Intentional Object\u2019. Here are two other definitions I found. Tim Crane: what an intentional state is about.Merriam Webster: something whether actually existing or not that the mind thinks about. These are both very clear, and I suggest we adopt them. That … Continue reading “How Should We Use ‘Intentional Object’? Is the IO the Thing Itself?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[100],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2521","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-intentionality"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2521","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2521"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2521\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2521"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2521"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2521"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}