{"id":1587,"date":"2023-03-04T13:55:48","date_gmt":"2023-03-04T13:55:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2023\/03\/04\/london-ed-offers-the-following-aporetic-morssel-for-our-delectation-this-is-not-mine-lycans-but-it-is-tricky-berti\/"},"modified":"2023-03-04T13:55:48","modified_gmt":"2023-03-04T13:55:48","slug":"london-ed-offers-the-following-aporetic-morssel-for-our-delectation-this-is-not-mine-lycans-but-it-is-tricky-berti","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2023\/03\/04\/london-ed-offers-the-following-aporetic-morssel-for-our-delectation-this-is-not-mine-lycans-but-it-is-tricky-berti\/","title":{"rendered":"The Analysis of Qualia"},"content":{"rendered":"

London Ed sends the following for our rumination and delectation:<\/span><\/p>\n

       This is not mine (Lycan's). But it is tricky:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1) Bertie is experiencing a green thing.<\/span><\/p>\n

2) Suppose that there is no physical green thing outside Bertie\u2019s head. But<\/span><\/p>\n

3) There is no physical green thing inside Bertie\u2019s head either.<\/span><\/p>\n

4) If it is physical, the green thing is either outside Bertie\u2019s head or inside it. Thus,<\/span><\/p>\n

5) The green thing is not physical. [1,2,3,4] Thus,<\/span><\/p>\n

6) Bertie\u2019s experience contains a nonphysical thing. [1,5] Thus,<\/span><\/p>\n

7) Bertie\u2019s experience is not, or not entirely, physical. [6]<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The argument seem to presuppose an act-object<\/em> analysis of experiencing. Accordingly, there is the experiencing and there is that which is experienced, a green item, a green quale.  If the quale is not physical, then the experiencing is not, or is not entirely, physical.   The argument goes through. But then the experiencing cannot be a brain process (which I think is what Bill Lycan would want to maintain).<\/span><\/p>\n

On an adverbial<\/em> analysis of experiencing, however, it may be possible to uphold the view that experiencings are brain processes.   Accordingly, my sensing a green quale is my sensing green-ly. Thus there is no green object that appears: 'green' functions here not as an adjective that modifies a noun, but as an adverb that modifies the present progressive form of the verb 'to experience.'<\/span><\/p>\n

The main problem with the adverbial analysis is that it gets the phenomenology wrong. If I see a green item, I see something that is green.  I do not see a green sensing or a sensing-greenly. This is so even if the green something I see does not exist! Ed will baulk here given that he upholds the dubious thin theory of existence. But surely I do not see a sensing-greenly, whatever that might mean. And that is the second problem. The locution 'sense-greenly' just makes no sense, unless it is replaceable salva significatione<\/em> with 'sense something green.' The point is that 'sense-greenly' has no independent or irreducible sense. Since it does not, the adverbial theory is a non-starter.<\/span><\/p>\n

'She ate quiche' makes sense, and so does 'She ate quickly.' But she ate-quiche-ly' means nothing unless it is a weird way of saying 'She ate quiche.'<\/span><\/p>\n

Once again we seem to have landed in an aporetic 'pickle.'<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

London Ed sends the following for our rumination and delectation:        This is not mine (Lycan's). But it is tricky: 1) Bertie is experiencing a green thing. 2) Suppose that there is no physical green thing outside Bertie\u2019s head. But 3) There is no physical green thing inside Bertie\u2019s head either. 4) If it … Continue reading “The Analysis of Qualia”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21,449],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1587","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aporetics","category-qualia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1587","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1587"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1587\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1587"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1587"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1587"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}