{"id":1531,"date":"2023-04-03T14:19:52","date_gmt":"2023-04-03T14:19:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2023\/04\/03\/trope-troubles-an-exercise-in-aporetics\/"},"modified":"2023-04-03T14:19:52","modified_gmt":"2023-04-03T14:19:52","slug":"trope-troubles-an-exercise-in-aporetics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2023\/04\/03\/trope-troubles-an-exercise-in-aporetics\/","title":{"rendered":"Trope Troubles: An Exercise in Aporetics"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Elliot C. asked me about tropes. What follows is a re-post from 30 March 2016, slightly emended, which stands up well under current scrutiny.  Perhaps Elliot will find the time to tell me whether he finds it clear and convincing and whether it answers his questions.<\/span><\/p>\n

…………………………..<\/span><\/p>\n

A reader  has been much exercised of late by trope theory and other questions in ontology.  He has been sharing his enthusiasm with me.   He espies <\/span><\/p>\n

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. . . an apparent antinomy at the heart of trope theory. On the one hand, tropes are logically prior to objects. But on the other hand, objects (or, more precisely, the trope-bundles constituting objects) are logically prior to tropes, because without objects tropes have nowhere to be \u2013 without objects (or the trope-bundles constituting objects) tropes cannot be. Moreover, as has I hope been shown, a trope cannot be in (or constitute) any object or trope-bundle other than that in which it already is.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

How might a trope theorist plausibly respond to this?  Can she? [My use of the feminine third-person singular pronoun does not signal my nonexistent political correctness, but is an anticipatory reference to Anna-Sofia Maurin whom I will discuss below.  'Anna-Sofia'! What a beautiful name, so aptronymic. Nomen est omen<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n

What are tropes?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

It is a 'Moorean fact,' a pre-analytic datum, that things have properties.  This is a pre-philosophical observation.  In making it we are not yet doing philosophy.  If things have properties, then there are properties.  This is a related pre-philosophical observation.  We begin  to do philosophy when we ask: given that there are properties, what exactly are they?  What is their nature?  How are we to understand them?  This is not the question, what properties are there, but the question, what are properties<\/em>?  The philosophical question, then, is not whether there are properties, nor is it the question what properties there are, but the question what properties are.<\/span><\/p>\n

On trope theory, properties are assayed not as universals but as particulars: the redness of a tomato is as particular, as unrepeatable, as the tomato. Thus a tomato is red, not in virtue of exemplifying a universal, but by having a redness trope as one of its constituents (on the standard  bundle version of trope theory) or by being a substratum in which a redness trope inheres (on a nonstandard theory championed by C. B. Martin which I will not further discuss). A trope is a simple entity in that there is no distinction between it and the property it \u2018has.\u2019 'Has' and cognates are words of ordinary English: they do not commit us to ontological theories of what the having consists in.  So don't confuse 'a<\/em> has F-ness' with 'a<\/em> instantiates F-ness.'  Instantiation is a term of art, a terminus technicus<\/em> in ontology.  Or at least that is what it is in my book.  More on instantiation in a moment.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus a redness trope is red, but it is not red by instantiating redness, or by having redness as a constituent, but by being (a bit of) redness. So a trope is<\/em> what it has<\/em>. It has redness by being identical to (a bit of) redness.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is therefore inaccurate to speak of tropes as property instances.  A trope is not a property instance on one clear understanding of the latter.  First-order instantiation is a dyadic asymmetrical relation: if a<\/em> instantiates F-ness, then it is not the case that F-ness instantiates a<\/em>.  (Higher order instantiation is not asymmetrical but  nonsymmetrical.  Exercise for the reader: prove it!)  Suppose the instantiation relation connects the individual Socrates here below to the universal wisdom in the realm of platonica.  Then a further item comes into consideration, namely, the wisdom of Socrates<\/em>. This is a property instance.  It is a particular, an unrepeatable, since it is the wisdom of Socrates<\/em> and of no one else. This distinguishes it from the universal, wisdom, which is repeated in each wise individual.  On the other side, the wisdom of Socrates is distinct from Socrates since there is more to Socrates that his being wise.  There is his being snub-nosed, etc.  Now why do I maintain that a trope is not a property instance? Two arguments. <\/span><\/p>\n

Tropes are simple, not complex.  (See Maurin, here<\/a>.)  They are not further analyzable.  Property instances, however, are complex, not simple.   'The F-ness of a<\/em>'  –  'the wisdom of Socrates,' e.g. — picks out a complex item that is analyzable into F-ness, a<\/em>, and the referent of 'of.'  Therefore, tropes are not property instances.<\/span><\/p>\n

A second, related,  argument.  Tropes are in no way proposition-like.  Property instances are proposition-like as can be gathered from the phrases we use to refer to them.  Ergo, tropes are not property instances. <\/span><\/p>\n

One can see from this that tropes on standard trope theory, as ably presented by Maurin in her Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, are very strange items, so strange indeed that one can wonder whether they are coherently conceivable at all by minds of our discursive constitution.  Here is one problem.<\/span><\/p>\n

How could anything be both predicable and impredicable?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Properties are predicable items.  So if tropes are properties, then tropes are predicable items.  If the redness of my tomato, call it 'Tom,'  is a trope, then this trope is predicable of Tom. Suppose I assertively utter a token of 'Tom is red.'  On one way of parsing this we have a subject term 'Tom' and a predicate term '___ is red.'  Thus the parsing: Tom\/is red.  But then the trope would appear to have a proposition-like structure, the structure of what Russell calls a propositional function.  Clearly, '___ is red' does not pick out a proposition, but it does pick out something proposition-like and thus something complex.  But now we have trouble since tropes are supposed to be simple.  Expressed as an aporetic triad or antilogism:<\/span><\/p>\n

