{"id":12837,"date":"2009-02-01T13:59:53","date_gmt":"2009-02-01T13:59:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/02\/01\/epistemicdoxastic-possibility\/"},"modified":"2009-02-01T13:59:53","modified_gmt":"2009-02-01T13:59:53","slug":"epistemicdoxastic-possibility","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/02\/01\/epistemicdoxastic-possibility\/","title":{"rendered":"Epistemic\/Doxastic Possibility"},"content":{"rendered":"

Recent forays into the metaphysics and epistemology of modality require us to be quite clear about the senses  of 'possible,'  necessary,'  and the other modal words in play.  In the contexts mentioned, these words are not being used epistemically or doxastically.  <\/p>\n

Is Joan in her office? If I ask you, you might reply, "It's possible." Or if I ask you, "Is Zorn's Lemma logically independent of the Axiom of Choice" you might reply, "It's possible." We need to clarify these uses of 'possible.'<\/p>\n

The second example illustrates how a state of affairs can be epistemically possible but not really possible. If subject S has a limited knowledge of set theory, then it will be possible 'for all S knows' that the lemma and the axiom be independent. But as a matter of fact, they are provably equivalent. So in this case what is epistemically possible is really impossible. <\/div>\n
 <\/div>\n
Examples like this can be generated ad libitum.<\/em>  Can a set T have a proper subset that is the same size (same cardinality) as T?  Many will say, "It's impossible."  But that response reflects their ignorance of Cantorian set theory.  Accordingly, their use of 'impossible' is epistemic.  It is impossible for all they know, but possible nonetheless.  It's possible because it's actual.<\/div>\n

\n

In the case of Joan, it may be possible 'for all you know' that she is in her office. But it will be really impossible if she died on her way to work. But suppose she didn't die, and suppose she is on campus near her office but the only thing preventing her from being in her office is her aversion to the place. Then, it will be epistemically possible for you that Joan be in her office, but also really possible that she be there.<\/p>\n

So what do we mean by epistemic possibility?   The examples suggest that epistemic possibilities are possibilities parasitic upon ignorance.  I propose the following definition for discussion and possible<\/em> refutation:<\/p>\n

State of affairs X is epistemically\/doxastically possible for subject S =df X is logically consistent with what S knows\/believes.<\/strong><\/p>\n

My earlier talk about possibilities is to be understood as talk about real, not epistemic\/doxastic, possibilities.  I don't deny that there are outstanding puzzles about real (i.e., mind-independent)possibilities, what they are and how they are known.  But the negative point that they are not to be confused with epistemic or doxastic possibilities is a step in the right direction.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Recent forays into the metaphysics and epistemology of modality require us to be quite clear about the senses  of 'possible,'  necessary,'  and the other modal words in play.  In the contexts mentioned, these words are not being used epistemically or doxastically.  Is Joan in her office? If I ask you, you might reply, "It's possible." … Continue reading “Epistemic\/Doxastic Possibility”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[235],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12837","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-modal-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12837","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12837"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12837\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12837"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12837"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12837"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}