{"id":2413,"date":"2021-10-01T05:23:47","date_gmt":"2021-10-01T05:23:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/10\/01\/must-we-be-ontologically-serious-about-something\/"},"modified":"2021-10-01T05:23:47","modified_gmt":"2021-10-01T05:23:47","slug":"must-we-be-ontologically-serious-about-something","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/10\/01\/must-we-be-ontologically-serious-about-something\/","title":{"rendered":"Ontologically Serious and Unserious Uses of  &#8216;Something&#8217; and the Problem of Reference to the Nonexistent"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">If Jane is friendly, then there is something Jane is, namely, friendly. But one hesitates to infer either<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">1) There is (exists) such an object as friendly<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">which is not even well-formed, or<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">1*) There is (exists) such an object as friendliness<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">which is well-formed but offensive to the nominalist sensibility. &#39;Jane is friendly&#39; commits one to Jane but not obviously to the property of being friendly.&#0160;<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">According to Sainsbury and Tye (<em>Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them<\/em>, Oxford UP, 2012, p. 114), &quot;&#39;There is something&#39; is not an object quantifier&quot; in sentences like &#39;There is something that Jane is, namely, friendly.&#39; In such cases,&#0160;<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">The &#39;thing&#39; in &#39;something&#39; is not ontologically serious. By contrast, expressions like &#39;object&#39; and &#39;entity are used in philosophical discourse&#0160; to mark ontological commitment; and words like &#39;dagger&#39; and &#39;fountain of youth&#39; are used by everyone in that way in extensional contexts. (ibid.)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">The idea is that there are two senses\/uses of &#39;something.&#39; One is ontologically serious because ontologically committal while the other is not.&#0160; If I kick a ball, then there is&#0160; something I kick. (Ontologically committal use of &#39;something&#39; in an extensional context.) If Macbeth hallucinated a dagger, then there is something Macbeth hallucinated, namely, a dagger. (Ontologically noncommittal use of &#39;something&#39; in an intensional\/intentional context.)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">Do we have here the makings of a solution to the ancient problem of apparent reference to the nonexistent?&#0160; I don&#39;t think so.&#0160;<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">Go back to Jane. Jane is friendly.&#0160; So there is something she is, namely, friendly. So far, so good. Everything is clear. But trouble starts and murk intrudes when we are told that the &#39;something&#39; in play here is ontologically noncommittal: there is nothing in reality that Jane is, or is related to in virtue of which she is friendly. Thus there is no property, friendliness, that she instantiates, or any property that she has as a constituent, or anything like that. In reality there is just Jane.&#0160; But then what is the difference between Jane&#39;s being friendly and her being unfriendly?<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">It is evident to me that there has to be something in reality that grounds that difference. If you deny this, I will not understand you. Suppose you say&#0160; that Jane&#39;s being friendly&#0160; is just the circumstance that someone attached or applied the predicate &#39;is friendly&#39; to her.&#0160; I will say: So she needs to be called friendly to BE friendly? That is absurd.&#0160; If I called her unfriendly, would she then be unfriendly? What if I called her anorexic? IS she whatever I SAY she is? Has she no properties independently of my say-so? If no one called her anything, would she have no properties at all?&#0160; Before the evolution of languages was the Earth neither spheroid nor non-spheroid?&#0160; Is there no difference between a predicate&#39;s being true of an individual and its being applied to or predicated of an individual?&#0160;<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">These considerations convince me that the distinction between ontologically serious and&#0160; unserious uses of &#39;something&#39; has not been established.&#0160; Note that it needs to be established independently of the Macbeth problem.&#0160; To first introduce it as a solution to the Macbeth problem would be <em>ad hoc<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia, palatino; font-size: 13pt;\">There is also this question: what is the difference between saying that there is something &#8212; in the ontologically unserious sense &#8212; that Macbeth hallucinated and saying that Macbeth hallucinated a Meinongian nonexistent object?&#0160; How does the Sainsbury and Tye solution differ from a Meinongian one?<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>If Jane is friendly, then there is something Jane is, namely, friendly. But one hesitates to infer either 1) There is (exists) such an object as friendly which is not even well-formed, or 1*) There is (exists) such an object as friendliness which is well-formed but offensive to the nominalist sensibility. &#39;Jane is friendly&#39; commits &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2021\/10\/01\/must-we-be-ontologically-serious-about-something\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Ontologically Serious and Unserious Uses of  &#8216;Something&#8217; and the Problem of Reference to the Nonexistent&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[482],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2413","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-meinong-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2413","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2413"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2413\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2413"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2413"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2413"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}