{"id":12803,"date":"2009-02-21T18:20:10","date_gmt":"2009-02-21T18:20:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/02\/21\/is-every-consciousness-a-consiousness-of-what-exists\/"},"modified":"2009-02-21T18:20:10","modified_gmt":"2009-02-21T18:20:10","slug":"is-every-consciousness-a-consiousness-of-what-exists","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/02\/21\/is-every-consciousness-a-consiousness-of-what-exists\/","title":{"rendered":"Consciousness and Existence: Is Every Consciousness a Consciousness of What Exists?"},"content":{"rendered":"

What follows in purple are <\/font>two quotations<\/font><\/a> (from separate works) from the <\/font>Ayn Rand Lexicon<\/font><\/a>.  <\/font><\/p>\n

If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness. (FNI, 124)<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n

Directly or indirectly, every phenomenon of consciousness is derived from one\u2019s awareness of the external world. Some object, i.e.<\/em>, some content<\/em>, is involved in every state of awareness. Extrospection is a process of cognition directed outward\u2014a process of apprehending some existent(s) of the external world. Introspection is a process of cognition directed inward\u2014a process of apprehending one\u2019s own psychological actions in regard to some existent(s) of the external world, such actions as thinking, feeling, reminiscing, etc. It is only in relation to the external world that the various actions of a consciousness can be experienced, grasped, defined or communicated. Awareness is awareness of something. A content-less state of consciousness is a contradiction in terms. (ITOE, 37)<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n

This sort of writing is typical of Rand and Peikoff, et al.  It is confused and confusing and will be dismissed out of hand by most philosophers.  Yet there may be a solid point here that someone like Harry Binswanger could develop and make persuasive. It is clear from the above passages and others that Rand wants to show that there exist entities that are transcendent of consciousness.  Indeed, she wants to show that the denial of such transcendent entities is self-contradictory.  But how will she achieve this goal?<\/font><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n

We are told that "A content-less state of consciousness is a contradiction in terms." Since Rand is using 'content' and 'object' interchangeably, what she is saying is that an object-less state of consciousness is a contradiction in terms.  But this won't get her to her goal unless she confuses intentional objects with existents transcendent of consciousness.  I<\/span><\/span>t is a plain fact that we are often conscious of objects that do not exist. From<\/span><\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

1. Every consciousness is a consciousness of something<\/font><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

one cannot validy infer<\/font><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Every consciousness is a consciousness of something that exists.<\/font><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

That (1) is true is not self-evident, though I will concede its truth for the space of this discussion.  For it is not self-evident that every<\/em> conscious state is an intentional state as the philosophers say, a state that it directed upon an object.  Brentano thought so, but his great student Husserl held that some conscious states are non-intentional. See <\/font>Are There Non-Intentional Mental States?<\/font><\/a>  <\/font><\/span><\/span>But (2) is plainly false.  Suppose Tom is in state of desire.  Desire is a state of consciousness.  And it is a state of consciousness that is object-directed.  One cannot desire without desiring something.  Perhaps it is a matter transmitter that Tom desires.  Clearly, from the fact that Tom desires a matter transmitter, it does not follow that there exists an x such that x is a matter transmitter and Tom desires x.  Or suppose Tom is imagining his dream lover.  One cannot imagine without imagining something.  The act of imagining 'takes an accusative,' has an object.  We call this the intentional object of the act.  But surely it is obvious that from the fact that Tom is imagining a girl of such-and-such a description it  does not follow that there exists a girl of such-and-such a description!<\/font><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

The point I have just made about (2) not following from (1) is a commonplace.  There is nothing 'original' about it and nothing controversial.  Now re-read the first sentence of the first quotation above.  Rand appears to be denying the commonplace point.  Not good!  Can we be blamed when we label her an amateur?<\/font><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

It is therefore manifestly false that every consciousness is a consciousness of something that exists, that every act of consciousness by its very nature as an act of consciousness entails the mind-independent existence of its intentional object.  Nevertheless, there is another thesis is the vicinity which is perhaps defensible.  This is a thesis, not about particular acts of consciousness, but about consciousness in general:<\/font><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

3. Consciousness cannot exist unless there are entities that exist independently of consciousness.<\/font><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

But (1) is not quite what Rand wants to say since (1) would be satisfied if conscious beings are the only entities that exist independently of consiousness. What she wants to say is something like<\/font><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

3*. Consciousness cannot exist unless some of the objects of consciousness exist independently of any consciousness.<\/font><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

(3*), unlike (2), is defensible, or at least it is not obviously indefensible.  Now if Dr Binswanger can present us with a pithy, rigorous argument for (3*), then I will be much obliged and we will have something concrete to discuss.  But please no quoting from the Holy Scriptures.  Just a nice tight argument that an analytically-inclined but open-minded contemporary philosopher can wrap his mind around. I realize that Drs. Binswanger and Gordon are worrying these bones in another thread, but a succinct presentation of Binswanger's case for the above thesis would be helpful.<\/font><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/font><\/span><\/span> <\/p>\n

<\/font><\/span><\/span> <\/p>\n

<\/span><\/span> <\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

What follows in purple are two quotations (from separate works) from the Ayn Rand Lexicon.  If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, … Continue reading “Consciousness and Existence: Is Every Consciousness a Consciousness of What Exists?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,100,54,175],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12803","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-intentionality","category-mind","category-rand-ayn"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12803","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12803"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12803\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12803"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12803"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12803"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}