{"id":12768,"date":"2009-03-07T07:36:54","date_gmt":"2009-03-07T07:36:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/03\/07\/the-twofold-sense-of-the-actual-world\/"},"modified":"2009-03-07T07:36:54","modified_gmt":"2009-03-07T07:36:54","slug":"the-twofold-sense-of-the-actual-world","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/03\/07\/the-twofold-sense-of-the-actual-world\/","title":{"rendered":"The Two-Fold Sense of ‘The Actual World’"},"content":{"rendered":"

A correspondent poses the following difficulty:<\/font><\/p>\n

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\n

. . . compare two possible worlds W1 and W2. What makes them different worlds? Their constituent substances and events \u2013 that\u2019s how we identify a world. Let\u2019s say that W1 and W2 are distinct possible worlds, and add that A, the actual world, is in fact W1. [. . .] And then we seem to have a problem: It turns out that W1 = A, but W1 \u2260 W2. But if we say that A could have been W2, then it seems that W1 could have been W2 \u2013 but that\u2019s impossible, given the necessity of identity. What to do, what to do . . . . <\/font><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n

Think about how you would respond to this before proceeding.<\/font><\/p>\n

\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n

I believe that the above is a pseudoproblem engendered by a failure to distinguish between 'A' used as a proper name or Kripkean rigid designator, and 'A' used as a definite description. Although there is and can be only one actual world, every world is possibly such that it is actual. Suppose that 'A' names, i.e., rigidly designates, our world, the world that happens to be actual. Then from the fact that other worlds could have been actual, it does not follow that any of these other worlds could have been identical to A. What follows is merely that they could have been actual.   'The actual world' is ambiguous.  It could be used as a substitute for the rigid designator 'A,' or it could be used as a definite description that is satisfied by whichever world happens to be actual.  The following is a consistent set of propositions: <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n

1. W1 is actual
2. Necessarily, W1 \u2260 W2
3. Possibly, W2 is actual
<\/font><\/p>\n

This also is a consistent set:
<\/font><\/p>\n

4. A = W1
5. Necessarily, W1 \u2260 W2
3. Possibly, W2 is actual
<\/font><\/p>\n

To appreciate the ambiguity, consider the question, 'Is the actual world necessarily actual?' If 'the actual world' is a rigid designator of our world, the world that happens to be actual, then the answer is in the negative: the actual world is not necessarily actual since it could have been non-actual. If, on the other hand, 'the actual world' is a definite description satisfied by whichever world happens to be actual, then the answer to the question is in the affirmative: the actual world is necessarily actual.<\/font><\/p>\n

The ambiguity also infects 'Possibly, the actual world is not actual.'  It is possible that A not be actual, but it is not possible that the world that happens to be actual not be actual.<\/font><\/p>\n

Consider a more mundane example illustrative of the same sort of ambiguity. 'Is the president of the U.S. necessarily the commander-in-chief of the armed forces?'  Yes, if 'the president of the U.S.' is used de dicto<\/em> of whomever happens to be president of the U. S.; no, if the phrase is used de re<\/em> of the current office-holder, at the moment Barack Obama.  Surely Mr. Obama is not commander-in-chief  of the U.S. in every possible world in which he exists. <\/font><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A correspondent poses the following difficulty: . . . compare two possible worlds W1 and W2. What makes them different worlds? Their constituent substances and events \u2013 that\u2019s how we identify a world. Let\u2019s say that W1 and W2 are distinct possible worlds, and add that A, the actual world, is in fact W1. [. … Continue reading “The Two-Fold Sense of ‘The Actual World’”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,235],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12768","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-language-matters","category-modal-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12768","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12768"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12768\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12768"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12768"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12768"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}