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a. Tropes are simple.<\/span>
b. Tropes are predicable.<\/span>
c.  Predicable items are complex.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The limbs of the antilogism are each of them rationally supportable, but they cannot all be true. Individually plausible, collectively inconsistent. The conjunction of any two limbs entails the negation of the remaining one.  Thus the conjunction of (b) and (c) entails ~(a).<\/span><\/p>\n

We might try to get around this difficulty by parsing 'Tom is red' differently, as: Tom\/is\/red.  On this scheme, 'Tom' and 'red' are both names.  'Tom' names a concrete particular whereas 'red' names an abstract particular.  ('Abstract' is here being used in the classical, not the Quinean, sense.)   As Maurin relates, D. C. Williams, who introduced the term 'trope' in its present usage back in the '50s, thinks of the designators of tropes as akin to names and demonstratives, not as definite descriptions. But then it becomes difficult to see how tropes could be predicable entities. <\/span><\/p>\n

A tomato is not a predicable entity.  One cannot predicate a tomato of anything.  The same goes for the parts of a tomato; the seeds, e.g., are not predicable of anything.  Now if a tomato is a bundle of tropes, then it is a whole of ontological parts, these latter being tropes.  If we think of the tomato as a (full-fledged) substance, then the tropes constituting it are "junior substances." (See D. M. Armstrong, 1989, 115) But now the problem is: how can one and the same item — a trope –  be both a substance and a property, both an object and a concept (in Fregean jargon), both impredicable and predicable?  Expressed as an aporetic dyad or antinomy:<\/span><\/p>\n

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d. Tropes are predicable items.<\/span>
e. Tropes are not predicable items.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Maurin seems to think that the limbs of the dyad can both be true:  ". . . tropes are by their nature<\/em> such that they can be adequately categorized both<\/em> as a kind of property and<\/em> as a kind of substance."  If the limbs can both be true, then they are not contradictory despite appearances.<\/span><\/p>\n

How can we defuse the apparent contradiction in the d-e dyad?  Consider again Tom and the redness trope R.  To say that R is predicable of Tom  is to say that Tom is a trope bundle having R as an ontological (proper) part.  To say that R is impredicable or  a substance is to say that R is capable of independent existence.  Recall that Armstrong plausibly defines a substance as anything logically capable of independent existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

It looks as if we have just rid ourselves of the contradiction.  The sense in which tropes are predicable is not the sense in which they are impredicable.  They are predicable as constituents of trope bundles; they are impredicable in themselves. Equivalently, tropes are properties when they are compresent with sufficiently many other tropes to form trope bundles (concrete particulars); but they are substances in themselves apart from trope bundles as the 'building blocks' out of which such bundles are (logically or rather ontologically) constructed.<\/span><\/p>\n

Which came first: the whole or the parts?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

But wait!  This solution appears to have all the advantages of jumping from the frying pan into the fire.   For now we bang up against the above Antinomy, or something like it, to wit:<\/span><\/p>\n

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f. Tropes as substances, as ontological building blocks, are logically prior to concrete particulars.<\/span>
g. Tropes as properties, as predicable items, are not logically prior to concrete particulars.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This looks like an aporia <\/em>in the strict and narrow sense: an insoluble problem.  The limbs cannot both be true.  And yet each is an entailment of standard (bundle) trope theory.  If tropes are the "alphabet of being" in a phrase from Williams, then they are logically prior to what they spell out.  But if tropes are unrepeatable properties, properties as particulars, then a trope cannot exist except as a proper ontological part of a trope bundle, the very one of which it is a part.  For if a trope were not tied to the very bundle of which it is a part, it would be a universal, perhaps only an immanent universal, but a universal all the same. <\/span><\/p>\n

Furthermore, what makes a trope abstract in the classical (as opposed to Quinean) sense of the term is that it is abstracted from a concretum.  But then the concretum comes first, ontologically speaking, and (g) is true.<\/span><\/p>\n

Interim conclusion: Trope theory, pace<\/em> Anna-Sofia Maurin, is incoherent. But of course we have only scratched the surface. <\/span><\/p>\n

Pictured below, left-to-right:  Anna-Sofia Maurin, your humble correspondent, Arianna Betti, Jan Willem Wieland. Geneva, Switzerland, December 2008.  It was a cold night.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Maurin,<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
<\/a>Armstrong, Quine, Universals, Abstract Objects, and Naturalism<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>Peter van Inwagen, "A Theory of Properties," Exposition and Critique<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>Atheism and Ontological Simplicity: A Retraction and a Repair<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>God and Mann: Divine Simplicity and Property-Instances<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>God, Simplicity, and Tropes<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>Tropes as Truth-Makers? Or Do We Need Facts?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
<\/a>In a Philosophical Conversation, Three's a Crowd<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Elliot C. asked me about tropes. What follows is a re-post from 30 March 2016, slightly emended, which stands up well under current scrutiny.  Perhaps Elliot will find the time to tell me whether he finds it clear and convincing and whether it answers his questions. ………………………….. A reader  has been much exercised of late … Continue reading “Trope Troubles: An Exercise in Aporetics”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21,487,84,89],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1531","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aporetics","category-constituent-ontology","category-predication","category-trope-theory"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1531","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1531"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1531\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1531"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1531"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1531"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}