{"id":2446,"date":"2021-09-08T19:28:58","date_gmt":"2021-09-08T19:28:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/09\/08\/a-proof-of-individual-concepts\/"},"modified":"2021-09-08T19:28:58","modified_gmt":"2021-09-08T19:28:58","slug":"a-proof-of-individual-concepts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/09\/08\/a-proof-of-individual-concepts\/","title":{"rendered":"A Proof of Individual Concepts?"},"content":{"rendered":"

This just in from Edward:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Proof that singular concepts (aka individual concepts) exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

1. Common terms (\u2018cat\u2019) and singular terms (\u2018this cat\u2019, \u2018Max\u2019) exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. These terms are meaningful, i.e. their meanings exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. A concept is the meaning of a term.<\/span><\/p>\n

4. Thus (from 1,2, 3) singular concepts, aka singular meanings, exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

QED<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This argument equivocates on 'meaning.' There are of course general and singular terms and they both have meanings if the meaning of a term is its extension<\/em>, the (set of) things to which it applies. Accordingly, the meaning\/extension of 'cat' is (the set of)  cats, and the meaning\/extension of 'Max' is Max, or his singleton.  General terms also have meaning in the sense of intension<\/em>.  'Cordate' and 'renate' are general terms that have the same extension but differ in intension.  But the singular term 'Max,' while it has an extension, lacks an intension.<\/span><\/p>\n

So for both (1) and (2) to be true, the meaning of a term must be its extension. But for (3) to be true, the meaning of a term must be its intension. So the argument trades on an equivocation and is for that reason invalid.<\/span><\/p>\n

Here is a sound argument:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

5. A concept is the intension of a term.<\/span><\/p>\n

6. Singular terms lack intensions.<\/span><\/p>\n

7. If a term lacks an intension, then there is no concept the term expresses.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

8. Singular terms do not express concepts. (From 5, 6, 7)<\/span><\/p>\n

9. If a term does not express a concept, then there exists no concept the term expresses.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

10. There are no singular\/individual concepts.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Just ask yourself: how could there be a concept of precisely Max and nothing actually or possibly different from Max? Suppose that there is a definite description that Max alone satisfies in the actual world.  That description would express a concept that only one thing could bear or instantiate. But such a concept would not be singular but general since something else might have satisfied the description.   For there to be an individual concept of Max, Max himself<\/em> would somehow  have to be a constituent of the concept. But that is impossible and for two reasons.  First, concepts reside in the mind but no cat is a constituent of anything in my mind.  Second, a concept is distinct from its bearer and can exist whether or not its bearer exists.  But the concept MAX, if there were such a concept, would not be wholly distinct from its bearer and could not exist without its bearer.<\/span><\/p>\n

The individual qua individual cannot be conceptualized. My conceptual grasp of an individual such as Max is always and necessarily by way of general concepts: cat, domestic cat, black cat, Tuxedo cat, black male Tuxedo cat five years old and weighing 20 lbs,  cat presently in my visual field, this cat to which I am now pointing.  Note that Max need not be this cat to which I am presently pointing, whence it follows that the haecceity of Max himself  cannot be reached or grasped or conceptualized in the concept this cat to which I am presently pointing.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This just in from Edward: Proof that singular concepts (aka individual concepts) exist. 1. Common terms (\u2018cat\u2019) and singular terms (\u2018this cat\u2019, \u2018Max\u2019) exist. 2. These terms are meaningful, i.e. their meanings exist. 3. A concept is the meaning of a term. 4. Thus (from 1,2, 3) singular concepts, aka singular meanings, exist. QED This … Continue reading “A Proof of Individual Concepts?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[554,558],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2446","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-concepts","category-haecceity"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2446","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2446"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2446\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2446"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2446"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2446"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}