{"id":2002,"date":"2022-06-09T14:19:43","date_gmt":"2022-06-09T14:19:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2022\/06\/09\/on-whether-an-individual-is-identical-to-its-existence\/"},"modified":"2022-06-09T14:19:43","modified_gmt":"2022-06-09T14:19:43","slug":"on-whether-an-individual-is-identical-to-its-existence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2022\/06\/09\/on-whether-an-individual-is-identical-to-its-existence\/","title":{"rendered":"On whether an individual is identical to its existence"},"content":{"rendered":"

This just over the transom:<\/span><\/p>\n

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Good day Dr. Vallicella,<\/span><\/div>\n
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I was reading your book on existence, and on page 71, there is this argument for the real distinction between an individual's essence and its existence:<\/span><\/div>\n
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"[I]f in a<\/em> essence and existence are identical, then a<\/em>'s essence entails a<\/em>'s existence. But that is to say that a<\/em> is a necessary being… [this] implies that every individual is a necessary being, which is absurd."<\/span><\/div>\n
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I've reconstructed this as follows, and it seems one can object to premise (2):<\/span><\/div>\n
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(1) If a<\/em>'s existence is identical to a<\/em>'s essence, then a<\/em>'s essence entails a<\/em>'s existence. <\/span><\/div>\n
(2) If a<\/em>'s essence entails X, then a<\/em> is necessarily X. <\/span><\/div>\n
(3) Therefore, if a<\/em>'s existence = a<\/em>'s essence, then a<\/em> necessarily exists. <\/span><\/div>\n
(4) a<\/em> is a contingent being. <\/span><\/div>\n
(5) No contingent being can exist necessarily. <\/span><\/div>\n
(6) Therefore, a<\/em>'s existence is not identical to a<\/em>'s essence.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
(2) seems ambiguous. We can say that a<\/em> can be necessarily X absolutely or conditionally. Put in terms of possible worlds, a<\/em> is necessarily X absolutely if a<\/em> is X in all possible worlds, while a<\/em> is necessarily X conditionally if a<\/em> is X only in all worlds where a<\/em> exists. <\/span><\/div>\n
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BV: I accept your distinction, but I would couch it in different terms, terms in keeping with standard practice. Let the free variable 'x' range over individuals.  To say that x is essentially<\/em> F (where 'F' is a predicate that picks out a property) is to say that x is F in every possible world in which x exists. To say that x is accidentally<\/em> F is to say that x is F in some, but not all, of the possible worlds in which x exists. To say that x is necessarily<\/em> F is to say that (i) x is essentially F, and that (ii) x exists in every possible world.  <\/span><\/div>\n
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If we read (2) in terms of absolute necessity, then (2) is false\u2013just because a triangle's essence entails being three-sided, it doesn't follow that triangles exist in all possible worlds. <\/span><\/div>\n
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BV:  If you are talking about  particular  material triangles, a triangular piece of metal for example, then it it is true that they do not exist in all worlds.  And this despite the fact that every triangle is essentially three-sided.  But what I mean by the essence of a concrete contingent individual such as a triangular piece of metal is the whatness or quiddity of that very individual minus its existence. Recall that I distinguish between wide and narrow senses of 'essence' on p. 68:<\/span><\/div>\n
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'Essence' is here employed in a wide sense to denote the conjunction of those properties that make up what<\/em> a thing is, and not in the narrow sense according to which a thing's essential (as opposed to accidental) properties are those it cannot fail to possess. Thus in the wide sense of 'essence' being sunburned now is part of my essence, even though I might not have been sunburned now. Thus [both] narrowly essential and accidental properties (whether monadic or relational) are part of my wide essence. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
So consider that triangular piece of metal. It exists, and it exists contingently, which is to say — avoiding possible worlds jargon — that it is possibly such that it does not exist. It might not have existed: there is no metaphysical necessity that it exist.  But if the existence of x<\/em> and the wide essence of x<\/em> are one and the same — as the 'no difference theory' implies — then our triangular piece of metal exists just in virtue of its being what<\/em> it is. That is equivalent to saying that its possibility entails its actuality, which is the definition of a necessary being. But that piece of metal is surely no necessary being. So I conclude that there is a real distinction between wide essence and existence in it and in every contingent being.  What I argue in the book is that the metaphysical contingency of a contingent being is rooted in the real distinction.<\/span><\/div>\n
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If we read (2) in terms of conditional necessity, then (2) is true\u2013a triangle is three-sided only in worlds where it exists\u2013but this would render (6) false, since something can exist necessarily in a conditional sense and still be a contingent being.
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It is certainly true — to put it my way — that a thing can have an essential property and "still be a contingent being."  But this is not relevant to what I am saying.<\/span><\/div>\n
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You must bear in mind that I deny  that existence is a property where P is a property =df<\/sub> P is possibly such that it is instantiated.   Your argument above seems to miss this important point. You seem to be assimilating existence to a property.  We rightly distinguish essential and accidental properties, but existence is neither an essential nor an accidental property.<\/span><\/div>\n
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The existence of x  is just too basic to be a property of  x, but not so basic as to be identical to x!<\/span><\/div>\n
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Is this a fair reconstruction of your argument, and if so, how can the above objection be addressed?<\/span><\/div>\n
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I would say that you haven't grasped by argument. Comments are enabled in case you have a rejoinder.<\/span> <\/span><\/div>\n
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Thank you for your time.<\/span><\/div>\n
Best,<\/span><\/div>\n
M. L. Pianist<\/span><\/span><\/div>\n
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Thank you for writing, M. L.<\/span><\/div>\n
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 <\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This just over the transom: Good day Dr. Vallicella,   I was reading your book on existence, and on page 71, there is this argument for the real distinction between an individual's essence and its existence:   "[I]f in a essence and existence are identical, then a's essence entails a's existence. But that is to say that a is a necessary … Continue reading “On whether an individual is identical to its existence”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,346],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2002","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-identity-and-individuation"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2002","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2002"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2002\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2002"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2002"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2002"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}