{"id":12835,"date":"2009-02-02T16:27:08","date_gmt":"2009-02-02T16:27:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/02\/02\/back-to-parmenides-binswangers-defense-of-rands-block-universe\/"},"modified":"2009-02-02T16:27:08","modified_gmt":"2009-02-02T16:27:08","slug":"back-to-parmenides-binswangers-defense-of-rands-block-universe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/02\/02\/back-to-parmenides-binswangers-defense-of-rands-block-universe\/","title":{"rendered":"Back to Parmenides: Binswanger’s Defense of Rand’s Block Universe"},"content":{"rendered":"

In response to Harry Binswanger, I wrote<\/a>:<\/p>\n

My diagnosis of our disagreement is as follows. You think that what is causally necessitated (e.g. the lunar craters) is broadly-logically necessary (BL-necessary) whereas I think that what is causally necessitated is broadly-logically contingent. Because you think that what is causally necessitated is BL-necessary, you naturally think that my having my hat on is not causally necessitated. If I've understood you correctly, you do not deny that there are BL-contingent events, an example being my freely choosing to put on my hat. What you deny is that there are any BL-contingent events in nature (the realm of the non-man-made).<\/span><\/p>\n

Your scheme makes sense if (i) time is [metrically] infinite in the past direction; (ii) nature always existed; (iii) nature exists of BL-necessity (also known in the trade as metaphysical necessity) and nothing about nature is BL-contingent. On these assumptions, every event is BL-necessary. Add to that the assumption that every event in nature is causally determined, and we get the extensional equivalence of the causally necessitated and the BL-necessary. Man-made facts, which you grant are BL-contingent, are not causally necessitated because, for you, X is causally necessitated if and only if X is BL-necessary.<\/span><\/p>\n

If the foregoing expresses your view, then I think I have isolated the source of our disagreement: we disagree over (iii). I see no reason to accept it. Do you have an argument?<\/span><\/p>\n

Binswanger responded<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Your "diagnosis" is correct in spirit. I have quarrels over formulation, but there's no need to discuss them here. So we disagree about (iii): the existence of nature is logically necessary and nothing about nature is logically contingent.<\/span><\/p>\n

You ask for an argument for that. Well, the first part is axiomatic: "existence exists." What makes that logically necessary? The fact that "existence doesn't exist" is a contradiction. "What is, is; what is not, is not" Parmenides wisely said. <\/span><\/p>\n

The second part is non-axiomatic, and derives from causality. Objectivism holds that causality is the application of the law of identity to action. Things do what they do because they are what they are. For the fragile to act as non-fragile would be the same kind of contradiction as for glass to be not glass. This view of causality rejects the Humean event-to-event idea of causation (which actually originated with Telesio, I believe). We go back to the pre-Renaissance (broadly Greek) view of causation as a relation between entities and their actions.<\/span><\/p>\n


\n<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

It looks as if we have achieved a bit of agreement: we agree on what we disagree about.  Binswanger maintains that the existence of nature is logically necessary and nothing about nature is logically contingent.  I deny this thesis, or rather I see no good reason to accept it, which is why I asked for an argument.  Binswanger's argument is this:   "Existence exists." What makes that logically necessary? The fact that "existence doesn't exist" is a contradiction. "What is, is; what is not, is not" Parmenides wisely said. <\/font><\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

Binswanger is telling us that the existence of nature is logically necessary because "existence doesn't exist" is a contradiction.  Well, it is certainly true that<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

1. 'Things that exist do not exist' is a logical contradiction.<\/strong> And it it  true that <\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

2. The Moon is one of the things that exist.<\/strong>  But it does not follow from (1) and (2) that<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

3. 'The Moon does not exist' is a logical contradiction.  <\/strong><\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

Why is this a non sequitur<\/em>?  First of all, if an argument has true premises and a false conclusion, then it cannot be valid.  We know from Logic 101 that validity is truth-preserving.  (3) is false because the logical form of 'The Moon does not exist,' i.e. a does not exist,<\/em> where 'a' is a nonvacuous individual constant, admits of both true and false substitution-instances.  But the logical form of 'Things that exist do not exist,' i.e. Things that are F are not F<\/em>, does not admit of both true and false substitution-instances:  no matter what is substituted for 'F,' a falsehood results.<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

Because the nonexistence of the Moon is not logically contradictory, the existence of the Moon is not logically necessary.  What is true of the Moon is true of every natural thing:  No natural thing is such that its existence is logically necessary.  Since nature is just the totality of natural things, the existence of nature is not logically necessary.<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

Here is another way to see why Binswanger's argument is invalid.  There are philosophers who maintain that (a) everything that exists is logically contingent.  That is, they maintain with respect to each x that the nonexistence of x is logically possible, i.e., involves no logical contradiction.  These same philosophers also maintain, as they must, that (b) everything that exists exists.<\/span><\/font> It is obvious that (a) and (b) are logically consistent.  This implies that one cannot validly move from<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

4. Necessarily, whatever exists exists<\/strong><\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

to<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

5. Whatever exists necessarily exists.<\/strong><\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

And surely this is a fallacious move. I've pointed out this modal fallacy more than once.  Objectivists seems to have a real weakness for it.  It goes hand-in-glove with their strange notion that substantive metaphysical theses can be squeezed out of mere logical truths.<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

Now if an argument for a thesis is bad, it doesn't follow that there is no good argument for the thesis.  So let me ask Binswanger one more: Is there a good reason to accept the proposition that, as he puts it, "the existence of nature is logically necessary"?  There is no point in discussing his other point about causality if no good answer to this question is forthcoming.<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/font> <\/p>\n

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<\/span><\/font> <\/p>\n

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<\/span><\/font> <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In response to Harry Binswanger, I wrote: My diagnosis of our disagreement is as follows. You think that what is causally necessitated (e.g. the lunar craters) is broadly-logically necessary (BL-necessary) whereas I think that what is causally necessitated is broadly-logically contingent. Because you think that what is causally necessitated is BL-necessary, you naturally think that … Continue reading “Back to Parmenides: Binswanger’s Defense of Rand’s Block Universe”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,235,175],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12835","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-modal-matters","category-rand-ayn"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12835","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12835"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12835\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12835"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12835"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12835"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}