{"id":1567,"date":"2023-03-17T06:10:14","date_gmt":"2023-03-17T06:10:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2023\/03\/17\/the-phenomenal-principle\/"},"modified":"2023-03-17T06:10:14","modified_gmt":"2023-03-17T06:10:14","slug":"the-phenomenal-principle","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2023\/03\/17\/the-phenomenal-principle\/","title":{"rendered":"The Phenomenal Principle"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ed Buckner sends this:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cIf there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality\u201d. (Howard Robinson, Perception<\/em>, 1994, London: Routledge, p. 32)<\/span><\/p>\n

That is the question. If it sensibly <\/em>appears<\/em> to Jake that there is a green after-image, does it follow that there is something green of which Jake is aware?<\/span><\/p>\n

I\u2019m inclined to answer yes. But then we have the problem that there is nothing green and physical outside Jake\u2019s brain, nor inside Jake\u2019s brain. So what is it that is green? We agree that it can\u2019t be a physical item, if Robinson\u2019s Principle is true.<\/span><\/p>\n

I recommend Robinson\u2019s 1994 book, and also his November 2022 book Perception and Idealism<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Ed seems to be coming around. Robinson is asking the right question, and Ed answers in the affirmative or at least is so inclined. (By the way, I read Robinson's excellent Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism<\/em>, Cambridge UP, 1982, when it first came out. I expect his later work, which I haven't read, is equally good.)<\/span><\/p>\n

It is best to approach the question from the first-person point of view. A green after-image sensibly appears to me. (It appears visually and so sensibly.) Does something appear or does nothing appear? The datum is not nothing, so it is something.  It is indubitably<\/em> something. And it is a describable<\/em>, definite something: green, pulsating, etc. The green item is not outside my head. But it is not inside my head either. (As Bill Lycan says, if I have something green inside my head, then I am in big trouble.)<\/span><\/p>\n

It follows that the indubitable phenomenal datum cannot be a physical item that is green, pulsating, etc. The inference is correct and the conclusion is true.  What Ed should do is simply admit that there are sensory qualia.  But he appears loathe to do so. He needs to explain why. Is he ideologically committed to materialism? I don't think that's it. <\/span><\/p>\n

We know that Ed reasonably rejects the characteristic Meinongian thesis that (i) some of the items to which we refer both in thought and in language have no being (Sein<\/em>) whatsoever (not Dasein<\/em>, not Bestehen<\/em>, not intentionales QuasiSein<\/em>, not any Seinsmodus<\/em>) but nevertheless (ii) are mind-independent Soseine<\/em> that actually (not merely possibly) instantiate properties. But this rejection of Meinong cannot be a good reason for Ed to refuse to countenance the green after-image, and this for two  reasons. First, the sensory quale in question is not<\/em> mind-independent. Second, it exists<\/em>. In its case, esse est percipi, <\/em>to be is to be perceived. The green after-image is perceived, and by the same stroke, it is<\/em>\/exists.<\/span><\/p>\n

But it may be that Ed is confusing the green after-image with the green unicorn. And we did catch him in that confusion in an earlier thread. Suppose I am thinking about a green unicorn. Let's use 'thinking' in the broad Cartesian way to refer to any object-directed act of awareness, including imagining. Imagining a green unicorn, I am not imagining an image since a unicorn is an animal, not an image; I am imagining a unicorn. The object-directed act of mind purports to display a mind-independent animal,  not a mind-dependent image. <\/span><\/p>\n

But of course there are\/exist no unicorns!  For that very reason, a sensory quale such as a green after-image cannot be assimilated to a green unicorn. What's more, unicorns are not mind-dependent. Qualia are; ergo, etc. <\/span><\/p>\n

Your move, Ed. Give us some good reasons why you will not admit qualia. If your reasons are neither pro-materialist not anti-Meinongian, what are they?<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ed Buckner sends this: \u201cIf there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality\u201d. (Howard Robinson, Perception, 1994, London: Routledge, p. 32) That is the question. If it sensibly appears to Jake that there is a … Continue reading “The Phenomenal Principle”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[96,54],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1567","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-consciousness-and-qualia","category-mind"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1567","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1567"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1567\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1567"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1567"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1567"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}