{"id":1997,"date":"2022-06-13T11:26:46","date_gmt":"2022-06-13T11:26:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2022\/06\/13\/what-is-subjective-idealism\/"},"modified":"2022-06-13T11:26:46","modified_gmt":"2022-06-13T11:26:46","slug":"what-is-subjective-idealism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2022\/06\/13\/what-is-subjective-idealism\/","title":{"rendered":"Idealism: Subjective, Objective, Transcendental"},"content":{"rendered":"

This from a recent comment thread:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

I think we should all agree on what counts as \u2018subjective idealism\u2019. I characterise it as the view that the objects we commonly take to be physical objects are in some way, or wholly, mind dependent. This a reasonable interpretation of Kant.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Let's leave the interpretation of Kant for later. The definition on offer raises questions.<\/span><\/p>\n

1) Does the 'in some way' render the definition vacuous? I see a tree. The tree exists whether or not I am looking at it. But while I am looking at it, the tree has the relational property of being seen by me.  This property depends on my seeing which is a mental act of my mind.  (An act is not an action, but an intentional, or object-directed,  experience.) So there is a way in which the tree is mind-dependent.  It is dependent on me for its being-seen. There is a whole range of such  properties. The tree is such that: it is deemed beautiful by me; falsely believed by me to be a mesquite; thought by me to have been planted too close to the house, thought by you to have been planted just the right distance from the house, etc.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Or consider money. What makes a piece of paper or a piece of metal money? Obviously, money to be money, i.e., a means of exchange, depends on minded organisms who so treat it.<\/span><\/p>\n

2) If, on the other hand,  physical things are wholly<\/em> mind-dependent, then that presumably means that trees and such are dependent on one or more minds for all of their properties, whether essential or accidental, whether monadic or relational, and also<\/em> dependent on minds for their very existence.  This leads ineluctably to the question as to who these minds are.  Surely the physical universe in all its unspeakable vastness does not depend on my mind or yours or any finite mind or any collection of finite minds.<\/span><\/p>\n

So the question arises: has there ever been a subjective idealist (as defined above) among the 'name' philosophers?  George Berkeley, you say? But the good bishop brought God into the picture to secure the existence of the tree in the quad when no one was about:<\/span><\/p>\n

Dear Sir, your astonishment\u2019s odd<\/span>
I am always about in the Quad<\/span>
And that\u2019s why the tree<\/span>
continues to be<\/span>
since observed by, Yours faithfully, God<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

If the other spirit in question is God, an omnipresent being, then perhaps his perception can be used to guarantee a completely continuous existence to every physical object. In the Three Dialogues<\/em>, Berkeley very clearly invokes God in this context. Interestingly, whereas in the Principles<\/em>, as we have seen above, he argued that God must exist in order to cause<\/em> our ideas of sense, in the Dialogues<\/em> (212, 214\u20135) he argues that our ideas must exist in<\/em> God when not perceived by us.[20<\/a>]<\/sup> If our ideas exist in God, then they presumably exist continuously. Indeed, they must exist continuously, since standard Christian doctrine dictates that God is unchanging. (SEP Berkeley entry<\/a>)<\/span><\/p>\n

Now if the ultimate subject of subjective idealism is God, who exists of absolute metaphysical necessity and who creates and ongoing sustains in existence  everything other than himself, then such an idealism is better described as objective. <\/span><\/p>\n

Kant's brand of idealism is neither subjective nor objective, but transcendental. What this means I will explain later. <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This from a recent comment thread: I think we should all agree on what counts as \u2018subjective idealism\u2019. I characterise it as the view that the objects we commonly take to be physical objects are in some way, or wholly, mind dependent. This a reasonable interpretation of Kant. Let's leave the interpretation of Kant for … Continue reading “Idealism: Subjective, Objective, Transcendental”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[489,79,270],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1997","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-berkeley","category-idealism-and-realism","category-kant"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1997","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1997"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1997\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1997"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1997"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1997"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}