{"id":2493,"date":"2021-08-12T18:36:23","date_gmt":"2021-08-12T18:36:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/08\/12\/back-to-the-intentionalityreference-discussion\/"},"modified":"2021-08-12T18:36:23","modified_gmt":"2021-08-12T18:36:23","slug":"back-to-the-intentionalityreference-discussion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/08\/12\/back-to-the-intentionalityreference-discussion\/","title":{"rendered":"Back to the Intentionality\/Reference Discussion"},"content":{"rendered":"

Returning to the ongoing thread<\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

So to summarise the discussion so far. The doctrine of Reference and Identity<\/em> is that empty names can refer. That is because the verb phrase \u2018refers to\u2019 is intentional<\/em>. That is, \u201cS refers to N\u201d is consistent with \u201cthere is no such thing as N\u201d. Contrast with \u201cS touches N\u201d which implies there is such a thing as N.<\/span><\/p>\n

[. . .]<\/span><\/p>\n

Do you see any problem with that position?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

When you say, "empty names can refer," do you mean that some empty names refer and some empty names do not refer? Or do you mean that all empty names refer? (Compare: <\/span>If I said that integers can be either odd or even, that would be equivalent to saying that  some integers are odd and some are even.)<\/span><\/p>\n

I will assume that you mean that all empty names refer.  You say that this is because 'refers to' is intentional. It is intentional in the very same way that thinking-of is intentional. To think is to think of something. But 'A thinks of  N' is logically consistent with 'there is no such thing as N.'  If I am thinking of Asmodeus, it does not follow that I am thinking of something that exists.  So far, so good. Now I take it that you hold that the following are all logically equivalent where the substituends for 'N' are proper names such as 'Moses' and 'Asmodeus.' <\/span><\/p>\n