{"id":12653,"date":"2009-05-05T19:49:42","date_gmt":"2009-05-05T19:49:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/05\/05\/the-value-of-consciousness\/"},"modified":"2009-05-05T19:49:42","modified_gmt":"2009-05-05T19:49:42","slug":"the-value-of-consciousness","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/05\/05\/the-value-of-consciousness\/","title":{"rendered":"The Value of Consciousness"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">If you are ever in Flagstaff, Arizona in search of a coffee house, I recommend <\/font><a href=\"http:\/\/www.macyscoffee.net\/index.html\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Macy&#39;s<\/font><\/a><font face=\"Georgia\">.&#0160; I met up with Peter Lupu there on Saturday and an excellent discussion ensued fueled in part by by&#0160;my triple espresso con panna and his triple latte.&#0160; We discussed consciousness, its existence, meaning, and value.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p><font face=\"Georgia\"><\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">We agreed that consciousness exists, that it cannot be intelligibly viewed as an illusion.&#0160; We also agreed that it cannot be reduced to the physical.&#0160; Thus we agreed that it can neither be eliminated nor identified with the physical.&#0160; We also seemed to agree that identifications collapse into eliminations.&#0160; And of course we also agreed that consciousness <em>as we normally experience it<\/em> is tied to a physical substratum.&#0160; Our main disagreement concerned the nature of the tie.&#0160; Peter thinks of consciousness as necessarily tied to its physical substratum so that a particular synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness cannot exist apart from a living brain\/body.&#0160; If I understood Peter, his view is that consciousness and self-consciousness are emergent from matter but not reducible to it.&#0160; So his position could be called nonreductive physicalism.&#0160; The most interesting way to develop this would be in terms of the view that consciousness is not an emergent <em>property<\/em> but an emergent <em>substance<\/em>.&#0160; Thus&#0160;a person&#39;s&#0160;consciousness would be a genuine individual unity with irreducible causal powers,&#0160;but one which somehow emerges from its material base while remaining necessarily&#0160;tied to it for its&#0160;continuing existence.&#0160; By contrast, I take seriously the possibility of a particular unity of consciousness existing apart from a material&#0160;substratum.&#0160; This possibility could be cashed out it dualist&#0160;terms or in idealist terms.&#0160; Either way, the <em>necessary<\/em> ontological dependence of mind on matter is denied.&#0160; <\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Our discussion then took an axiological turn:&#0160; what is the <em>value<\/em> of consciousness, especially if it serves no evolutionary purpose?&#0160; (We seem to have agreed that it does not serve such a purpose, that human animals like us could have evolved without ever becoming conscious, self-conscious, and morally sensitive.) I took Peter to be proposing something like the following axiological thesis about consciousness:<\/font><\/p>\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\">\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><em><font face=\"Georgia\">ATC. Even if consciousness does not have a higher origin &#8212; does not bespeak a spiritual nature in us capable of surviving the destruction of&#0160;the physical vehicle &#8212; but is emergent from and dependent necessarily upon matter, it is <strong>good<\/strong> that conscious beings exist even with all t<span id=\"fck_dom_range_temp_1241569055343_937\"><\/span>he evils that consciousness brings in its train such as pain, meaninglessness, alienation, misunderstanding, ignorance, hatred, fear, horror, unresolved questions, etc.<\/font><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"text-align: justify; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px\"><font face=\"Georgia\">To focus the issue, consider two possible worlds which are alike except for the following&#0160;difference.&#0160; &#0160; In W1, consciousness arises as a fluke of evolution.&#0160; Unities of consciousness are emergent entities but dependent on matter for their existence and so all of them are slated for destruction.&#0160; There is&#0160;no redemption for the billions upon billions of those who have suffered and suffered meaninglessly.&#0160; There is no final solution, no answer, no exit except annihilation.&#0160; In W2, consciousness never emerges.&#0160; The universe remains &#39;dark.&#39;&#0160; There are human animals but they are (philosophical) zombies.&#0160; Now which world do you prefer if you are forced to choose between the two? Which world <em>should<\/em> you prefer?&#0160; Assuming that W1 is actual, would it have been better if W2 had been actual?&#0160; <\/font><\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"text-align: justify; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px\"><font face=\"Georgia\">I prefer W2 over W1. Peter prefers W1 over W2.&#0160; Furthermore, Peter firmly believes that W1 is actual, whereas&#0160; for me it is an open question whether W1 is&#0160;actual.&#0160; So for me there&#0160;is hope: the hope that consciousness has a higher origin and that its continued existence (and equally important) its transfiguration or transformation&#0160;is possible. For Peter there can be no such hope.&#0160; But he feels he needs no such hope to live well here and now.&#0160; I say he doesn&#39;t really appreciate how horrible conscious life is, when we judge it objectively, and not just in terms of our privileged instances of it.&#0160; So from my point of view, he is involved in a subtle self-deception: he evades&#0160;the true nature of our predicament.&#0160; Of course, he can easily turn the tables on me.&#0160; But I&#39;ll let him do that.<\/font><\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"text-align: justify; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px\"><font face=\"Georgia\"><\/font>&#0160;<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\"><\/font>&#0160;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>If you are ever in Flagstaff, Arizona in search of a coffee house, I recommend Macy&#39;s.&#0160; I met up with Peter Lupu there on Saturday and an excellent discussion ensued fueled in part by by&#0160;my triple espresso con panna and his triple latte.&#0160; We discussed consciousness, its existence, meaning, and value.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[54],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12653","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-mind"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12653","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12653"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12653\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12653"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12653"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12653"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}